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ABSTRACT
What value can be attached to a concept of mystery and has it a place 
in contemporary Western culture? 
Anne Harkin-Petersen
The idea for this thesis arose from a chain of reactions first set in motion by a 
particular experience. In keeping with the contemporary need to deconstruct every 
phenomenon it seemed important to analyse this experience in the hope of a 
satisfactory explanation. The experience referred to is the aesthetic experience 
provoked by works of art. The plan for the thesis involved trying to establish 
whether the aesthetic experience is unique and individual, or whether it is one that 
is experienced universally. Each question that arises in the course of this 
exploration promotes a dialectical reaction. I rely on the history of aesthetics as a 
philosophical discipline to supply the answers. This study concentrates on the 
efforts by philosophers and critical theorists to understand the tensions between 
the empirical and the emotional, the individual and the universal responses to the 
sociological, political and material conditions that prevail and are expressed 
through the medium of art. What I found is that the history of aesthetics is full of 
contradictory evidence and cannot provide a dogmatic solution to the questions 
posed. In fact what is indicated is that the mystery that attaches to the aesthetic 
experience is one that can also apply to the spiritual or transcendent experience. 
The aim of this thesis is to support the contribution of visual art in the spiritual 
well being of human development and supports the uniqueness of the evaluation 
and aesthetic judgement by the individual of a work of art. I suggest that mystery 
will continue to be of value in the holistic development of human beings and this 
mystery can be expressed through visual art. Furthermore, this thesis might 
suggest that what could be looked at is whether a work of art may be redemptive 
in its affect and offset the current decline in affective religious practice.
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Introduction:
The Tate Modem has one room set aside for nine paintings by twentieth century painter 
Mark Rothko. The first impressions on entering are that this room bears no resemblance 
to any other in the gallery. Little by little, it becomes clear what makes it different. In 
the first instance, the lighting is understated. There is no harsh illumination of the 
paintings on the walls. There is no stark demand by the lighting to draw attention to the 
work. Like the steady advance of a chromatic scale the body adjusts to the containment 
of the space. Initial apprehension is replaced with tranquillity. Gradually, and gently, an 
awareness o f the paintings intrudes upon the perceptive senses. Slowly it enters the 
psyche how huge these paintings are. Their size alone momentarily halts the 
comprehensive process and the paintings demand respect. The size o f each painting is 
considerable and while three have the same measurements, with the vertical side being 
the longest, two others are identical, but with greater length in the horizontal direction; 
another two are equal in vertical length to the first three mentioned, but the horizontal 
lengths do not conform to one another. The remaining two paintings have different 
measurements. All in all, it must be understood that only some element of conformity 
can be found as regards size. Therefore these are not presented as a series. The subtlety 
of each painting is unique.
To demonstrate the content of these paintings it may be helpful to examine one in detail. 
Plate 1, simply titled, Black on Maroon, measures 266.7 x 457.2 cm, is a rectangular oil 
painting on canvas. The colours, in this particular instance are of maroon and black. 
They merge in and out of one another, in unequal measure along the borders of the 
painting. Where one colour begins, and the other ends, is not clearly defined. What 
could be described as two cloudy maroon panels, pillars, or figures o f unequal width but 
corresponding depth, appear to hover above, or present themselves as somehow external 
to the black background, which itself, seems to float out from a bed o f maroon. The 
brushstrokes imply a haphazard approach that might result in confusion but no such 
effect is felt. Dynamism coexists with an induction to calm. The effect is enigmatic.
The room is not empty, so the viewer is alerted to the fact that there is something 
intriguing about this space. What enters the viewer’s mind is an awareness of the
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inclination to stay, to find out, what it is about these paintings that others find so 
fascinating. What it is about these particular works that places them in such a 
prestigious setting, and, what is it about them that attracts and holds such attention. Can 
a link be made with some other occurrence where an awareness o f shared experience 
invites participation? What does this say about the intention of a work of art? Has the 
role o f art a wider value than either its monetary or sensory value? The viewer is alerted 
to a sense o f communal intrigue that these paintings obviously radiate.
With no intrusive change of rhythm, contradictions begin to challenge the 
understanding. Despite their large size the impact is non- threatening. The palette, for 
all nine paintings, is limited to black, maroon and red. But these colours exude a 
pulsation that is spellbinding, rather like the persistent rhythm of a Bach prelude. The 
invitation to become involved is proffered and accepted. By now, accustomed to the 
dim atmosphere, the viewer becomes aware that these canvases contain little or no overt 
representation or recognizable symbol. They are simplicity itself, it seems. Bands o f oil 
colour of various depths and widths, in maroon and black and red, sometimes 
horizontal, sometimes vertical. Yet their affect is anything but simple. The challenges 
continue.
The experience is one where the viewer may become lost in reverie, from deep within 
excitement stirs, and fires the imagination. The oppositions remain. The experience is 
overwhelming, and unforgettable, soothing and exhilarating. The seductive invitation to 
linger, and participate, grows stronger while, all the while, the viewer is being drawn 
step by step, into an enthralled trance. The ritual, between the viewer and the paintings, 
rises and falls, like the rhythm of a dance. A dance, that reaches to a crescendo of joy 
and excitement, and falls to the depths of contemplation and reverie. The incorporation 
of the viewer is complete.
Reluctantly, and with conscious effort, the viewer leaves the space. The euphoric 
feeling is carefully deposited to the safekeeping o f the memory. But it refuses to lie 
dormant. The initial reaction, to hold this remarkable experience within the safety o f the 
individual mind, is superseded by the desire to share the experience with others. But, the 
problem that the viewer encounters is, that such an experience defies logic. Logic 
demands that an explanation for all phenomena ought to be possible. Where can the
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viewer seek an explanation? Is there any connection to be made between this and any 
other known experience?
The questions tumble over one another in an effort to identify what exactly about these 
works o f art has induced such a reaction. Can all works o f art activate such a response 
in the viewer? Does the responsibility to produce this affect depend on the artist alone? 
Reason dictates that such experiences must have been recorded previously. What can be 
lcamt from history? Can everyone enjoy this experience? If, a work of art, can induce 
such a transcendental experience, surely then it must form an important constituent to 
essential considerations regarding human development. Can such an experience have 
any relevance in a society that is driven by empirical and material imperatives?
An inducement to reverie could be considered an essential component o f the experience 
of the Rothko paintings. In this case, the paintings act as a catalyst that encourages an 
experience, which may be analogous with the experience o f mystery. It would seem 
reasonable therefore that, the history of art, might be the first and obvious source to 
discover what criteria are necessary to invoke such a response. Aesthetics, the 
philosophical branch of art history, should elicit the best information. Uncovering, 
within the history of art, a record of similarly described experiences, ought to validate 
their authenticity. While establishing the historical validation o f the aesthetic 
experience, a natural evolution might be the possibility of links with other known 
experiences. Traditionally, a reverential experience is induced by a deeply ritualistic or 
spiritual moment.
The anticipation of this journey is exciting, and promises all the elements of adventure 
and curiosity, a search through time, wondering what will be uncovered along the way. 
It remains to be seen whether such a decision will provide satisfactory answers to the 
questions posited.
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Chapter I: Circumstantial evidence in support of the aesthetic 
experience:
A suggestion o f a puzzling or mysterious factor is introduced through the experience of 
the Rothko images. In order to establish a base from which to progress, it is important to 
look at the documented evidence of how, the idea of mystery infiltrates and impinges 
upon the history of human growth. The following investigation should establish the 
growth and development o f aesthetic theory. It should also clarify, the divergent 
approaches by philosophy to an understanding o f mystery, from ancient times to the 
present day.
Each person may have a particular idea o f what the word mystery conjures up. Mystery 
has several connotations, such as apprehension, anticipation, excitement, dread, 
curiosity, endlessness, and transcendence. These features can be linked with the means 
that are used to express mystery, e.g. myth, magic, religion, ritual, allegory and 
symbol1. Perhaps a simple definition could be that mystery is what is partly 
understandable but never completely understood.
As a painter, this expedition can be equated with the beginning o f a new work of art, 
which usually requires a concept, deep contemplation in and around this concept, then 
having already sought out certain tools with which to operate, beginning the work. 
What invariably happens is, that the work itself acquires an impetus of its own, which 
may or may not follow strictly along the lines of what was the original objective, but 
does offer wonderful surprises and excitement along the way. What immediately 
springs to mind is adventure, a seeking out of information, a journey undertaken in 
order to arrive at a culminating point, but in reality, arriving at a signpost to another 
destination. The history o f aesthetics is analogous with this journey and therefore 
constitutes an adventure, which will undoubtedly produce several exciting paths for 
exploration.
Concern surrounding the aesthetic poses an intriguing conundrum, for both the scholar, 
and any person who affords time to a contemplative attitude to the mystery of life. As 
aesthetic theory is uncovered it will, hopefully, become clear, from all the research, how
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many theories are tabled, and how debate vacillates from one position to another. 
However, despite the emergence of different criteria, hopefully it will become obvious 
that one constant remains, and that is, that philosophers and critical theorists still find 
the question of aesthetics a fascinating one.
For the purposes o f this essay it is not possible to research every philosopher whose 
work has had serious impact upon the development of aesthetic thought, however, those 
whose work is considered as being of tremendous importance includes, from Ancient 
times Plato (427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322BC) and Plotinus (205-70BC). From the 
Middle Ages, Augustine (354-430), and Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274). From the 
Renaissance Marcilio Ficino(l433-1499) and the philosophy o f Neo Platonism together 
with such theorists as Leone Battista Alberti (1404-1472) Albrecht Durer (1471-1528) 
and Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).2
For a philosophy of the period known as the Enlightenment, the theories of such 
protagonists as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
(1770-1831) are considered. Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) Walter Benjamin (1892- 
1940), Theodor Adorno,(1903-1969) Georg Lucaks (1885-1971),Soren Kierkegaard 
(1815-1859)Friedrich Nietsche (1844-1900) Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976) Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) Albert Camus (1913-1960) 
Clement Freud (1856-1939) and Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) and critics Roger Fry 
(1866-1934), Clive Bell (1881-1964), from the Modem era. Roland Barthes(1915- 
1980), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Jean Francois Lyotard (1924-1998), Umberto Eco 
(1932-), Jean Baudrillard (1929-), Jurgen Habermas (1929-), Edward Said (1935-2003) 
and Hal Foster from the Postmodern period.
Perhaps it is helpful to be reminded at this point, what the term "aesthetics', as given in 
the Dictionary o f Philosophy, means
‘the study o f  what is immediately pleasing to our visual or auditory perception 
or to our imagination; the study o f  the nature o f  beauty; also, the theory o f  taste 
and criticism in the creative and performing arts ’3
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Some other terms that may require clarification are, ‘a p rio ri’, from what is earlier; or 
prior to the formulation of, ‘'ontology’ the branch o f metaphysics that deals with the 
enquiry into the theory o f Being in the capacity o f Being; ‘metaphysics' the theory that 
deals with first principles especially o f being and knowing, concerned with that which 
lies beyond nature, e.g. the existence of God; ‘epistemology' theory of knowledge 
especially the critical study o f its validity, methods and scope; ‘ teleology ’ theory which 
describes in terms of purposes e.g. the evidence o f purpose or design in the universe and 
especially that this provides proof o f the existence of a Designer; ‘ theology ’ inquiry into 
the teachings and practices o f religious doctrine or practices; ‘ transcendent’ beyond the 
limits of any world experience.
Aesthetics is first considered to constitute a legitimate branch o f philosophy by 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762). Between 1750 and 1758 he published 
Aesthetica, the first text solely focused on formulating a comprehensive theory o f 
aesthetics, including a theory o f perception. But the subject of beauty and its constituent 
parts certainly occupied an important role for the ancient Greeks, as delineated by 
Monroe Beardsley in his history o f aesthetics. As Beardsley points out, debates about 
art go back further than Plato (427-347BC) but it would appear, that the latter 
formulated questions about art and its merits more concisely than his predecessors.4
Development o f a natural science and a natural philosophy give some indication of the 
beginning of both an aesthetic, and a critical theory as explored by Homer, Hesiod (750 
BC) and the Pythagorians (c 582-507).5 But it is in Platonian philosophy that the 
formulation of certain important questions may be found. Homer (c.700 BC), and his 
contemporaries, record their interest in the relationship between creation o f the world, 
the artist’s creative power, and the mystery attached to both, long before Plato (427-347 
BC), according to Beardsley. They also make concerted attempts to answer questions 
relating to aesthetic theory and metaphysical concerns.
In the first instance, Plato finds it extremely puzzling why the arts o f music and drama 
should exist at all. Broadly speaking, Plato’s position as regards intelligent productive 
work, to which category the arts belong, involves a plan therefore all production is 
imitation. Consequently art is imitation6.
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One o f the main thrusts o f Platonian philosophy is the principle of Ideal Form. Plate 2, 
(Classical Greek sculpture showing ideal proportion). Again, according to Beardsley, 
Ideal Forms, or an Ideal Form of Beauty ‘ exists, or subsists, in a realm distinct from  the
7 •empirical world’ Plato believes that all Form is in the mind a priori. Whatever 
representation or imitation can stimulate the intellect to recall Ideal Form, acts as an 
instrument to reunite the human with the divine or transcendental nature for which it 
ultimately yearns.8
If we are to take Plato’s position that everyone is bom with an a priori knowledge of 
Form, it should follow that criteria set out by Plato to stimulate the viewer should be 
sufficient to transcend the individual. By adopting Plato’s understanding o f 
representation, as being only important in so far as it imitates Form, it would seem 
logical that the most beneficial way for representation is to progress from the purely 
sensuous to a more ontological understanding. This understanding would then lead to 
an eventual transcendental or out o f this world experience through the image presented, 
taking the concept o f Ideal Form as being the basis o f the representation.
It is understandable therefore, how a pupil o f the Plato Academy contributes to the 
effort to solve basic questions surrounding phenomena. According to Beardsley, this 
key figure in the history o f classical aesthetics is Aristotle (384-322). A substantive 
portion o f Aristotle’s study relies on logic. His interest involves the working out in 
sequential thought how ultimate realities are constituted. Through logical debate, 
Aristotle acknowledges the imitative aspect o f the arts, and recognises it to be natural to 
humankind. Aristotle distinguishes and celebrates m an’s ability to reason. While 
acknowledging man is intelligent, and acknowledging that man believes a deity to be 
the prime mover and creator, Aristotle considers that man’s salvation is due in a large 
part to his being able to reason out why, in other words, for what purpose man is 
created. He formulates his conclusions by systematically working through four types of 
explanation or causes, material, formal, productive agent, and the end for which 
something is made.9 Aristotle questions Plato’s position concerning Ideal Forms and 
suggests that Form may be the soul.10 The concept o f soul has implications that are far 
more inclusive than the concept o f Ideal Form. Ideal Form implies containment or a 
cognitive grasp o f concrete substance that is not usually attributed to the concept of 
soul. Soul implies an expanse o f spirit that has potential to expand into wider all
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encompassing parameters. Therefore, soul has a much richer concept than that o f Ideal 
Form.
Because Aristotles’ philosophy is more grounded in human discourse, it seems 
reasonable to make the assumption that, his position affords visual art an inclusive and 
universal role. It remains to be seen, whether one theory more than another, can be 
judged to be more accessible, more easily understood, and capable o f imparting more 
knowledge, or, whether a combination of both, might provide a more rounded outlook.
Many philosophers, at this time, are concerned with making sense out o f metaphysics. 
Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature o f reality and is concerned 
with such questions as the existence of God.11 One such individual is Plotinus (205-70 
BC), who extends Platonism in the third century. He widens the parameters o f the 
understanding of representation, and opens up the possibility o f abstract concepts when 
he states
‘the soul takes joy  in recognizing its own nature objectified, and in thus
12becoming conscious o f  its own participation in divinity ’
Not only, does Plotinus believe in the metaphysical perfection o f artistic ideas, he also 
asserts, the artist, through his interior vision, manifests a particular understanding that 
embraces the fundamental principles o f nature.13 As a Neo-Platonist, Plotinus’ avers 
sign is no longer only a straightforward signifier; it takes on an unsolved quality.
Here we have three different approaches to mystery as expressed by the Classical 
Scholars; Plato espouses the a priori rationale o f Ideal Form; Artistotle concerns 
himself with the end for which man is created; and Plotinus’ believes in the perfection 
of artistic ideas. All three approaches relate to the mystery of the relationship between 
human beings and a creator. All three also question, from an aesthetic or art theory 
standpoint, how this relationship can best be expressed in visual terms.
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Beardsley claims, aesthetic research by Plotinus bridges the gap between the Classicists 
and the early Christian scholars.14 It is reliably established by art historians, that 
allegory and symbol are widely used in the Middle Ages15. Allegory can be understood 
as a story, which also can convey a deeper meaning, in addition to its apparent meaning. 
Symbol, can have two meanings; it can be an object or shape taken to represent 
something else, or an authoritative statement of religious faith.16 Beardsley indicates 
there is no great evidence to support the notion that specific attention is paid to an 
aesthetical theory per se.
War and Monasticism, are predominant features of reality in Europe in the Middle 
Ages. The reaction, to both conditions, is an awakening o f the imagination, which 
develops bodies of symbols to communicate ideas. Because symbol, can enlighten in a 
way that mere representation may not be able to, Umberto Eco points out, how symbols 
are employed so they ‘could make intelligible those doctrines which proved irksome in
>17their more abstract form  ’
Eco explains, that the Medieval theory o f art is a theory made up o f the capabilities of 
the human being to design, and the relation between that capability and how nature 
itself brings together the elements o f design18. In other words, a theory o f art exists that 
is based upon design and production. Accordingly, art is more concerned with 
construction than expression.19 So, art is constructed in such a way, that the use of 
allegory and symbol will express a moral or spiritual value, or exemplary idea that can 
be easily grasped. This exemplary idea is clear, and not complicated by the possibility 
of an emotive or subjective response.
This state o f affairs benefits both the lay and the academic. The unsophisticated convert
their beliefs into images, and the theorists construct their theories to the ordinary man.
  _ __
As E. H. Gombrich points out no text is quite as particular as an image can be. And so 
art can be perceived to retain its’ traditional didactic role, and that is to display truths in 
a cognitive manner to a general audience.
Beardsley, does point out how Christian influence promotes the idea of metaphysical 
symbolism. Metaphysical symbolism is understood to be Gods’ hand in everything. 
Therefore, it is taken for granted that, God is the creator of the universe. Consequently,
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one of the main anxieties of the Middle Ages is, to work out how God can be explained, 
and what is mans’ relationship with God. These issues have important consequences for 
works o f art, a theory of art, and aesthetics. Umberto Eco’s ‘Art and Beauty in the 
Middle Ages’ offers a good guide to the aesthetic climate o f this period.
But, medieval theorists still rely on Platonian philosophy and Christian theology, to 
develop their aesthetic theories. In the context o f Medieval art, signs are derived from a 
religious base, and symbol is looked upon as ‘the mysterious language o f  the divine. ’2l
Eco mentions ‘The Book of Wisdom’ from the ‘Old Testament’. This text appears to 
act as a handbook from which the Medievals take direction. The implication is 
everything is looked at and measured by triads o f reference from the Old Testament. 
One such triad, Eco identifies as, ‘that which determines, that which proportions, and 
that which distinguishes,22 Allowing that all understanding of the world is directed by 
God, it follows, the triad o f unity, truth and goodness is applied to all existence. As 
outlined by Eco, Medieval thought does not consider a huge chasm exists between the 
natural and the supernatural worlds. Instead, it considers both states to be integrated. 
Nature, is a kind o f alphabet through which God speaks to humankind; reveals the order 
in things; the blessings o f the supernatural; how to conduct oneself in the midst o f this 
divine order; and, how to win heaven. Things in themselves might inspire distrust but, 
things are more than they seem, they are recognised as signs. Hope is restored because 
the world is Gods’ discourse to man.23 The use o f signs is employed, in the Medieval 
quest, to unravel the mystery. Another adaptation by the Medievals, to a Christian 
viewpoint, would appear to be Artistoles’ rational of causes. The universe being 
considered the material cause, God the Father, the efficient cause; the Son, the 
organising principle; and the Holy Spirit, the end cause o f aesthetic harmony.24
St. Augustine (354-430), is one, among many Christian scholars, who promotes 
Christian ideals, others include John Scotus Eriugena, (810-877) Hugh St. Victor (1006- 
1141), John of Salisbury (1115-1180) St. Bonaventure (1221-1274), and St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), Eriugena, for instance, propagates the Christian dimension to all 
aspects o f symbol and allegory.
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But, by the thirteenth century, a study o f the psychology o f vision builds up. All work is 
designed with aesthetic perception in mind, and, according to Eco, artists not only 
consider, but also understand, at what level the receptivity of their work might be 
gauged.25 This, perhaps, throws some light on why Aquinas understands the act of 
seeing as, not only one of recognition o f a certain object, but also o f an understanding of 
the implications o f the object.
For Aquinas aesthetic knowledge has the same kind o f  complexity as 
intellectual knowledge, because it has the same object, namely, the substantial 
reality o f  something informed by an entelechy,2(>
Augustine is the first great Christian philosopher, and a key figure in the progression of 
a metaphysical theory.27 Augustine’s, great emphasis on the importance of number, 
helps focus the minds of the philosophers on the more practical and empirical 
sciences28. A theory of light that develops in the Middle Ages is adapted and used to 
symbolise Christian principles. God as light enters the Christian tradition through 
Augustine.29 It is a good example of the use of symbol. The principle o f light is one of 
the main metaphors explored for metaphysical and redemptive properties at this point in 
history. Plate 3
St. Thomas Aquinas’ gift to the history o f aesthetics, relates, in a particular way, to the 
question of beauty. As pointed out by Eco, Aquinas makes a significant contribution to 
the explanation of the role o f allegory. He adopts a position that is both logical and 
practical. He brings a rational view to the question o f phenomena. Aquinas points out, 
that if  spiritual realities are grasped in a rational manner, they are much more 
comprehensible and understandable to the human mind. John Scotus Eriugena is 
another notable contributor, to the ongoing dilemma of making sense of the world. As 
Eco points out, Eriugena’s interest focuses on the formulation of metaphysical 
symbolism. He maintains, that universal allegory, the world as a divine work of art, 
possesses moral, allegorical and anagogical meanings, in addition to the literal meaning, 
and declares
'The face o f  eternity shines through the things o f  earth, and we may therefore 
regard them as a species o f  metaphor ’3I
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Gombrich points out, Aquinas also believes in the use o f metaphor to facilitate 
understanding. Metaphor is found in symbols, and once accepted by the viewing 
community, it is irreversible32. Not only does this understanding affect thinking, it also 
has the influence of expanding interpretation. Normally, things are interpreted in terms 
of cause and effect, this is now extended and things are looked at, not only as causal 
connections, but also as a web of meanings and ends. As Eco explains,
'the formation o f  symbols was artistic. To decipher them was to experience 
them aesthetically. It was a type o f  aesthetic expression in which the Medievals 
took great pleasure deciphering puzzles, in spotting the daring analogy, in
> 33feeling that they were involved in daring and discovery ’
But, according to Eco, the concern of Medieval taste is not partial to the autonomy of 
art, nor to the autonomy of nature, the concern is more comprehensive, and involves
‘an apprehension o f  all o f  the relations, imaginative and supernatural, 
subsisting between the contemplated object and a cosmos which opened onto the 
transcendent. It meant discerning in the concrete object an ontological 
reflection of, and participation in, the being and the power o f  G od ,34
A point to be remembered, the Middle Ages is the link between Classicism and the 
Renaissance. To summarize, here is a period when the germ of the concept o f feeling as 
applicable to visual art is sown. Consequently, tensions surface between the traditional 
concepts of art, and the beginnings of an acknowledgement o f sensory perception that 
relates to subjectivity in art.
As already stated, art in the Middle Ages is concerned with construction. A theory o f art 
then is based on knowledge and production. There is a great reliance on the classical 
tradition of Plato and Aristotle. Their ideologies, and those o f Plotinus, are adapted and 
given a Christian authority. Christian values are influenced by the wisdom of the 
Classical scholars and a gradual development emerges in a theory o f  art. Eco refers to 
the deliberations of John o f Salisbury (1115-1180). These include the didactic role of 
art, with nature acting as an agent o f G od.35 Nature provides the means from which art 
can be devised. It is not difficult to understand that visual art is used as a means to
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educate, and influence, in a time where scholarship is the privilege of the few. Aquinas 
affirms that nature is the prime source o f form. Consequently art is only produced from 
the substance that is already there. But Aquinas sustains the idea that concrete existence 
should only be ‘interpreted in the light o f  the metaphysics o f  divine participation 36 
Where the Platonian believes that all knowledge is a priori and comes from above, e.g. 
light comes from above, Aquinas follows more in the line o f Aristotle’s logic. His point 
of view is that clarity comes from below, from the heart o f things.37 Bonaventure’s 
position is, that art operates on nature, and presupposes existing things. So, it is evident 
that the questioning of the relationship between God, nature and the human being, 
heralds a fundamental change in aesthetic theory. Clear-cut traditional rules of 
engagement with visual art can be seen to be undergoing expansion.
Traditionally, nature and art are judged on how they represent the supernatural 
allegorically. God is perceived to be omnipresent in nature. Therefore the 
consideration of any aspect o f nature accepts the presence o f God therein. Moreover, 
social history affirms, that Medievals have the ability to grasp certain analogies, 
interpret signs and emblems, which tradition determines. So, the Medievals can then 
translate images into their spiritual equivalents.38 What can be firmly acknowledged is, 
the propensity in the Middle Ages to understand the world through symbol and 
allegory39.
As part of the new approach to understanding; how to reconcile traditional theory with 
the empirical and scientific experience o f the world; the theorists o f the Middle Ages 
face the problem of where the exemplary idea comes from. Eco explains, in the Middle 
Ages, there is a consciousness that technical and manual skills are required for art, and, 
artistic elements can also be found in technical skills. Eco traces the beginnings o f the 
concept o f the imagination to the Greeks. Sequentially the notions o f expansion are laid 
down and start to germinate. Someone like Plotinus, who believes that the artistic idea 
possesses the highest metaphysical perfection, views the imaginative ideas o f the artist 
as noble. Augustine believes the mind can add or subtract from its memorable 
experiences. If the latter is true, in fact, it is possible for the artist to produce an image 
that does not fit any recognisable form in nature. Aquinas makes his contribution to the 
quest, by taking the position that the image exists in the artist’s mind, and consists of a 
marriage between form and matter.40 Aquinas leans towards Aristotle’s position, which
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does not take into account the spontaneity or subjectivity o f the artist. At this point in 
time no thought is given to pleasurable responses that might be induced by a work of
In the earlier Middle Ages aesthetic values are expressed in stylised formulae that can 
be applied to life. Traditionally, no margin for speculation is considered. The exemplary 
idea is made known through recognised use of allegory and symbol. The lines are 
firmly drawn; these are applied in the light of the divine. With the expansion of 
education, travel and intercultural relations, art takes on a new direction. The stylised 
formulae take on social values. 41 Doubtlessly it is the influence o f the mystics that sow 
the seeds of subjectivity and feeling into the fertile ground o f the imagination. In the 
first instance, Christian theologians and philosophers introduce possible avenues that 
can be explored, that might suggest alternatives to the current aesthetic theories e.g. the 
Platonian idea of Ideal form. The mystics open up the debate still further through 
forwarding a notion o f contemplation and subsequently embracing Francisan 
spirituality. As pointed out by Eco, Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), noted Medieval 
mystic, expands on the Platonian theory of form. While acknowledging that ‘the forms 
o f every created object exist first in the mind o f  G od’42 he believes, that human beings 
should focus on the form of the reality that they wish to represent to such an extent that 
they identify with it. So, the image that is produced not alone contains the exemplary 
idea within it, but also becomes the exemplary idea. Eco attributes Eckhart with the 
following statement ‘an image is an emanation from  the depths, in silence excluding 
everything exterior,43
As already explained, tensions arise in the Middle Ages between the traditional God 
centred universe, and, how human beings are actually experiencing the world. 
Regardless of the experience and scientific advances Medievals ‘still saw the world with 
the eyes o f  G od’44. The contradictions naturally produce difficulties as to how 
exemplary ideas could best be communicated, and, how mystery fits in with the 
dawning secularisation. i  0 £ 5  'J -j
As we have seen, the seed o f secularisation is sown in the Middle Ages. The
J Zsubsequent period, from 1400-1600, is generally accepted as sciefice^and
scientific research take significant steps forward in advanpfi&L^xplanations for various
f l j (  I t  M A R  ‘iM)
phenomena. Therefore, it is understandable that the eyes o f the world adjust to a more 
earthbound focus and eschew the heaven-centred focus o f the preceding centuries. 
Human beings become the centre o f attention, and accordingly everything is measured 
by how people live in the world. This period is aptly called the Renaissance that 
generally translates to re-birth, a new approach to old questions.
As indicated by Beardsley, humanist ideals advance during the Renaissance. Humanism 
can be understood as the propagation o f an ideal that promotes the full development of 
the individual, rejecting religious asceticism and narrow scholasticism.45 Products of 
this newly acquired sensory awareness are, that more attention is drawn to the 
individual, and individual feelings, on matters pertaining to the transcendent, are given 
less emphasis.46 Consequently, the authoritarian and church based culture o f the 
Middle Ages bows to a more secular Middle Class society.
The ideals o f humanism are enhanced by the study o f the Classics. Opening up Classical 
values contributes to the adoption o f Neo-Platonism in the sixteenth century. 
Intellectuals declare in favour o f thought and investigation. Beardsley makes reference 
to Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499). Ficino’s translation o f Plato, Aristotle, and St. 
Augustine extends the aesthetic narrative.47 Visual art acquires a new and unique status. 
One result is a renewed interest in the portrayal o f the human body. Plate 4
Whereas, it is not possible to highlight various aesthetic theories as proposed by 
Renaissance philosophers; nor indeed is it possible to rely on one source o f reference to 
illustrate the evolution of a remarkable aesthetic theory that can be applied to this period 
in history between 1400 and 1600; it is possible, to extrapolate an important link in the 
historical chain. The Renaissance produces three outstanding theorists. Their research 
continues the quest for answers, to assist artists, on how to communicate the mysteries 
of the universe in a practical and visual manner. Plate 5 These theorists are, Leon 
Battista Alberti (1404-1472), Albrect Durer (1471-1528), and Leonardo da Vinci (1452- 
1590).48 By careful and empirical enquiry the work produced by these three has 
profound affects on the development o f art and by definition on aesthetics. Their 
discoveries are adopted and achieve a prominent role during the Renaissance.49
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Most fifteenth century paintings are religious in content but both church and state 
recognise the role o f art in society and exploit art for their own ends. As already pointed 
out, traditionally art fulfils a didactic role. The church feels, in presenting the mystery 
o f the Incarnation and the lives o f the saints with secular overtones, they can, firstly, 
maintain their position as instructor o f the people, secondly, make it simpler to identify 
with it and thirdly, paintings are considered to excite feelings o f devotion. Several 
formulae are employed to this end, one being the exploitation o f sacred images or 
stories from scripture and placing the protagonists in a secular scene; this latter 
concession acknowledges the dawning of a humanist dimension. Plate 6
Nevertheless, as Beardsley suggests, because o f high demand from the church, the 
princes and the merchants, the role o f the artist changes in the fifteenth century. But, art 
gradually gains independence both from the world o f faith and the world o f practical 
affairs. Artists become more independent, with a new freedom, to interpret the world 
from their own point o f view. Closer observation o f the physical world has the affect of 
making people more aware o f the particulars of their surroundings.50 As more people 
are educated demands for guidelines to establish reasonable criteria for a good work of 
art naturally arise.51 . This is a noteworthy consequence that appears out o f a more 
sophisticated policy of social integration. Art is no longer only considered a craft as it
* j  52is perceived in the Middle Ages ‘Art was a knowledge o f  the rules fo r  making things ’ 
So, the foundation is laid for the change in status o f the artist, from that o f the 
craftsman, to that of the genius. This change of status has its incubation in the 
Renaissance but flourishes in the period of the Enlightenment. A development, such as 
this, is a vast improvement upon the position o f the artist in the Middle Ages, who
53frequently receives no public acknowledgement o f his work.
It is essential to retain the concept o f this transfer from a heavenly centre o f focus to an 
earthly centre o f focus. As far as visual art is concerned, this hypothesis is greatly 
assisted by the advances in the study o f perspective. One point perspective or linear 
perspective is introduced and explained by the noted theorist, Leon Battista Alberti 
(1404-1472). As already stated, in the Middle Ages pictures were constructed in such a 
way that the central focus was aimed directly towards a celestial or deist objective. This 
was achieved through using a triangular type o f composition with the head o f the deity 
or virgin at the apex. However with the introduction o f linear perspective the eyes of
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the observer are brought to focus on the horizon or terra firma. Plate 7 displays the 
move from religious to secular concerns. Historical research demonstrates that 
humanism challenged the meaning attached to existence by the theological leaders of 
the Middle Ages ‘and declared, timidly at first, and then more boldly, in favour o f  
interpreting life in purely mundane or human terms 64
The visual arts become increasingly concerned with portraying human nature rather 
than nature per se55. Albrecht Durer and Leonardo da Vinci contribute in no small way 
to the technical aspect o f painting a true representation.56 Plate 8
However, it is important to keep in mind that, hand in hand with humanist objectives, 
allegory and symbol are still being manipulated to symbolise the divine aspect o f 
creation. E. H. Gombrich points out, Christianity takes its cue from the Platonic 
standpoint, that the world o f the senses is only a pale reflection o f the real world o f the
— ST ispirit, and, so, Christianity justifies the use o f symbol. . An aspect o f symbol that 
should not be over-looked is the difference between conventional symbols and essential 
symbols. Convention can be learned whereas the essence o f something is intuitive and 
depends upon the intellect and imagination. Gombrich explains
‘ Where symbols are believed not to be conventional but essential, their
58interpretation in itself must be left to interpretation and intuition ’
This understanding of symbol is a progression on the Medieval understanding of 
symbol, that is based solely on convention. So an essential symbol, involves presenting 
the mind with a puzzle, which requires a rising above and beyond what is represented, 
so that one may endeavour to arrive at the implied meaning of an exemplary idea.59 
Gombrich explains that it is in the paradoxical nature attached to the understanding o f 
an image that one can typify mystery. Further, he explains, that the image o f mystery 
will encourage the mind in its ascent to the intelligible world -  the Ideal world o f 
Platonian thought, in other words the transcendent.60.
Gradually, symbol and allegory assume a more expansive intention. Their use is not 
confined to a purely Christian interpretation. In other words, strong attempts are made 
to demystify, or to put human language on, what is considered up to this point to have
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no solution, or, to be explicable only in a divine, other- worldly, or transcendent 
context. Rather than draw attention to the divisionary aspect of heaven and earth, 
symbol and allegory are applied to bridge the gap between heaven and earth. With 
symbol and allegory it is incumbent upon the viewer to work out or ponder what 
mystery is actually unfolding before his eyes. The image then, takes on the attribute of 
magic in the Renaissance.61 As we have seen, according to Eco, the Medievals were 
already excited by this challenge. Hauser also points out, that the scientific and 
humanist developments of the Renaissance affect art and its practice by drawing 
attention to the viewer’s power to discriminate.
‘Taste lies in the conformity between discriminations demanded by a painting
and skills o f  discrimination possessed by the beholder,62
Attention has already been drawn to the development o f the magnitude of imagination 
that slowly begins to materialize in the Middle Ages. With the advance o f humanism, 
and the emergence o f such eminent thinkers as, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650), John Locke (1632-1704), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and 
Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl o f Shaftesbury (1671-1713), the powers, and
63associated powers o f the imagination, occupy a high position in the debates o f the day. 
Norman Hanson makes a strong case for superiority o f intuitive power, when he 
comments, ‘Even as a source o f  ideas, the imagination was fe lt to be quicker and bolder 
in perception than plodding reason,64
Cartesian enterprise alludes to the four faculties o f the mind involved in cognition, these 
are, understanding, imagination, sense and memory. Descartes ‘allows that the 
imagination may be o f  some help to the understanding.65 ’ This position calls to mind the 
Aristotelian rationale of causes, material, efficient, organising and end and subsequently 
their Christian interpretation, the universe, God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The 
stand, taken by Descartes regarding the imagination, vacillates between the passive 
image forming capability, and the semi active power o f recombination.66 This is a rather 
limited view of the power o f the imagination. Here is a position reminiscent of the 
attitude taken by Aquinas. Aquinas believes in the importance o f metaphor to bring 
about a better understanding of Scripture, but he attributes a purely literal meaning to
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art. He claims, ‘ the form  introduced into matter by the artist was accidental rather than 
substantial form 67'
However, underlying the philosophy of Plato and Artistotle; despite the advancement of 
humanist and Cartesian philosophy of think, therefore I  am ’; it is important to 
remember, the firm belief that God is the principle conductor of all creation, remains 
strong. As Norman Hanson points out, the prevailing disposition is
‘Above all we will observe as an infallible rule that what God has revealed is 
incomparably more certain than all the res t’68
But as Beardsley points out, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), attributes a far more active and 
significant role to the imagination. His empirical study is primarily concerned with the 
psychological processes that are involved in art. He considers the imagination is not 
confined to the ‘laws o f  matter '.69 Imagination has the power to break up the laws of 
nature and reassemble them or in fact to unite other features that are not naturally 
united.70 Through his interest in the source and function of the imagination, Bacon 
suggests the possibility, that the imagination could be, ‘a special active power in its own 
right’71
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), takes Bacon’s challenge, and puts forward the theory 
that, any concept must first be bom in part or in completion through ‘the organs o f  
sense n i. He suggests that all images arise spontaneously, and have nothing to do with 
inspiration or divine interference. His philosophy also takes into account the notion of 
good judgement. He differentiates between sensual reaction to an image and a coherent 
judgement. Hobbes, ties in the powers o f the imagination with the power to arouse 
passion, but also considers what arouses the mind has superior consequences for the
I'Khuman being.
John Locke (1632-1704), emphasises the freedom of the mind to work on the ideas o f 
sensation and reflection so as ‘to produce all the complex ideas that we have’74 Locke, 
advances the theory that ideas are not isolated, ideas depend on one another and, 
through combination, present a united front. According to Hanson, Locke discredits the 
Cartesian concept o f innate ideas.75 Locke mainly concerns himself with language. He
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attributes hidden dangers, such as deceit and error, to the association o f ideas without 
judgement. He encourages the separation of ideas, one from the other, in order to arrive 
at a judgement. Locke aligns associative ideas with allegory and metaphor.
However, despite the ongoing struggle of human endeavour, to make sense o f the 
mystery o f the world, what must be kept in mind is, that new thought, in the seventeenth 
century, takes for granted, or assumes, the ingenuity o f the world’s creator -  
Providence. As indicated by Hanson, notwithstanding the Fall of Man, a general 
understanding is that ‘the earthy felicity o f  man was the constant and overriding 
concern o f  G od,1(' In other words, there is an awareness o f God’s search for man. So 
despite the preoccupation with self, that becomes apparent in the Renaissance, it must 
always be remembered this self- awareness is juxtaposed with the underlying belief in 
God’s interest in the human being.
To summarize, the Renaissance is a period that develops the secularisation o f art. The 
cornerstone for this has been laid in the Middle Ages. Increasingly, in the fifteenth, 
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, allegory and symbol are used to transmit humanist 
ideals. This happens through logical and empirical analysis o f the evolutionary 
understanding o f the role o f the symbol. The understanding, that previously attaches to 
symbol, as learned convention, must now be understood on the level o f intuition. This 
new comprehension o f symbol implies, the Renaissance is a period full o f the idea of 
symbol as the purveyor of mystery. Another implication is the whole notion of 
adventure and possibility.77
The progressive aspect o f artistic theory and the growing autonomy o f the artist, which 
occurs in the Renaissance, endow a more prominent role on art. Much of this 
development can be attributed to the advance of humanism, and to the need for artists to 
adapt traditional concepts to the emerging independence from Church and state. Art is 
no longer regarded as a purely didactic tool; art now offers a socially attractive avenue 
along which it is possible to explore individual preference. A significant aspect of the 
autonomy o f the artist, and the art o f the Renaissance, is the advancement o f the 
importance o f the imagination. The imagination is engaged not only to put forward the 
exemplar idea, but also to acknowledge ownership o f it. Gombrich points to the
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consequences, and the responsibilities, that attach to such a perception of image, when 
he proposes the following
‘For i f  the visual symbol is not a conventional sign but linked through the 
network o f  correspondence and sympathies with the supracelestial essence 
which it embodies, it is only consistent to expect it to partake not only o f  the 
‘meaning’ and effect’ o f  what is represents but to become interchangeable with
.. ,78 It .
So, while the didactic role o f art in Middle Ages requires the artist to be a craftsman, the 
art o f the Renaissance widens its parameters to accommodate the development o f 
Humanist ideals. One manifestation o f the foregoing is the increase in the use of 
metaphorical symbol.79 It is understandable therefore, how the role o f the artist in the 
Renaissance can assume that o f the genius.80 If this is the case the implication is that 
the viewer must adopt a more interactive role with the visual image. It becomes 
incumbent on the viewer, to try and work out the exemplary idea, to which the artist is 
alluding through the use o f metaphorical symbol.
To summarize thus far historically, there is sufficient evidence available, to affirm that 
aesthetics, and all epistemological enquiry involved therein, verify the quest by 
humankind to make more sense of the world. What is also evident is that this 
understanding is significantly assisted through the medium of art.
Cartesian reasoning contributes in a unique manner to the development of rational 
thought from the seventeenth century onwards, as Beardsley points out. In conjunction 
with the impact of the theories o f Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the influence o f English 
thinkers, and German philosophers, is central to the development o f aesthetic theory in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As already seen, Descartes, and his followers, 
are interested in the power o f deduction through intuition that rests on innate concepts
Q 1
and propositions.
Norman Hanson, in T h e  Enlightenment’, shows that, a natural consequence o f the 
epistemological and empirical considerations that are being debated in this period, is a
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tension that provokes considerable argument between what is rational, what is 
sensational, and how art can reflect both82. The impression one gets from both 
Beardsley and Hanson, regarding this period o f history, is one of a climate o f great 
enthusiasm for adventure, particularly in the subject of knowledge. Hanson draws 
attention to the collaborative air between artists, philosophers, and theorists. Efforts 
include, trying to solve such problems as, the analysing of beauty, and the sublime 
experience. They also include an effort to justify the judgement o f them, through their 
causes and effects.
Hanson notes that the dissemination o f ideas is aided and abetted by the increase in the 
number o f literate people, particularly in England. French is widely spoken, and Latin 
is also understood among the educated upper class. 83One consequence is an expansion 
of Art Academies, ensures a greater involvement by a larger number in the making of 
works o f art. This directly guarantees a place for art and the artist. As a result, art and 
artist become more dominant in this society. It is worth noting here that the scientific 
explorations o f Isaac Newton (1643-1727), and Johan Wolfgang von Goethe (1749- 
1832), into the theory of colour, expand and make available to artists of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries the possibility for experimentation with visual language not 
previously undertaken. Both enquire extensively into the theory of light and colour. 
Newton’s work Optics, and Goethe’s Theory o f Colour, provide the relevant evidence 
of their contribution. Plate 9
Empiricism is recognised as a key feature o f eighteenth century philosophical debate. 
This preoccupation with cause and effect includes the investigation o f the role o f 
criticism, particularly with regard to aesthetics. Rules, previously accepted, are 
challenged. Many philosophers in the eighteenth century are involved in this new 
examination into the role of aesthetics.84 Their scholarship carefully elucidates, and 
extrapolates from the traditions that precede them. They introduce new concepts for 
consideration, all in the effort to try and clarify the mystery surrounding a true work o f 
art. They are also interested in trying to establish the role of art in relation to, for 
instance science and religion. In particular, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and George 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) add, in a special way, to an interpretation of 
mystery, and the links between fine art, spirituality and mystery. But, it is important to 
remember the influence of such British and Scottish philosophers as Thomas Hobbes
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(1588-1679), the Earl of Shaftsbury (1671-1713), and John Locke (1632-1704) whose 
philosophies are the foundation on which later scholars e.g. David Hume (1711-1776) 
base their work.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), distinguishes ideas from impressions, and seems to adopt 
an Aristotelian approach to this dilemma, while placing great emphasis on the powers of 
the imagination. His study involves a break down of the imaginative process under two 
headings, simple and compound.
David Hume (1711-1776) seems to advance on Locke’s thesis that ideas are not 
isolated. As already pointed out, Locke discredits the notion of innate ideas. One 
position, adopted by Locke, is that knowledge may only be arrived at through a proper 
and rational association of ideas. Such a position has further consequences for the role 
o f art. It is only when genuine connections can be established between the ideas can 
great implications ensue for a work o f art. Hume admits the tendency to associate ideas 
according to their resemblance, but also according to ‘causal connection, and the 
spatial and temporal contiguity o f  their original impressions ,85. Espousal of this view 
is not too far removed from Aristotelian logic.
Beardsley remarks, divergent theories regarding the imaginative process, may well lead 
to a distrust of the role of the imagination, which emerges in the late seventeenth 
century.86 All of the above, however, implies the importance o f how to captivate the 
audience or spectator, and, by inference, the unique role of art in the development o f the 
human being.
Practically speaking, by the eighteenth century, there is a growing inclination to up-date 
symbols. Reference has already been made to the fact that traditional symbols relating 
to metaphysical interests become dimmer, and no longer fulfil their function. In other 
words they are outdated. When the allegorical reference is lost there is a search for new 
symbols that have an aura o f mystery about them.87 Gombrich points to Friedrich 
Creuzer in his Symbolik of 1810 who links together the creative mind, art, religious 
faith and symbol. He details this connection
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‘ Whenever the creative mind takes up contact with art or dares to crystallize 
religious intuition and faith in visible shapes the symbol must become boundless 
and infinite,88
The thrust behind this description of symbol is to include the immeasurable. The 
immeasurable associates with the notion of mystery and so the symbol is mystical. The 
influence o f this type of symbol, according to Creuzer, is to attract the beholder with an 
irresistible force and so touch the soul with the need that belongs to the World Spirit. 
Creuzer makes a distinction between sign and symbol. Symbol, can be understood as 
being clouded in mystery, with several possible meanings, sign, is more singular and
89transparent.
E. H. Gombrich alludes to the Christian adaptation of the Platonic standpoint, which is, 
that the world of the senses is only a pale reflection of the real world o f the spirit and so 
use of symbol is justified.90 But by the eighteenth century what some would consider as 
an irrational concept of symbol, that is an alignment with Christian revelation, is 
dispelled and replaced by the more logical Aristotelian approach to symbol, the 
illustrated metaphor.91 Plate 10 As the theories o f Locke and Hume verify, efforts are 
made to separate symbol from intuition. But, the Earl o f Shaftesbury goes back to the 
old Platonian theory of a priori knowledge. He places the emphasis on the first reaction 
to a work o f art. This is primarily a sensuous reaction, and, according to him only 
thereafter can associations of a moral or aesthetic nature be made. His thesis of 
disinterested aesthetic contemplation is reflected and developed by Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804). Kant strongly opposes the efforts made to separate symbol from intuition 
as put forward by the logicians.
Kant publishes three major works between the years 1781 and 1790, which directly 
relate to the investigation undertaken here. He focuses his attention on the problems of 
assessing and establishing criteria for the judgement of taste. The works are, Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781), Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Critique of Pure 
Judgement (1790). Basically these relate to knowledge, desire and feeling. The first 
Critique explores the variations in empirical propositions, the second Critique examines
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variations in a priori propositions, and the third Critique investigates aesthetical and 
teleological judgements.
One can verify the magnitude o f the influence o f Kantian philosophy, in the history o f 
aesthetics through recognised texts. It would be extremely rare that any discussion on 
aesthetics could occur without reference to Kant. Any textbook of note will confirm 
this. Here, information is derived mainly from Beardsley’s Aesthetics and Rasmusson 
and Kearney’s An Anthology of Continental Aesthetics and E. H. Gombrich’s Symbolic 
Images.
According to Beardsley, the rationalist approach of Kantian theory, in the eighteenth 
century, supports the idea of the relationship between symbol and intuitive thought. 
Gombrich’s thinking reinforces this opinion. He points to the fact that Kant did not 
agree with the logistician’s idea o f symbol, that is, the separation o f the use of symbol 
1from the intuitive a c t’.92 Kant’s theory relies heavily on the Platonic tradition, which 
separates the intuitive from the discursive. He makes the link between the concept of 
intuition and a judgement o f taste. The problem of assessing and establishing criteria for 
the judgement of taste is examined and scrutinised by him.
As previously mentioned, a strong theme of Kantian theory is the differentiation 
between aesthetic judgements and logical judgements. Kant holds the opinion that the 
judgement o f taste is concerned with three modes of consciousness, knowledge, desire, 
and feeling93. In the Critic]ue o f Pure Reason, Kant studies knowledge as the capability 
to include particular sense intuitions under general concepts. Kant considers the 
understanding to be the faculty of concepts, and the imagination to be the faculty, ‘that 
brings together in a synthesis the manifold o f  sense,94. Personal judgement arises, when 
the faculties o f imagination and understanding are connected, to bring about cognition. 
He makes a very clear distinction between, desire and feeling. Basically, what he says is 
that desire is linked to reason, and intuition is linked to feeling. Here, Kant is making a 
distinction between a logical judgement and an aesthetic judgement. For Kant, aesthetic 
judgement does not depend on the cognisance o f the object to be judged, but, relies 
rather, on the imagination and the feeling o f pleasure or displeasure precipitated by the 
object. This judgement is determined by the fact that the object is independent of 
interest. There is no logical judgement made on the usefulness o f the object, or any 
other advantage/disadvantage that may be attributed to the object. Certainly, Kearney’s
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interpretation of Kant is, that Fine art can only be judged through cognition and 
intelligence. Representation and technical ability in visual works are not sufficient to 
merit the definition Fine Art. Fine Art also must have an impact on cultural 
advancement in the interest of social communication. Kant concludes, that the requisites 
for fine art are, imagination, understanding, soul and taste. Soul, according to Kant, in 
an aesthetical sense, signifies the animating principle in the mind95.
In no small way does Kant contribute to the notion o f the artist as genius, or rather that 
Fine art is the product of genius, in so much as it must be original and exemplary.
‘ Genius is the innate mental aptitude through which nature gives the rule to a rt.,96 Kant 
elaborates still further and implies the mysteriousness quality o f art because, according 
to him, ‘ it cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product,97
What Kant discovers, in the area o f aesthetics, seems clear from his essay on The 
Critique of Judgement. What is necessary, in a work of art, is sufficient association o f 
ideas that will bring the viewer to a state o f thought or contemplation. This, in turn, will 
focus the mind on an ideal that is worth pursuing. Once again, art is confronted with the 
exemplary idea. This philosophy, and theory of Fine Art, augments what, up to this 
point in history, has been examined and debated by epistemologists. Their concern is to 
explore the nature o f aesthetic principles.
What is apparent, from Beardley’s and Kearney’s analyses of Kant, is the utmost 
attention that Kant gives to aesthetics, logistics and epistemological study. This, points 
to the fact that Kant is keenly interested in finding answers to many aesthetic questions. 
It would not be unfair to say, that Kant, sets about unravelling the mystery of what it is 
that conspires to arouse the human being to such heights that activate the soul. Even 
considering that Kant uses such terminology, implies that, despite all his dissection and 
rationalisation of desire, intuition, delight, disinterestedness, purpose without 
purposedness, subjectivity and objectivity, he still relies on such an ephemeral term as 
soul, to describe the ultimate aim of the aesthetic experience. This latter fact is 
convincing enough to align his search with mystery.
Where Kant takes this point o f view, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
takes another. Hegel, takes for granted that, art proceeds from the Absolute Idea, which
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is a Platonian concept, and, art is responsible for presenting, in the most appropriate 
sensuous manner, what will convey this Absolute Idea.98 He takes an intensive look at 
the evolution of artistic practice and makes the following observations. These 
observations are outlined in Hegels’ Lectures on Aesthetics, as researched by Kearney 
and Rasmusson in ‘An Anthology of Continental Aesthetics’.
Central to Hegel’s proposal, as outlined in his ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’, is the need to 
accentuate the importance of expanded elucidation, when evaluating artistic production. 
According to him, artistic production can no longer be limited to a formal activity in 
accordance with specifications, as was the case with Renaissance art.
George W. F. Hegel contributes, in an extraordinary way, to the notion of the 
relationship between philosophy, religion and fine art. He divides the objectives o f art, 
and, by analogy, religion, into three spheres. Firstly, we are presented with nature, 
secondly, ‘our consciousness makes God its object’ and thirdly, we need to worship as a 
community." Hegel’s emphasis is on the work o f art as a spiritual activity. He strongly 
advocates his viewpoint when he remarks, that
‘the universal need fo r  art is m an’s rational need to lift the inner and outer 
world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he recognises his
7 S ')  1 0 0own selj
Hegel categorises art as follows, he believes the first form of art is the symbolic form, 
where an object is portrayed in such a way that it conveys the substantial or exemplary 
Idea e.g. the art of the Middle Ages. Plate 11 Subsequently these objects are interpreted 
in this manner.101 He goes on to develop this line o f thought and attaches to this first 
form of art or symbolic form, attributes o f search, fermentation, mysteriousness and a 
sublime nature.102
Hegel considers Classical art the second form of art and opposes it to the symbolic 
form. Plate 12 How, Hegel, sees the Classical art form is best expressed in the human 
body; the Classical stance, and the Neo-Platonism of the Renaissance that commit to the 
portrayal o f the human body. But this form of art has its limitations in presenting the 
Absolute Idea.
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Hegel logically develops his theories about spirituality in art, and concludes that 
Romantic art, the contemporaneous art practice, is ‘ the se lf transcendence o f  art but 
within its own sphere and in the form  o f  art itself’103 Plate 13 In a way, this echoes 
Eckhart’s assessment of the image, not alone containing the exemplary idea but 
becoming the exemplary idea104.
So, the secularisation of art, that takes place in the Renaissance, would seem to be 
usurped by the strong emphasis that Hegel attaches to spirituality in art. His approach is 
logical. Firstly, he examines the commonly held ideas o f what constitutes a work of art 
(a) it is the product of human activity, not a natural product, (b) essentially it is made for 
human apprehension and issues from the sensuous field for apprehension by the senses, 
this relates directly to the Renaissance theory o f art (c) it has an end and aim in itself. 
Hegel’s third constituent for a work o f art brings with it a reminder of Aristotelian logic. 
Secondly, Hegel scrutinises these common ideas of art and opens up new paths that 
offer and elaborate a wider basis to the understanding of visual art.105
In his examination of (a) art as the product of human activity, not a natural product 
Hegel distinguishes, the production of ordinary human activity and that o f an artist, 
who, in his opinion, is a specially gifted spirit. The latter, is an idea that develops in the 
Renaissance. As such, the artist has a responsibility to produce work that reflects his 
own inner spirituality to the highest possible degree. Fie explains, human beings as free 
subjects need to try and make sense of the world around them, through the self- 
production o f art, in order to more fully appreciate the essence o f themselves, as human 
beings. Hegel clarifies this opinion, and explains that an artist satisfies this need,
‘on the one hand, within by making what is within him explicit to himself but 
correspondingly by giving outward reality to this his explicit se lf and thus in 
this duplication o f  him self by bringing what is in him into sight and knowledge 
fo r  himself and others’106
He also makes a decisive point regarding the responsibility o f the artist to himself and to 
his audience.
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When considering (b) art is made for human apprehension and issues from the sensuous 
field for apprehension by the senses, the first point made by Hegel is, when considering 
a work of art, feeling or sensation of itself is a purely subjective, vague, empty, shallow, 
inadequate emotion. He is critical of previous educational efforts to expand the idea of 
feeling, from a mere sense o f pleasure into a specific sense of beauty, and spells out his 
own position as to the seriousness of purpose, and the full thrust of reasoning required 
for the contemplation o f a work of art. A full appreciation of a work of art necessarily 
includes a certain level of contemplation otherwise; it falls short of its main objective. 
Hegel suggests that a work of art,
‘ should disclose an inner life, feeling, soul, a content and spirit which is ju s t
)  107what we call the significance o f  a work o f  a r t’
What is central to Hegel’s proposal, in the Lectures on Aesthetics, is the need to 
accentuate the importance of expanded elucidation, when evaluating artistic production. 
According to him, artistic production can no longer be limited to a formal activity, in 
accordance with given specifications. On the contrary, because o f its spiritual content, it 
must work from within itself, and, bring before the mind’s eye, much more than the 
individual creations actual formulae can provide. Working from this position, allows the 
artist the opportunity for a considerable enlargement to the rules and regulations that 
govern the art of the Renaissance. So there is an expansion of humanism. The 
implications, demanded by this content o f spiritual reflection in what can now be 
considered a work o f art, mean that, a work of art can attain a higher position than any 
natural product, which is not imbued with a spiritual dimension.108 In other words, what 
would appear to be implied here is that a work o f art can be considered equal to a 
religious symbol.
A work o f art is for both sensuous and spiritual apprehension. As indicated by Hegel 
this latter standpoint infers a responsibility to the artist. On the one hand, it is necessary 
to produce work that has an intrinsic content. On the other hand, the viewer must value 
what the artist is trying to convey, without getting too caught up in formal rules.109 The 
involvement implied, between the artist, the work o f art and the viewer, is reminiscent 
of the threefold relationship outlined in the Book of Wisdom ‘that which determines,
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that which proportions, and that which distinguishes ’ that acts as a guide in the Middle 
Ages.
Another of Hegel’s observations worth considering is the recognition of the extension 
of people’s intellectual horizons in assessing works o f art. How this intelligence can be 
complemented through philosophical research, into, not only the particularity o f works 
of art, but also into a discernment as to what is theoretically possible to ascertain, 
concerning works of art per se .] "'Not only does Hegel show his concern for the 
universality and particularity o f art works, he also elaborates upon the role these 
attributes play in the story of art. Hegel points out, that if  art is only considered in the 
light of its function as explicit instructor, then it falls short o f its broader intention.111
Still another aspect of artistic theory is highlighted by the German Idealists. Their 
concerns revolve around the dualism of human nature, and how to reconcile the 
sensuous, and the reasonable. To this end, they exalt and centralise the position o f art. 
Hegel’s argument, that the obligation o f art is to bring spirituality and what is 
universally good to a wider audience, is a logical, cohesive argument. It elaborates 
upon Kant’s position regarding the sensuous and intellectual responses to a work of art. 
While Kant provokes much debate and consideration o f the beautiful, and the 
judgement thereof, Hegel’s theories, stress the sheer magnitude of art’s role in the 
holistic development o f the human being, and, consequently, in society as a whole. 
Hegel refers here to the role of the spiritual in art. Hegel elucidates,
' when great passions and the movements o f  a profound soul are revealed, there
is no longer any question o f  the finer distinctions o f  taste and its preoccupation 
> 112with pedantic details ’
Whereas, the position adopted by Hegel opens the door to the wider possibilities in the 
future of art, at the same time, it challenges traditional standpoints on criteria for 
judging a work of art. This gives more responsibility to both the viewer, and the artist 
alike. However, one direct result of Hegel’s reasoning, regarding works o f art and what 
they may precipitate, can be gleaned from the following statement. Works o f art
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‘can bring home to our sense our feeling, and our inspiration everything which 
has a place in the human spirit’113
As a logical progression it is essential to consider (c) art has an end and aim in itself. 
For the moment, it is sufficient to point out that Hegel is adamant that a work of art is 
more than representation, and asserts the aim o f art is to include more than technical 
expertise. According to Hegel the aims of art
‘ lie in something still other than the purely mechanical imitation o f  what is
there, which in every case can bring to birth only technical tricks, not works, o f
.,114art
Hegel shows his concern with the universality, and particularity o f art works, and what 
role these attributes play in the story of art. If, art is only considered in the light of its 
function as explicit instructor, in other words the didactic role o f art in the Middle Ages, 
then it falls short of its broader intention. Hegel elaborates, and makes the point, that, 
only when the content o f a work of art is considered as essentially individual, and 
essentially sensuous, can that work disclose any degree of universality, otherwise it 
does not warrant being considered a work of art.115 This would appear to contradict 
Artistotle’s idea of universality. However, it appears that Hegel does adopt Artistotle’s 
belief in the end for which things are made. It is not always clear how access to the 
heart and will is facilitated by art. Is it through recognisable forms, or is it through 
symbol. Hegel constantly refers to the transcendent nature o f art’s function and 
maintains that
‘ with the Concept o f  art there arises the need (a) fo r  a common end fo r  its 
particular aspects, but (b) also fo r  a higher substantial end’116.
The position, taken by Hegel, opens the door to the wider possibilities in the future o f 
art. It challenges traditional standpoints on criteria for judging a work o f art, giving 
more responsibility to both the viewer and the artist. A direct result o f Hegel’s 
reasoning implies, that works of art can focus the mind on what is important, and so, he 
emphasises, once more, the significance o f art. Hegel believes that art can
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‘bring home to our sense our feeling, and our inspiration everything which has
)117a place in the human spirit ’
Hegel analyses traditional roles that art has adopted. Classical art attains a harmonious 
unity of content and form not present in Symbolic art. Classical forms o f art are 
specific and therefore restrictive in their wider potential for interpretation on a spiritual 
level. But Romantic art has a freedom of spirituality, unlike classical art, or symbolic 
art, therefore Romantic art makes more demands upon the spectator than either o f these 
other forms of art. Hegel explains it this way
‘symbolic art seeks that perfect unity o f  inner meaning and external shape which
classical art finds in the presentation o f  substantial individuality to sensuous
118contemplation and which romantic art transcends in its superior spirituality .
Though Hegel makes his position quite clear, in his Lectures on Aesthetics, that the 
vocation o f art is to gauge the spirit o f a people, and find the artistic expression 
corresponding to it, he nominates Romantic art as the pinnacle o f art forms, because of 
its openness to encourage and deepen spiritual awareness. Romantic art, according to 
Hegel, is best equipped to fulfil this vocation. This pinnacle can only be achieved if  the 
artist is genuinely in tune with himself, his own spirituality and is aware o f his 
contemporary surroundings. Romantic art form, provides an opportunity to touch depths 
of the imagination, that allows a human being to become enthralled, and so
‘lift the soul high above all the painful entanglement in the restrictions o f  the 
real world119.
Then the remit o f the artist is to ignite this freedom of imagination within himself, and, 
through the content o f his work, transmit it to the world.
fo r  when great passions o f  a profound soul revealed, there is no longer any 
question o f  the finer distinctions o f  taste and its preoccupation with pedantic 
details.120
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As it is important to remember that Hegel strongly recommends artists have high ideals,
and search for originality, he urges what ought to be paramount to the artist is ‘the free
development o f  the spirit’.121 Also, Hegel stresses, that freedom allows an artist to use
all forms of representation, and presentation, as stepping-stones to higher or
transcendent objectives. This freedom also opens the door; to the use of whatever
material the artist can utilise, to achieve his aim. But, Hegel exhorts the artist to imbue
122the materials, to be used for artworks, with living and contemporary interest.
While Hegel encourages the use of a variety o f materials, he also issues a strong note of 
warning regarding the content of a work of art. No work of art should exhaust its 
content through its representation, so that the sense o f mystery is lost, because as he 
sees it
'the spirit only occupies itself with objects so long as there is something secret, 
not revealed in them ,m
But, as Gombrich points out, we need language to be able to express what can be found 
in great art, or, as he puts it, ‘understand the growth o f  those alternative systems o f  
metaphor which make great art more profound that any mystic hieroglyph can ever 
b e ’124
Symbol, as an image, offers more than the discursive, because language limits in a way 
that free association does not. In other words, metaphor can find a way to express a 
discordant relationship between language and image. Consequently, the art of the 
eighteenth century becomes more a question o f deeper inward concerns, rather than 
mere outward appearance.
To summarize, the secularisation of art that is sown in the Middle Ages, that takes root 
in the Renaissance, gains ground in the eighteenth century, but without losing sight o f 
the element o f mystery that attaches to art. In fact, it is fair to say that, the eighteenth 
century, in a particular way, highlights the importance o f mystery and spirituality, 
without an excessive reliance on religion, as a basis for this spirituality. It locates 
spirituality within the individual, by emphasising the possibility of the presence of 
spirituality within the imaginative and cognitive powers of the individual. This 
spirituality can be accessed through the tripartite relationship between the artist, the
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work and the viewer. This viewpoint can only emerge as a result of a reassessment of 
the traditional concepts that have preceded it.
To consider some of the key features of aesthetic history from the ancient Greeks and 
early Christian period, through the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, from the 
seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, encompassing the Enlightenment and the 
Romantic period, clarifies that the search for meaning in the role of art is constant. In 
other words, each new development, or discovery o f technique, or adjustment o f content 
are markers, to aid the resolution of pressing questions. However, with each addition 
new possibilities are indicated, and thus the continuum is perpetuated. A quotation from 
Alfred Lord Tennyson sums it up
‘yet all experience is an arch wherethro ’ 
gleams that untravelle’d world whose margin fades 
For ever and fo r  ever when 1 m o v e 25
It can be seen that notions o f Humanism and empiricism dominate the Enlightenment 
period. The affects, o f Kantian theory and German Idealism, on the perception o f 
imagination, really take hold in the Romantic period. The latter are investigated by 
Richard Kearney in his book ‘The Wake o f Imagination’. Kearney carefully elucidates 
the transition from the mimetic paradigm of imagination, predominant up to the mid 
seventeenth century, to that o f a paradigm of production, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.126
To explain the radical transfer in the perception o f imagination, both Richard Kearney 
and Monroe C. Beardsley, offer some insights into the various intellectual and 
aesthetical questions that surround the need for clarification, which is sought in the 
nineteenth century.
According to Beardsley, the dominant intellectual concerns of the nineteenth century
197focus on the primacy of feelings, and emotion, over logical thought. Subsequently, 
any attempts by theorists and artists themselves to expand aesthetic theory, involves the 
application o f this new understanding o f imagination. Consequently, the traditional 
value system, that underpins the creative process, is questioned. Beardsley points out
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the fact that, Romantic theory is deeply linked with the literary arts. However, it can be
understood, that when Kearney refers to the Copemican Revolution vis. a.vis the
• • 128 imagination, he is including all creative practice.
Kearney’s reference to the Copemican Revolution, a propos the imagination, refers to 
the fact o f a transfer o f location o f the source of imagination. Such a transfer emanates 
from a static heavenly deist focal point, to a more flexible focus o f the human mind as 
the new creative centre. The reassignment o f location is reminiscent o f the introduction 
of one point perspective in the Renaissance, with the same objective. Both innovations 
can be seen as contributors to the growing autonomy o f the human being.
Self-expression is perceived to be the end for art in the Romantic period. Beardsley 
points to the fact that some artists acknowledge art as playing a part in transcendental 
enlightenment. While the functional end o f art is kept before the mind, account is taken 
of the Christian adaptation of Aristotle’s theory, and Christian impetus behind Romantic 
art is recognised.129 A remark by Joseph Joubert (1754-1824), and quoted by 
Beardsley, illustrates the Christian influence,
‘Imagination is, the faculty o f  making sensuous what is intellectual, o f  making 
corporeal what is spirit; in a word, o f  bringing to light, without depriving it o f
y130its nature, that which in itself is invisible ’
So, efforts continue to try and unite the ‘ concepts o f  revelation and o f  creation'' into a 
comprehensive whole. In other words, efforts are still being made to try and solve the 
riddle of existence.131
Proposals to separate traditional insight into the role of the imagination, as a mimetic 
function, into the role of production are first tabled by the German Idealists. The 
particular understanding of imagination as a living organism is introduced by German 
Idealism, and supported by the opinions o f Johan Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), 
and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Beardsley notes that Goethe’s opinion in 
this context is that works of art have organic unity, because they grow out of man as 
part of nature. According to Goethe, works o f art express man’s unity with nature, lA 
perfect work o f  art is a work o f  the human soul, and in this sense, also a work o f
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nature,l32 He applauds the role of the artist, and the work of art as a spiritual creation. 
This, latter point of view, coincides with the Hegelian idea of spirituality in art already 
examined.
The hypothesis, that a work o f art is a living organism, contradicts the concept of a 
work of art as an inanimate rational object. This opinion, art as a living organism, can 
be aligned with Kant’s theory o f the ‘transcendental imagination’ as outlined by 
Kearney133. Kant gives voice to the belief that human beings have within themselves the 
power to produce. He maintains the imagination is the seat o f this power. Kearney 
continues to systematically explain how Kant arrives at this conclusion.134 Kant ascribes 
to the imagination, the active responsibility o f synthesising the two branches of 
knowledge, sensibility and understanding. It follows, that the new concept of 
imagination is an active, internal, productive agent, that Kant describes as an ‘art 
concealed in the depths o f  the human sou l’. It is hardly surprising then, that certain 
ramifications ensue for artists, theorists and works of art.135.
Kearney alludes to the fact that Kant originally defined the ‘transcendental imagination’ 
as, ‘a root unknown to u s ’136. The implication from this statement would seem to be, 
that the powers o f the imagination come from an unknown source. Traditionally, this 
unknown source is understood as divine. But, Kant carefully breaks down the mimetic 
and productive elements of imagination. He looks at sensibility as the human experience 
of things, and, understanding provides the formal categories to make sense o f this 
perception. As already made clear, the active faculty for uniting these two, sensibility 
and understanding, is the imagination. But Kant is also saying that this synthesising 
function is a priori. The synthesising factor, which operates between sensibility and 
understanding, is productive through each individual imagination. In other words,
1 'Mhuman beings can summon imaginative powers from within themselves .
Beardsley cites Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), as the person responsible for 
introducing the theory o f imagination as organic form, to Britain. According to 
Kearney, Coleridge also expresses his interest in separating the functions of imagination 
into primary and secondary functions, mimetic and productive. Kearney believes that, 
Coleridge aligns the primary function of representation with Kant’s idealist position of 
‘transcendental imagination’, and matches the secondary function of production with
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Kant’s judgement of taste.138 Coleridge also refers to the secondary productive function 
of imagination as a ‘synthetic and magical pow er.,l39 The reason for this, he maintains, 
is that this secondary power can balance and reconcile opposites, and can inject a sense 
of novelty into old and familiar objects.
The challenge for Romantic Art is to adjust itself to these new theories relating to the 
imagination and feeling. Beardsley points out, that Romantic art is intuitive, and is 
trying to establish an important cognitive status for the creative process. The general 
aim is an art that can still be considered in a didactic role, but not in the neo classical 
sense; an art that should be the bearer o f general truths, Aristotelian universals, and 
teachable abstractions.140 As already intimated, theories surface to support the 
suggestion that scholarship continues to be concerned with exploring the mystery of 
how the creative process works.
The main thrust, o f the dynamic change for the creative arts, can be seen in several 
instances. As already stated, the role o f the artist, the critic and the work o f art are 
comparatively different to the previously held definitions governing all three. Some 
attempt to illustrate these changes follows.
Beardsley makes a very important point when he draws attention to the change in status 
of emotional theory that occurs in the Romantic period. In the Aristotelian 
understanding of catharsis, the emotional theory is directed at the audience. In the 
Romantic understanding o f catharsis, the cathartic effect is aimed at the artist himself.141 
This can be seen as one indication as to why the artist, or creator behind the work of art, 
becomes the centre o f attention.
What is also evident from Beardsley’s research is, that the artist is regarded as both a 
genius, and a sacred instrument in the Romantic period. If the artist is being referred to 
as ‘God's tripod’ by Victor Hugo (1802-1885), or ‘G od’s anointed’ by Goethe, it 
follows that the role o f the artist is elevated to new heights at this time.142Attention is 
also drawn in Beardsley’s ‘Aesthetics’, to the ivory tower syndrome into which artists 
are categorised in the nineteenth century. As he explains a widely held perception of the 
artist as genius isolates him from society.
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‘The artist's paradox is that o f  the mystical saint; both need their lone 
wilderness retreat; i f  they are to bring back to society the fruits o f  their 
meditation,l43
In order that the artist can devote himself fully to his highest obligation, art itself, the 
demand for freedom from external pressures is recognised. However, due recognition 
to the need for isolation and freedom is acknowledged, in much the same way as it is 
understood that a scientist may need to be shut away in order to produce ‘something o f  
the highest value that cannot be achieved in the rush o f  ordinary affairs,144 
Consequently the artist bears responsibility only to his creative genius and to nothing 
else. The artist makes an assertion for the right to freedom of self- expression, the gifted 
individual who must express himself or perish. What emerges therefore is the idea that 
the work of such inspired artists takes on the role of magic. As Beardsley points out, 
the creative needs of artists requires special consideration in view o f the mysterious 
nature o f his vocation
‘the transcendent importance o f  his calling; and something o f  M allarme’s view 
that the artist practices a mystery which cannot be revealed to the masses who 
are not initiated into its rites ’ 145
Many o f the questions that arise in the nineteenth century are central to the function and 
relevance of art. These questions are posited by artists themselves, and also are o f great 
interest to the critics. As Beardsley points out, a central motive behind a work o f art, in 
the Romantic period, is to arouse the emotions. The role o f the critic expands as a 
result. The critic must consider the work of art, but he must also consider the spiritual 
intention and sincerity of the artist.146 Questions that arise, relate to the positive or 
negative aspects of art and, how art can contribute favourably to society on the whole.
Demands upon the critics, to have a clear knowledge o f their subject matter, are stronger 
than ever before, in the nineteenth century. It comes as no surprise then, that some of 
the leading critics o f the time, e.g. William Hazlitt (1778-1830) publishes ‘On Reason 
and Imagination’ in 1826, and John Ruskin (1819-1900), another noted critic, publishes 
two volumes o f ‘Modem Painters’, in 1846 and 1853. Both these writers are deeply 
committed to the productive paradigm of art and imagination. As Beardsley points out,
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Coleridge believes, ‘The critic’s job  is to look fo r  deeper unities’141 Interest of this 
nature is a reminder o f the theorists, Alberti, da Vinci, and Durer, in the Renaissance 
period, where the Humanist impetus first emerges.
It is not surprising therefore that a prevailing belief o f ‘Art fo r  A r t’s sake’ gains 
prominence in the late nineteenth century. Beardsley makes the point that, ‘Art fo r  a r t’s 
sake’, has its own code of professional ethics, its own laws, which must be obeyed. 
These are demanded by each individual work of art itself ‘to be developed and
1 A O
perfected' ‘Art fo r  A r t’s sake’ can be related to Kantian philosophy. For Kant, art is 
anything but utilitarian, 1fo r  its purposiveness is without purpose’. Christoph Friedrich 
Schiller (1759-1805) sustains Kant’s position. Schiller expands on Kantian philosophy 
and ensures its continued relevance149.
Beardsley also supplies considerable evidence o f the support given to the concept of 
‘art fo r  a r t’s sake’ by noteworthy writers and critics of the nineteenth century. For 
instance, Beardsley refers to the fact that Victor Hugo, French Novelist, is a great 
champion of ‘art fo r  a r t’s sake’, and artistic freedom. Theophile Gautier (1811-1872), 
noted writer and critic, also supports ‘art fo r  a rt’s sake’ and ‘defends the right o f art to 
be itself and o f  the artist to go his own way. ’ 150The artist is the only one who can make 
the experience of art intrinsically worthy, according to Gautier. When Gautier attests to 
his belief in the autonomy of art,4/  believe in the autonomy o f  art; fo r  me art is not a 
means but an end. ’ Once again this comment raises the question o f the Aristotelian 
rationale o f causes. 151
Another notable writer, who supports the ‘art fo r  a r t’s sake’ view, is Charles Baudelaire 
(1821-1867). He vows that art has its own morality. The implication here is 
considerable. It would seem to suggest that art is not dependent on any outside agency 
to inject or encourage a moral outlook. But, it is the theories o f Leo Tolstoy (1828- 
1910) in particular that draw considerable comment from Beardsley. Tolstoy is 
someone who examines in detail the social responsibility o f art. He also attaches moral 
responsibility to art, because it is a production. He questions the functions that art may 
serve. For him, art is a means o f intercourse between man and man, so art is a medium 
for communicating feelings. His thoughts on art are very well expressed in the 
following quotation, and cited by Beardsley,
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"Art is a human activity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means o f
certain external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and that
)152others are infected by these feelings and also experience them ’
Tolstoy also introduces the question of what is counterfeit or bad art. This concept of 
counterfeit art will be examined in greater detail in the Post-modern period of art 
history. Basically, he says that good art is conveyed through the sincerity o f the artist, 
and the feelings he expresses. If in any way the artist pretends, imitates, uses tactics to 
shock or excite, and fails to invoke any depth of feeling, then the art work is lacking and 
counterfeit. The following statement by Tolstoy has a threefold implication
‘Good art is indispensable; it is a means o f  the movement o f  humanity forward
)  1 53towards perfection. The task o f  art is enormous ’
He, not only places a responsibility upon the artist to produce good art, he, also implies 
an obligation of accountability to the critic’s role, and, ultimately challenges the viewer, 
to have a responsible attitude to art. Where the didactic role o f the art of the Middle 
Ages is concerned with moral rectitude, based on fear o f a judgemental God, the art of 
the Romantic period, assigns the judgement to the viewer himself, to act as a guide to 
moral rectitude.
So the question arises as to how, or by what means, the artist uses his materials to 
convey his feelings to the viewer. Once again, symbol and metaphor are put to 
widespread use. As Beardsely comments, the use o f symbols is prevalent, to try and 
capture this wonderful inner glow o f meaning that attaches to art o f this period154. This 
is a reminder of the art o f the Middle Ages, but what must now be accepted is, that 
already in the nineteenth century, Goethe makes an important distinction between the 
notion o f allegory and symbol as follows. Allegory brings the universal and the 
particular together externally. Symbol’s function, is to bring the object and the subject 
together, in order to suggest the ideal meaning to the mind o f the individual155. William 
Schlegel (1767-1845), another critic, then makes the link between the spiritual and the 
material object through symbol.
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The widespread adoption o f the use o f symbol and metaphor in poetry influences the 
visual arts. For instance it becomes quite common for Romantic artists to include verse 
with their visual art works. Plate 14, a painting by JMWTumer was accompanied by 
verse when exhibited. The symbol carves out a substantial niche for itself in the 
Romantic period and earns its autonomous position. According to Baudelaire, whose 
opinion, that everything is related, and that similarities exist between all things, suggests 
a system o f universal analogy.156 The artist, in a particular way, is gifted in locating 
these analogies. A very effective way to communicate analogy is through symbol. 
Symbolism, as an art movement, is a means to communicate a transcendental idea by 
the use o f symbols o f material objects. Such artists that adopt Symbolism as their form 
of communication include Odilon Redon (1840-1916), Gustave Moreau (1826-1898) 
Henri Rousseau (1844-1910) Auguste Rodin (1840-1917) and Edvard Munch (1863- 
1944). Plate 15 by Edvard Munch is a good example o f how the symbolic is used.
Hand in hand with artists and writers trying to establish universal analogies, is the 
growing mechanisation and materialism of the nineteenth century. This situation, of 
course, has deep consequences for aesthetic theory, and the creative process. So, while 
on the one hand, art is produced by such Romantic artists as Eugene Delacroix, James 
Mallord William Turner (1775-1851) John Constable (1776-1837), and Casper David 
Friedrich (1774-1840). Plate 16 On the other, a school o f  thought gradually emerges 
that adopts a Realist, rather than a Romantic, approach to art; realists, including, Honore 
Daumier (1808-1879), Gustave Courbet (1819-1877), Jean Francois Millet (1814-1875) 
Thomas Eakins (1844-1916). Plate 17
Such divergent reactions, to an analysis of the world, are recorded in the critical theory 
of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and referred to by Beardsley. Firstly, 
Schopenhauer looks at the world as phenomenon, and what this implies. The 
phenomenal world includes material objects, orderly relations o f space, time, and 
causality. This world is subject to a principle o f sufficient reason. Ordinary practical 
consciousness necessarily understands the things of the phenomenal world to stand in 
spatial and temporal relations, to be connected by causal laws. In order to understand 
and explain events in this phenomenal world, common sense inquiry, as well as
157empirical science, is ruled by this a priori condition o f space, time, and cause.
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But behind this phenomenal world is the noumenal world. Shopenhauer compares the 
noumenal world to ‘an irrational and limitless urge, the Will to L ive.' He professes a 
belief in a noumenal world that is free o f the principle o f sufficient reason, space, time 
and causality. This is reminiscent o f Kant and his theory of purpose without 
purposedness. It is a striving to understand the mystery o f life. So, really what he is 
saying is, that there are two forces fighting for survival, firstly the rational, secondly the 
emotional, not necessarily in that order. He attaches the emotional to intuition, and the 
spiritual aspects of human nature. He also believes there is no satisfying this longing. 
However, what he does say is, that art alone can transport the viewer out o f  this misery 
of longing. Art alone makes life tolerable. This is a new way of looking at art. It is 
not didactic. It is not aimed at a greater reality. Art is firmly linked to the emotional 
well being o f the individual. It is an instrument, whereby the viewer can lose himself in 
contemplation, and become one with the object o f his perception. Schopenhauer has no 
doubt as to the importance of art, or indeed the artist
‘But what kind o f knowledge is concerned with that which is outside and 
independent o f  all relations, that which alone is really essential to the world, the
> 158true content o f  its phenonema, etc. ? We answer Art, the work ofgenius ’
This theory of the phenomenal world is understandable, given the preoccupation with 
the usefulness o f things, and their material value, that is linked with the Industrial 
Revolution, that occurs in the nineteenth century. However, it is most interesting that, 
Shopenhauer is deeply committed to the contemplative aspect o f art, and feels, that art 
alone is the haven to which human beings can turn, in a time that is so heavily 
committed to practicality. Again the question of Kant’s theory of disinterestedness is 
raised.
Art has no practical use, its value lies in the experience afforded by its 
contemplative reception, the gratification itself o f  becoming a pure will less 
subject o f  knowledge, freed  from the burden and curse o f  se lf assertion ’ and 
'Works o f  art exist to present Ideas ’ 159
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For Schopenhauer, as pointed out by Terry Eagleton, the aesthetic transfigures the 
attitude to reality. In Shopenhauer’s attitude to contemplation a Kantian air of 
disinterestedness can be detected. Eagleton summarises
"the asthetic is what ruptures fo r  a blessed moment'the terrible say o f  teleology, 
the tangled chain o f  functions and effects into which all things are locked, 
plucking an object fo r  an instant out o f  the clammy grip o f  will and savouring it 
as pure spectacle ,I6°
Immediately, what is apparent here is the correlation between critical theory and art 
practice. It is not difficult to imagine that one understanding that may be deduced from 
the foregoing theory that Realism, as an art practice, belongs to the phenomenal world, 
and Romanticism, belongs to the noumenal world.
When Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), develops Shopenhauer’s theory of the 
noumenal world, his interest is in the nature o f the creative idea, the nature o f the 
impulse to make art. Again it is Beardsley who follows Nietzsche’s line of enquiry. He 
makes the point, that artistic creativity is the result o f the overflowing of a super 
abundance of life force. Similar to Schopenhauer, he attributes a redemptive quality to 
art. Artists create work, and celebrate this life force in the work, in order that it may 
reflect this self same life force back to the creator. This theory again supports the idea of 
the central preoccupation of Romantic art with the individual artist. However the 
benefits are also there for the viewer. Similar to Schopenhauer, Nietsche attributes a 
redemptive quality to art, as can be deduced from the following quotation cited by 
Beardsley, "Art is essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification o f  
existence 161
As Kearney points out, the combination o f Romantic imagination and German Idealism 
is unable to blot out the reality o f the world. The imagination then has to retreat into the 
world of illusion.162. However this state o f affairs can only sustain itself for a certain 
period. Eventually the need to adjust to what is happening in the world is reflected in 
the Existentialist theories that are already apparent in the hypotheses of Schopenhauer 
and Nietsche.
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To summarise the Romantic period, a number of important developments occur. The 
establishment of a new paradigm of imagination, i.e. an imagination as production, 
results in a closer association between theorists, artists and critics. Regarding the artist, 
as someone who isolates himself from the world, in order to create, carries two 
implications. One, that the artist may be removed from the political and practical 
realities of life, and two, that the artist can concentrate solely on the social conditions o f 
the world. The focus on the life o f the artist gives art a more central role. Art as a 
vehicle through which self -expression can be explored; an art that can excite important 
moral issues receives the support o f theorists and critics alike. Due to the rise and 
acceptance of scientific research, and the perception o f art as a living organism, 
analogies are drawn between the research of the scientist, and the research and 
development of the artist. Yet what is still running through the advanced theories is the 
underlying acknowledgement o f a spiritual dimension to life.
The turmoil and tension, between rationality and spontaneity, is expressed through the 
different art movements that develop in the nineteenth century. It could be argued that 
the rationalist view is supported by the Realist movement; the spontaneous idealistic 
view by the Romantic movement; the Symbolist movement might be seen as an effort to 
bridge the gap between the two, or as an effort to synthesise the Apollonian and 
Dionysian characteristics that are to be found in every human being.
Already, in the late nineteenth century, it is apparent no definitive answer to the mystery 
of how knowledge is best acquired or responsibly transmitted is clear-cut. However, 
what is unambiguous is the importance that can be attributed to art. Despite 
proclamations o f the death o f art, or indeed, the death o f philosophy, the following 
periods in art history are equally puzzled by what it is to be a human being. One 
question that remains relevant however, is how art and the practice o f art can serve as a 
beacon, and offer some light, through the maze o f possible avenues presented for 
exploration by the prevailing political and social structures. While the emphasis to this 
point has been concerned with the period up to the end o f the nineteenth century the 
following chapter will concern itself with the convolutions and contortions of ideas 
familiar to those for whom the twentieth century is not too distant. The Modem period 
of art history is one that launches the twentieth century into a milieu o f controversy
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where efforts continue to try to resolve the integral relationship between cultural, 
sociological and political issues.
52
Chapter II: Modern Dynamics:
The impact o f political and social conditions on the world o f aesthetics is considerable 
throughout the twentieth century. What is generally understood by the term Modernism, 
a term associated with art and aesthetics extends over a period o f approximately one 
hundred years, dating from the latter half o f the nineteenth century to the middle of the 
twentieth century, circa 1960. Modem can often be confused as a term applying to 
current conditions. Here Modem applies to Modernist ideals, philosophies, and art 
movements of the aforementioned historical period.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century scientific proofs become the new 
canon of genuine scholastic achievement as a consequence o f the high status that 
attaches to scientific research. Scientific proof is also applied to the canon of art. One 
product o f this development is the increased importance that attaches to aesthetics and 
art criticism. Hauser sees this advancement, and its consequences, reflected in art, as it 
continues to move from its traditional role
‘into an expensive plaything o f  the cultured bourgeoisie and philosophical rebus
o f  the academic and critical intelligentsia,l63
As, in all other great changes in art practice, there is no defining moment when what we 
call the Modernist movement in art is born. The voice of the critic reaches new heights 
and responsibility. The voice of the critic adds, to the deliberations of different 
philosophers and theorists, actively engaged in trying to resolve the role art plays in 
society. A claim, made by Clement Greenberg, art critic and seminal figure as regards 
the publicity surrounding art in the twentieth century, is that the greatest difference 
between criticism in the Enlightenment period, and, in the Modem period, is that the 
former has an external nature, whereas the latter is self engendered.164 In other words, 
the didactic approach adopted by Kant, the idea o f self-criticism as expressed in the 
Critique of Pure Judgement, adapts itself to a Modernist theory of art. The intensity, 
with which this self- criticism of art is approached, draws more and more attention to 
the importance of art in the development o f society. This confirms the dynamics of the
53
aesthetic question; Kantian theory o f the eighteenth century being resurrected, refined 
and readmitted into the aesthetics of Modem art.
Under this new didactic approach each discipline to be considered, under the term art, 
instigates its own self- criticism, independently o f any other art discipline. Because of 
this preoccupation with itself, it is more noticeable that the language o f art is distinctive. 
A term, now commonly used in the language of aesthetics, is hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics is the term used for describing the translation of the language of art into a 
language of experience. Basically, the task o f hermeneutics is to translate from one 
language into another, by way o f intelligible structure, what the former is really trying 
to convey. 165However, no meaning can be elicited without a willingness to understand, 
or an anticipation o f what may be meant. An understanding such as this echoes 
Hegelian theory. As Hans Georg Gadamer puts it, a work of art, in a particular way, 
presents a challenge and expresses an excess o f meaning, rather like a discovery o f 
something not previously revealed.166
Several adjectives may be applied to describe the technological and philosophical 
debates that pertain to the Modem period in history. These may include authentic, 
futuristic, constructionist, formalist, psychoanalytic, revolutionary, populist, elitist, 
existentialist, and Marxist.
Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), opens up aesthetic discussion of the twentieth century, 
according to Beardsley. Croce’s position is outlined in a paper entitled ‘Fundamental 
Theses o f an Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic’, published in 
1902, in which he carefully examines the objective and subjective nature of 
knowledge167. He believes that when it comes to criticism, it is important to separate 
the theoretical from the practical, and argues, that clear thought cannot be expressed in 
an obscure manner. Basically, he believes that art is an expression that draws all the 
complexities of intuitions together, to form a single feeling or emotion. He isolates the
i z :o
aesthetic emotion from any other physical activity, and points to its unique quality .
He also points out, that the failure o f a work o f art lies in the fact, that the intuitions 
have not been completely expressed or ratified by the artist.169 A natural consequence 
of this position might infer that the responsibility for a work of art lies solely within the
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mind of the artist. Therefore, the question o f the construct of the imagination is again 
raised.
Consequently, the focus of study here is directed to a critical analysis o f four major 
influences that contribute to the complexity of Modem aesthetics. The features of 
Modernism that come under scrutiny are Existentialism, Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and 
Formalism. In a particular way, the foregoing relate to the understanding of the 
imagination. As we have seen, the imagination has substantial links with mystery, and 
visual art. The Modem era in aesthetics is chronologically so close to the present time 
that Modem philosophies and aesthetical questions appear familiar. One explanation 
may be, that the theories of Modernism are very relevant to the Post Modernist aesthetic 
debates of today. No doubt an historical relationship is vital to all preceding theories, 
because it is often, with the benefit of hindsight, that solutions to current problems may 
be found.
Some of the main protagonists in this evolution of ideas and styles can be attributed to 
thinkers such as Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) Friedrich Nietsche (1844-1900) 
Edmund Husserl(l 859-1938), Albert Camus (1913-1960) Martin Heidegger (1889- 
1976) Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980). These are mainly concerned with Existentialist 
theories.
The theories of Karl Marx dominate the scholarship undertaken by the Frankfurt 
School. The Frankfurt School, set up in 1923, consists of a group o f intellectuals 
supported by Frankfurt University. Prominent members of this school include, Walter 
Benjamin (1892-1940), Theodor Adomo (1903-1969), Max Horkheimer (1896-1973) 
Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979). Jurgen Habermas(1929-)
Moving to the next significant influence o f the Modem period it should become evident 
how the explorations into the sub- conscious by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), affect the 
direction of the social and artistic thrusts of this period. A study o f Freud precipitates 
an examination o f the work of Carl Gustav Jung. (1875-1961).
The responses o f art critics, Clive Bell, and Roger Fry, will present a substantial 
resume of how the varying psychological, social, technological and political
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undercurrents influence the visual art of this period. Clive Bell et al, challenge aesthetic 
claims regarding works of art with great emphasis.170 More and more the role of the 
critic appears to eclipse the more philosophic attitude o f the aesthetician.
It remains to be seen, what will emerge, if  with the advances in technological, 
psychological and epistemological scholarship, a more concise understanding of 
mystery is presented. If  human beings continue to struggle in order to strike a balance 
between the immanent and the transcendent?
What should be clear, from the foregoing look at the history of aesthetics, is a sense of 
exploration; a search, to locate some clarity, regarding a particular aspect o f what is in 
vogue, in the cultural climate o f a specific era. Central to this is a sense o f adventure 
and thirst for knowledge, which might eventually lead to an extraordinary insight. Such 
extraordinary insight implies tremendous ramifications for the history of art. Essential 
to this is, the idea o f a journey along a road, with various signposts, that on some 
occasions leads to cul de sacs, and on others, leads to extraordinary vistas o f incredible 
potential. Another aspect, which may be deduced from the above research, is the 
recognition of a certain unrest and dissatisfaction. The latter is indicated by the fact that 
philosophers, from each era, are apt to disagree as to what direction to take, when their 
journey appears to point them down a one-way street. What comes to mind, 
immediately, is the notion that 'Art is dead’, which is the mantra o f some theorists in 
the early twentieth century. This results in the anarchic thrust of art forms such as 
Dadaism and Surrealism. It is reasonable to assume that some, like Baudrillard and 
Said, believe that contemporary art has also reached a dead end. However, it is to be 
hoped that such a negative outlook may not be the only option open to art and 
aesthetics.
As already pointed out the Romantic period encourages the autonomy of the individual. 
Romantic ideals promote a humanism that supports the belief that the human condition 
can conquer all eventualities despite prevailing social conditions. This is especially 
evident in well known art works of the period. Plate 18
According to Kearney, Romantic culture conceals the condition of social existence, at 
the same time as it affirms the condition of aesthetic existence. Kantian and Heglian 
philosophy, adopted by the Romantics, is instrumental in the rise o f bourgeois culture.
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Hegelian philosophy, believes in the superiority of the mental and spiritual realm of 
value, above the practicalities of social conditions. Kearney puts forward a summary of 
the German Idealist stand on transcendental doctrine, as follows
‘ With the discovery o f  the transcendental imagination each individual dispenses 
with all worldly and heavenly mediations and becomes the immediate source o f  
value 'I?I
It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois culture, concerns itself with the individual. 
Freedom, happiness and beauty are the goals o f this society. This utopian dream is far 
removed from the society that exists at the end o f the nineteenth century. As Kearney 
puts it, ‘The pure humanity o f  art became the counter-image o f  what obtained in
reality’ 172
It is inevitable that a belief in universality of opportunity and value is challenged by the 
philosophers of the time. It is also reflected in the emergence of Realism as an art form 
expressed through the work of visual artists such as Honore Daumier (1808-1879). 
Plate 19
Soren Kierkegaard (1815-1859), the Danish philosopher, is the first notable proponent 
of existentialist theory. This theory, as expressed by Kierkegaard and researched by 
Kearney, exposes the limits o f man’s creative powers. Existentialism therefore is a 
philosophy o f human finitude. Kearney draws attention to the emergence o f an 
existentialist outlook, which implies a movement from a basically affirmative culture, to 
a negative culture. 173
Kierkegaard considers the role of aesthetics is only one ingredient in the process of 
human development. The other components that foim a triadic in this process are 
religion and ethics. Romantic idealism supposes that the ethical and the religious can be 
subsumed under the aesthetic stage, but for Kierkegaard, the three coexist in the 
individual. What Kierkegaard holds, is that the human being must consider all three to 
make a free choice if, ‘he is to attain an authentic existence? ’174 His argument is, that if  
human beings confine themselves solely to the aesthetic, then authenticity cannot be 
attained.
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But, Kierkegaard takes his case further when, he points out, that the two stages, the 
ethical and the religious, impose limits on the creative imagination. The ethical presents 
responsibilities, to the individual other, and to the social other. ‘The religious stage 
transcends and dialectically recapitulates’ the two other stages, it transforms the
> 175irresponsible aesthetic attitude ‘m favour o f  a ‘leap offaith ’ towards the absolute ’
Kierkegaard freely admits that there is something absurd in taking the aforementioned 
position, as it cannot be backed by any traditional onto-theology. He is concerned with 
religion as an existential choice. To back up his argument, he tries to make an 
analogous connection between a religious act of faith, and an aesthetic act of 
imagination. He points to what is common to both. Neither can be based on rational 
discourse as in ''the objective norms o f  universal law ’; instead ‘both are expressions o f  
individual will, and both are existential projects without rational guarantee ’ But then, 
he also points out the essential difference between imagination, and faith, because faith 
in ‘its ‘subjective inwardness ’ posits, however absurdly, a relation to the transcendent 
Other beyond human subjectivity’176 while imagination, is ‘the inward face o f  will and 
desire before whose gaze all the contradictions and sufferings o f  reality seem to
1 77disappear’
It is understandable; therefore, that Kierkegaard disagrees with the efforts of Romantic 
idealism to elevate the human being to a Godlike status and to reduce God to the level 
of the human being. He warns against the glorification o f the imagination, and the 
power invested in it by the Romantics.
4The Promethean hope o f  Romantic idealism inevitably collapses into 
existentialist anguish; the terrifying discovery that the human imagination is, at
178bottom, a gaping void’
As Kearney points out, Kierkegaard has serious misgivings with the modem human 
being’s inclination towards confounding human imagination, with what he calls ‘divine 
invention’. The consequences o f such confusion, ‘betrays at once the existential finitude 
o f mankind and the eternal infinity o f  G o d 7J
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Kearney does point out, that Kierkegaard does concede, that the imagination can play a 
positive role. In his later work, Kierkegaard refines his earlier singular criticism of the 
Romantic idealism of the imagination i.e. a transcendent imagination. The ‘passion fo r  
the possible' as Kierkegaard describes the imagination, may serve, ‘on occasion, as in
j  180initiating force in the dialectical opening towards faith. ’
Imagination is the key to adventurous possibility for Friedrich Nietsche (1844-1900). 
One attitude he adopts, is to celebrate the eschewing of a transcendental deity, a 
condition he maintains that allows the imagination free rein. For him, this means there 
is no stricture on the possibilities o f imaginative power. He avers that traditionally, by 
subscribing to the notion that God is the prime mover, man is denied the power to 
decide for himself.
As Nietsche sees it, existentialist theory exposes holes in the arguments o f German 
Idealism and Romanticism, particularly in relation to truth. Nietsche points to the failure 
the Enlightement project as, "The so called thirst fo r  knowledge, may be traced to the 
lust o f  appropriation and conquest’.m  Traditionally, truth is regarded as being fixed in 
God. For Nietsche, truth is a fictional notion, orchestrated by man, in the quest for 
power. Consequently Nietsche regards German Idealism and Romanticism as the
1 R0obfuscation o f the absurdities of reality.
Kearney also points out, how Nietsche strongly upholds the notion that good and evil 
are man made inventions, basically for manipulative purposes. Even though 
Kierkegaard discloses the void at the heart o f human existence, he allows a glimmer of 
light through which one may take a leap o f faith. Nietsche, does not allow for this 
possibility. He maintains, the nothingness of existence has to be confronted. By 
reversing Kierkegaard’s model of three stages of existence, he lifts the aesthetic stage 
above and beyond the religious, and the ethical stages. For him, therefore, the aesthetic 
stage is the highest expression of existence. For a moment this assumption might 
suggest a strong alignment with Romantic idealism; the basic difference being, 
however, that the latter form their theories from a belief in the transcendent, while 
Nietsche, bases his hypothesis in a belief in the abyss o f nothingness.
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Despite Nietsche’s negation of the authenticity of the creative imagination, because, in 
his view, it depends on illusion to be taken as truths, he does admit, the creative 
imagination is authentic, for the very reason that it acknowledges its basis in illusion. 
His attitude is, that for the inventiveness o f the imagination to be put to proper use,
‘one has to abandon all established notions o f  truth'. Thus ‘the se lf contained infinity o f
y 183G od’ can be ‘replaced by the open infinity o f  human interpretation ’
Nietsche’s assertions go on to claim that truth can only be formed on a fictional basis, 
so truth has to be created. His understanding of truth is ‘no more nor less than an army 
o f  metaphors’ } u  Existence is made up of a series o f cover -ups ‘which the human 
imagination invents fo r  itself in order to experience an endless multiplicity o f  meanings ’ 
185 He denounces metaphysics as fiction. If the latter is the case, he argues, and then 
truth is an illusion and has to be created. To adopt Nietsche’s position then the concept 
of truth may only be formed on a fictional basis.
But when it comes to art, Nietsche makes a distinction, on one side there is fictional 
truth posing as reality, and on the other is art, ‘that is masquerading as truth but which 
knows itself to be fic tion ’186. He attributes a positive influence to art because its’ ‘se lf
acknowledged lies  enhance the creative playfulness o f  e x is te n c e 1X7 For him, art
has a more powerful influence than knowledge, because ‘art desires life whereas 
knowledge achieves as its ultimate goal only destruction’, because it denies reality. But 
if  art can be considered as ‘great ennobler o f  life ’ it may only do so in so far as ‘it is
/oo . ,
prepared to let nothingness be Nietsche argues, Christianity is nihilistic, because it 
negates the possibility of nothingness in art. Whereas he has admiration for those in the 
artistic world who exercise their imagination and so "dare to express the multifaceted 
complexity o f  existence’ 189
The contradictions in Nietsche are, on the one hand he believes in the creative 
imagination as a limitless source, ‘Art and nothing but a r t’, said Nietsche, we have art 
in order not to die o f  the truth’. 190 On the other, he believes in the limits of our 
concrete existence, and talks about the abyss o f nothingness. Neither Kierkegaard, nor 
Nietsche, despite their in-depth epistemological enquiry into the imagination, solves the 
enigma o f the creative imagination. They do, however, draw attention to some of the 
complexities of the puzzle.
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Together with, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus 
(1913-1960) carries the torch o f Existentialism into the nineteenth century. Continuing 
with Nietsche’s theory o f the meaninglessness of existence, Kearney refers to the fact 
that Camus, recognises the necessity to face up to this perceived reality, namely, the 
futility o f existence.191 Camus, understands that a recognition o f the world as it is, 
provides a platform from which to move forward, and become ‘ the great artist, the 
creator ’.192 As Kearney points out, Camus, makes a sincere effort to confront the 
‘contemporary crisis o f  nihilism ’, and asserts, that the only way to do this, is to reaffirm 
‘the creative power o f human imagination’, while, at the same time, admitting the 
absurdity o f this creation.193 Camus’ analysis of the absurdity o f nature is, the 
unbridgeable gap between the imagination’s desire to transform the world, and the 
refusal o f the world to be transformed. In other words, an impossible situation exists, 
on the one hand, man’s search for meaning and, on the other, the meaninglessness of the 
universe. Kearney refers to Camus’ interpretation of Nietsche’s idea of existentialist 
imagination, that draws an analogy between war and the absurd,
‘So it is with the absurd: it is a question o f  breathing with it, o f  recognising its
lessons and recovering their flesh. In this regard the absurd jo y  par excellence
194is creation.
It is interesting to note how Camus’ use of metaphor gives a positive slant to the 
existentialist imagination. As Kearney specifies, Camus’ theory, the greatest difference 
between the existentialist imagination and the romantic imagination is a question of 
admission. The existentialist imagination owns up to its fictitious nature, whereas the 
romantic imagination does not.195 This admission allows for the possibility o f moving 
forward so the existentialist creative imagination is content to produce myths.
Camus, uses the myth of Sisyphus as an example of the absurd.196 His argument is that 
even within this absurdity it is possible to outlive the absurd. Sisyphus is cognisant of 
the fact that he is not really achieving anything by his repetitive acts. But, by showing 
contempt for the futility o f his acts, he can adapt to his seemingly useless acts. What is 
important is the struggle towards the heights, and not the futility o f the journey. In 
other words, acceptance of the inevitable allows a possibility for achievement in the act
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of doing. This position has a much more positive outcome for the individual than the 
one taken by Nietsche.
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), as the founder o f the phenomenological movement in 
modem philosophy, marks a new approach to logic. In his book entitled ‘The Idea of 
Phenomenology’ published in 1907, he defends phenomenology as, that which is before 
the mind when a human being has a thought.197 The main interest o f the 
phenomenologist is the content o f consciousness and the consciousness o f things rather 
than natural sciences’ preoccupation with the things o f this world. Basically, the 
phenomenologist is seeking a primordial or ultimate understanding of things. For the 
purpose o f this essay the concern is with the phenomenon o f consciousness.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), famous for his modem interpretation o f traditional 
metaphysics, adapts Husserl’s theory of phenomenology towards a greater 
understanding of Kant. He is fascinated with Kantian philosophy. In his controversial 
work ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics’ (1929), Heidegger, points to the fact that, 
in his opinion, Kant already knows about the finitude o f human subjectivity.
Heidegger believes that Kantian theory revolutionises thought regarding the 
imagination, in so far as Kantian theory initiates the case for the formative property o f 
imagination e.g. its productive role. The main purpose that Kant attributes to the role o f 
the imagination is that o f a productive power ‘presupposed by sensation and
)198understanding rather than a derived intermediary function which comes after them ’ 
Heidegger develops Kant’s recognition o f the imagination’s power to intuit images, and 
produce them itself, without depending on ‘representations o f  empirical perceptions 
He makes the connection between this a priori condition and ‘the origin o f  our intuition 
o f  time' ‘"According to Heidegger, if  imagination is an original power of production, 
then, without it, sensation and understanding can have no meaning. So, Heidegger 
credits Kant as the first person who questions the timelessness o f ‘Being’.
In ‘Being and Time’, published in 1927, and referred to by Keamey, Heidegger takes 
Kant’s interpretation o f the transcendental imagination and gives it an existential 
reinterpretation. In his efforts to advance Kant’s understanding o f the imagination, 
[imagination produced through sensibility and understanding, i.e. transcendental
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imagination], he limits the concept of imagination to temporality, ‘as a finite being 
towards death which projects itself out o f  nothing towards nothing’.200 Therefore, 
according to his interpretation, the metaphysical concepts o f ‘Being’, really emerge 
from the limiting in time o f the projections o f imagination. It is reasonable to assume, 
that in this interpretation o f the temporality of the imagination, the traditional concept of 
the timelessness o f ‘Being’ is refuted.
It is most interesting to note, as indicated by Kearney, how Heidegger moves modem 
philosophy away from the transcendental concept o f imagination by renaming the 
imagination Dasein, which in German means existence.
‘ beyond the anthropological basis o f  modern idealism to a philosophy which
reveals that human being, qua Dasein, is in fa c t grounded on the non-ground o f
201nothingness, a non-ground which gapes into Being'.
It is also fascinating to remark that, where Nietsche talks about the abyss of 
nothingness, Heidegger talks about the abyss o f ‘Being’. Nietsche’s abyss of 
nothingness implies hopelessness, whereas Heidegger’s abyss o f ‘Being’ offers a 
positive possibility.
As already demonstrated, through analyses o f other philosophies, Husserl and 
Heidegger’s theory o f phenomenology, adds to the story o f the mystery o f human 
existence; developments that connect so strongly to the concept of imagination upon 
which visual art is so dependent.
According to Kearney, Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980), and Camus, share a ‘common
202fidelity to the struggle o f  imagination in a meaningless world'. Where Heidegger
wants to move away from the anthropological understanding of imagination, Jean Paul 
Sartre is keen to cherish and restore the anthropological nature of the imagination. For 
him, the great function o f consciousness is to create a world o f unreality.
Starting from a phenomenological base, Sartre expands on the studies o f Husserl and 
Heidegger. In his phenomenological attempts to describe the essential characteristics of 
imaginative activity, Sartre points to four distinct features.
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In the first place, the imagination is a productive activity, a position far from the 
traditional Platonian idea that images are deposited in the memory. According to 
Kearney, Sartre agrees with the existential idea that the essential life of consciousness is 
an intentional activity. The imagination is a phenomenon o f human significance 
independent o f empiricism. 203 Images are intentional projections o f consciousness, and 
it is only through this understanding of image that the essential characteristics of 
imaginative activity can be understood.
Sartre points to a distinction between image and percept. While both are different ways 
of being conscious o f objects, they are not different objects of consciousness. He 
refines these further into categories o f the real and the unreal, passive and spontaneous.
It is important to note his comments on symbol. His explanation, that the image is a 
deliberate act of consciousness, so therefore it cannot later acquire symbolic meaning. 
In other words the symbolic meaning is inherent in the image and therefore cannot be 
detached from the image. ‘The image is defined by Sartre, accordingly as a sui generis 
act o f  consciousness independent o f  both the percept and the concept ’204
Secondly, the percept he defines as the real presentation of the object, and the image as 
the unreal presentation o f the object. ‘ The quasi reality o f  the image is different to and 
fundamentally distinct from  the literal reality o f  the percept. ’ 205 This understanding of 
image will prove interesting for a postmodernist philosophy of the counterfeit. What 
may be implied from Sartre’s enquiry is, that there is something absent in the image. 
According to him, it is the hint o f an absent world which pulls the present one into 
shape, and endows it with meaning, so ‘imagination fa r  from  appearing as an actual 
characteristic o f  consciousness turns our to be an essential and transcendental 
condition o f  consciousness,206
Thirdly, Sartrean theory, as presented by Kearney, argues that imagination is an active 
genesis which spontaneously creates its meaning out of itself. '‘Imagination is a
}2 Q H
spontaneity o f  free subjectivity left entirely to its own devices ’ . Perception is a passive
genesis, which receives its object and subsequently works it out. According to him the
• > 208  • image is always spontaneous ‘immediately present to and identical with itself. This
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theory of passive and active responses to the image is hugely relevant to the 
understanding of visual art.
Fourthly, Sartre’s argument for the freedom of the imagination incorporates a belief of 
an image as, ‘ a nothingness ’ ‘ To project an imaginary world is ipso facto to negate the 
real world’.209 This, latter statement, is an imaginative projection. More light on this 
subject will emerge when psychoanalysis is examined. Again Sartre appears to be 
raising questions regarding the 4purpose without purposedness ’ of Kant.
Kearney continues, having established an imaginary world is different from the world
of existence, Sartre makes a case that the imaginary world o f art is a double negation o f
the world of existence. Because art is a state o f pure nothingness, and cannot be reduced
to the world o f perceptible things, and because, according to Sartre, beauty cannot be
210‘experienced as a perception and which by its very nature is out o f  this world. He 
believes that art is final in itself, and that it is impossible to be present to the real and the 
unreal at the same time, when confronted with art.
In his efforts to explain the dualism between the real and the imaginary, Sartre takes the 
phenomenological approach, between being- in- itself, e.g. the material facticity, and 
being- for- itself e.g. the inner freedom from material facticity. As Kearney explains, 
Sartre believes, the ultimate goal o f consciousness is to combine the inner freedom of 
existence with the outer necessity o f being -  a synthesis o f pure freedom and pure 
necessity. Sartre admits that God is what represents this ideal synthesis
'But while Sartre admits that such an ideal project o f  divine existence is what 
every human subject desires, he declares such a project is impossible’ 211
This is part of the puzzle that Sartre cannot solve. His theory would suggest the divide 
is too big between nothingness and being.
‘ The ultimate human project to be God is a mere fiction that can never be 
realized. It possesses all the ‘unreality’ o f  an imaginary object. It is a 
nothingness projected by an imaginative consciousness ’2I2
Based on the above argument, Sartre’s conclusion is that God is nothingness, and a 
product of imagination, but his theory does not offer a solution as to how to bridge this
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gap. It appears that he does, at all times, imply the object of consciousness is the search 
for what is absent.
But as Kearney notes, in Sartre’s book ‘Being and Nothingness’ published in 1956, he 
assigns the being- for- itself of consciousness, as value. Value, is defined by Sartre, as 
the possibility of a meaningful and unified existence: an always absent possibility 
imagined in order to try to make some sense of experience, what is not yet determining 
what is. For Sartre, however, this value is an imaginary something that is desired by 
human existence, but, at the same time, according to Sartre’s own interpretation of 
imagination, value cannot be defined as a phenomenon. The question arises that; 
perhaps Sartre is substituting the idea o f God with value. If however, Sartre holds that 
art is complete in itself then his idea of art does not allow for the possibility o f absence.
Sartre is full o f contradiction. It appears that on one hand he is upholding the 
arbitrariness of consciousness,
‘Human consciousness is always to be equated with freedom to the extent that it
} 213is always moving beyond the real towards the imaginary ’
While on the other, he is acknowledging the possibility, or indeed the necessity, of a 
goal. At the same time that Sartre recognizes that if  human beings acknowledge the 
omnipresent activity of imagination, then human beings are acknowledging their 
freedom from the given reality. There can be no doubt, however, as to the importance 
that Sartre attaches to the role o f the imagination.
‘Deprived o f  imagination the human subject is ‘crushed in the world, run 
through by the real’; he is reduced to the condition o f a mere thing in the midst 
o f things ’214
In Kearney’s interpretation, Sartre takes the position, that if  imagination is the 
‘transcendent condition o f  all consciousness’ then, a human being’s existence comes 
before his essence; and, each subject makes their own choice as to what they become, 
with their own particular meaning or value. Part o f this theory accepts ‘a project o f  
imagination which negates what is in order to open up possibilities o f  what is not yet’. 
Because this freedom of choice exists it is necessary to obliterate the possibility o f God. 
Sartre disagrees with Kierkegaard, and the possibility o f a leap o f faith towards a deity,
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Sartre believes in the ‘leap towards existence.’ In his later work Sartre admits a faith in 
existence will produce the authentic human being, ethical, moral and responsible.
‘Sartre now affirms that the human act o f  self-creation is in itself an act o f  moral 
commitment’. 215 As Kearney notes, Sartre goes on to compare, the moral choice or 
self-creation with a work of art, his reason being that both comprise creation and 
invention.
Kearney also points out, that Sartre recognises a problem if  self-creation has moral 
implications. His reasoning is, if  all human beings have the same self -determining 
morality, morality must collapse into an absolute relation of conflicting values. This 
poses the question of how it may be possible to have a universal morality. As Kant has 
already worked out, that a universal morality can only be applied if  each individual acts
' 216‘in a way that is universalizable fo r  others', this leaves Sartre with a dilemma. He is 
forced to make a choice between the primacy o f imagination, and the primacy o f reason. 
Sartre opts to move from ‘an existentialism o f  subjective imagination to a Marxism o f  
dialectical reason,2I? In other words to move from the more individual consciousness o f 
imagination, into the more collective, discursive possibilities of the dialectic.
To summarise this period in art history and critical theory what should be taken into 
account are the most relevant developments as regards the visual arts. Basically, in the 
late nineteenth century, and up to the middle of the twentieth century, social realities of 
technological development, and the impact of two World Wars, completely overturn 
Romantic Idealism. Romantic Idealism is anxious to ignore the facticity o f human 
existence. To redress this situation an existentialist theory evolves. The existentialist 
negation o f the imagination brings the finiteness o f human existence into conflict with 
Romantic illusion.
The intellectuals, most responsible for exploring the existentialist theory, include Soren 
Kierkegaard, Albert Camus, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. 
What appears to emerge has both positive and negative implications for the concept of 
mystery that is being explored.
On one hand, Kierkegaard concedes the fmitude of human existence, but has 
reservations about too much reliance on the imagination. He does, however, concede 
that imagination may have a positive contribution, in so far as it can institute a possible
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leap of faith towards the Absolute. In other words, he brings a Christian dimension to 
existentialism. Camus, through his interpretation o f the Sisyphus myth, also implies a 
possible solution to the awfulness o f reality. While Nietsche, considers the imagination 
to be the centre for every possible adventure, he dismisses truth, God, and Romantic 
Idealism as being manipulative forces to gain power. The redeeming aspect o f his 
theory is his view on art. It is here, Nietsche believes, that it is possible to find truth,
because art does not hide behind a fa?ade o f illusion. Art is the only means to present
218the ‘multifaceted complexity o f  existence’
The phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger, try to establish a primordial 
understanding of things. Heidegger, because o f his close association with Kantian 
theory, is most interested in the timelessness o f ‘Being’. The implication o f Heidegger’s 
theory, may be linked with that of Kierkegaard and Camus, all three acknowledge the 
possibility of hope in the Absolute.
Sartre contradicts or opposes Kierkegaard’s leap o f faith, he puts his trust in existence. 
As much as Heidegger wants to move from the anthropological understanding of 
imagination, Sartre wishes to cherish it. Even though Sartre believes that art can be 
compared to self- determination, he sees art as finality in itself. Sartre’s theory on art 
appears to contradict Nietsche, as Nietsche believes in the possibility o f truth in art. 
However, it is evident from Sartre’s late work that he is aware of the contradictory 
nature of existentialist humanism, and the creative imagination. Sartre maintains that the 
existentialist imagination has to die if  humanist man is to live on. What he means by 
this is that the indulgence of the autonomy of the individual implies the negation of the 
social responsibilities that surround the inclusive humanist objective.
So, despite the great advances and enormous scholarship undertaken by existentialist 
scholars, it is incumbent on The Frankfurt School, in the twentieth century, to pursue 
the mystery that relates to human existence.
What is obvious by now is the level of debate, conjecture, and argument, which 
surround aesthetics, and the consequent impact on the human condition. The Modem 
era is no exception. Herbert Marcuse, maintains that the purely ideological conception 
of art, which is the basis o f Marxist aesthetics, is questioned with increasing intensity in
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the Modernist era. According to him, subjectivity breaks out o f its inwardness and
219becomes a political value, to counteract aggressive and exploitative socialization.
Yet Theodor Adorno, critical theorist, adopts a position that proposes that only through 
the dynamics o f its own laws can art be understood?220 There is something familiar 
about this viewpoint; it has already arisen in the philosophy o f Hegel.
Considerable effort, to address fundamental social issues that arise out of the changing 
value systems of the early twentieth century, is made by the Institute of Social 
Research, otherwise known as The Frankfurt School. As one writer puts it, ‘one o f the 
primary tasks o f  Critical Theory in the twentieth century is to challenge the hegemony 
o f scientific technology221. This school is set up in 1923 by a group of intellectuals, with 
support from Frankfurt University. An apt description might be the birthplace and 
nurturing home o f modem Critical Theory. The Frankfurt School, includes such 
theorists as Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), Georg Lukacs (1885-1971), Max 
Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), 
and Jurgen Habermas (1929-,. All of these are influenced by Marxist theory, but, 
several studies in different aspects of critical theory such as deconstruction, the 
reinterpretation o f myth and symbol, plus studies in both anthropology and psychology,
999also form part o f the history of modem aesthetics.
It is generally held, that the Marxist dialectical method, is the most influential on the 
history of aesthetics in the twentieth century, even though Marx did not specifically deal 
with an aesthetic theory per se .223 Central to Marxist aesthetic theory is the question of 
the relevance o f an historical connection, as Terry Eagleton remarks in The Ideology of 
the Aesthetic . ‘the point o f  evoking the past is to summon the dead to the aid o f  the 
present,224
At this point, a brief explanation of the terms that dominate cultural and aesthetic debate 
in the twentieth century is called for. These include dialectical materialism, reification, 
instrumentalism, and deconstruction. A dialectical method of reasoning is a process of 
proposing a thesis, which brings about an opposition or antithesis, and holding on to and 
reconciling the contradictive elements arrive at a resolution. Marxist dialectical 
materialism is based on Hegel’s method of reasoning. Reification basically means the 
reduction o f all phenomena to their material value, objective value; human beings are
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also considered under the heading of object. Instrumentalism is an evaluation of the 
scientific theory o f truth; two views emerge from this evaluation, one that rejects truth 
in favour o f usefulness, and one that identifies truth with usefulness. Deconstruction 
concerns textual analysis. It questions the validity o f a single definite interpretation of a 
text225.
Critical theorists, o f the Frankfurt School, concern themselves with exposing the 
oppressive and exploitative mechanisms of modern society. A task o f this aim is, to 
alert human beings to the manipulative impulses of the society in which they live. Part 
of the criticism is directed at the perceived value o f materialism, over and above the 
well being of the individual and society. It is here, that the first empirical and 
sociological research into mass media, bureaucracy and technocracy is undertaken. 
Results point to the manipulation of individuals through the mass media, and the fact 
that mass media are lowering the standards o f all kinds o f aesthetic and intellectual 
culture. Research also shows, that public figures, bureaucracies, and commercial
organisations, manipulate and distort public awareness o f social and political matters.
♦ 226 One direct consequence is that cultural and personal values are neglected . The
Institute of Social Research considers the Enlightenment project responsible for this
latter state o f affairs. A major criticism is, that the Enlightenment project takes for
granted that all rationality is instrumental, which means that reason cannot establish any
997ends, but can only indicate means to ends .
By exploring, analysing and explaining the phenomenon of instrumentalism, the 
Frankfurt School hopes to improve society, and free people to make informed choices. 
Instrumentalism, as already stated, may be understood as a theory that supports two 
ways of approaching phenomena, in the first instance to reject truth in favour o f 
usefulness and secondly, to identity truth with usefulness.228 Those who support the 
Frankfurt perspective object to a purely scientific understanding o f things. They reject 
this position on the grounds that it is too clinical. They are critical of those positivists 
who consider knowledge to be free o f interest and value free. As has already been 
pointed out, the theory o f disinterestedness is associated with Kantian philosophy. A 
critical theorist argues that if  a social science that supports a technology o f satisfying 
people’s preferences is allowed to develop; and a technology aimed at shaping these
229preferences follows, the result will be the inability to legitimise any basic values. It is
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understandable; therefore, that Marxist perspective goes a long way to challenge the 
ideologies o f the Enlightenment. Rather than uphold the ultimate Humanist tradition of 
individualism, which can lead to the exclusion o f a more inclusive socialism, Marxist 
doctrine, emerges as a deep desire to bring about a utopian society o f universality, 
where everyone has equal opportunity and equal status. As Terry Eagleton remarks
‘ The utility o f  objects is the ground, not the antithesis, o f  our 
appreciation o f  them, ju s t as our delight in social intercourse is 
inseparable from  its necessity ,23°
Marxism, as a political doctrine, grows out o f the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883), 
and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). It is a reaction to the dominance of bourgeois values 
in the society o f the early twentieth century. Bourgeois society is understood to be in 
the ascendancy at this time, and includes owners o f factories and those who source raw 
materials; in other words those who can command a position o f power and influence 
due to their economic proficiency. The proletariat, are those who own nothing, and 
have no means to achieve any type of economic independence. Marxism, as an 
ideology, looks for support in the growing working class or proletariat movement, in 
order to achieve a utopian socialist system of equality. Marxism may also be 
interpreted as an ideology that incites revolution by the proletariat to achieve more 
equitable status. Eagleton points out, how Marxist doctrine suggests that the proletariat 
might achieve social equity
‘in a condition in which the powerful run insanely rampant, only the 
powerless can provide an image o f  that humanity which must in its turn 
come to power, and in doing so transfigure the very meaning o f  that 
t e r m 211
In other words, according to Marx, the social forces that will finally put an end to 
alienation are, themselves, the product o f alienation in its most extreme and most
232extensive form, therefore revolution depends on the proletariat.
While at Berlin University, Marx becomes part of the Young Hegelian movement. 
Hegelian philosophy promotes two distinct sets o f followers, those on the right, who
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believe history has reached a rational climax in the Prussian state, and those on the left,
• • * 1  233who are interested in atheism and revolution. Marx falls into the latter category.
Many of M arx’s writings do not become widely available until long after his death e.g. 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, written in 1844, but not published until 1932. 
Marx argues that productive activity should be seen as an essential component of m an’s 
being. In bourgeois society, however, private property represents the products o f labour 
as if  they were things. One corollary o f  this position is the alienation o f labour from 
itself. In reducing all phenomena to the status o f thing, labour included, it follows actual 
human endeavour, which comprises labour, is discounted and relegated. Capitalism, 
therefore, produces a society that expands the proletariat, with nothing to sell but their 
labour. If labour comes under the heading o f reification, it follows that the proletariat is 
also considered under the heading o f commodity. Consequently, in order to assert 
some semblance of the value o f humanity, the proletariat is interested in the abolition of 
private property. Marxist ideology proposes a solution to the proletariat, to alter the 
capitalist domination of society. The solution proposed is communism, the abolition of 
private property in general, and wage labour in particular.
Of those theorists, of the Frankfurt School, who engage with Marxist doctrine, Walter 
Benjamin (1892-1940), and Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), are considered among the 
most significant. Evidence o f this is apparent in their publications, but also their 
exchange o f letters highlights in a particular way the diversity and debate that surrounds 
Modem aesthetics. Aesthetics and Politics with an afterword by Fredric Jameson, An 
Anthology o f Continental Aesthetics edited by Richard Kearney and David Rasmusson, 
Adorno by Martin Jay, Aesthetics by Monroe Beardsley and The Ideology of the 
Aesthetic by Terry Eagleton, are most helpful to this study.
Benjamin and Adorno try to analyse the changing value systems in the twentieth 
century, how they may affect the individual, how these changes might be interpreted 
and the role of aesthetics in affecting change. It would appear that, Benjamin accepts the 
inevitability o f mass culture, and tries to salvage what he can from the ruins o f tradition, 
by promoting a new dialectics o f seeing. His proposed understanding, of the role of 
tradition, appears to offer the faint possibility o f an optimistic future for the individual, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the advance of a collective response to
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phenomena. However, despite his introduction to an alternative method of assessing 
tradition, he cannot offer a blueprint that will give a definite solution to the problems 
that face the Modem aesthetician. He sees communism as the redemptive tool to redress 
the Fascist position of politicising aesthetics. While Benjamin does offer great insight 
into Modem aesthetics, the mystery that surrounds the perceptive mechanisms of human 
beings remains open to continued scholarship.
Martin Jay makes it clear that Adorno, recognises the complications that arise in trying 
to understand Modem culture. His introduction to Adorno outlines the foundations that 
form Adorno’s critical outlook. Ideally, culture can be associated with the expansion of 
the human mind, but from the nineteenth century onwards, culture assumes a less than 
ideal status. Culture plays a divisive role, instead o f fostering harmony and 
development; culture becomes the surrogate for religion. One reaction is that the 
populist view of culture is tinged with suspicion. In other words culture is more closely 
associated with the division o f classes. Art becomes a commodity, and signifies cultural 
values and status in the twentieth century. Adorno, recognises the shift in 
understanding, from an anthropological basis to an elitist position, and, adopts 
metaphorical language to illustrate and examine cultural and social phenomena.
The letters, exchanged by Adorno and Benjamin, and published in Aesthetics and 
Politics, offer good insight into the nature o f dialectical debate, as they express the 
nature o f subjective and objective criticism. Adorno, believes that the aim of immanent 
criticism, with regard to intellectual and artistic phenomena, is to grasp the 
contradictions of Modem society ‘through the analysis o f  their form  and meaning the
234contradiction between their objective idea and their pretension . Adorno, also 
suggests, a less hermeneutic interpretation o f Marxist dialectical materialism than that 
proposed by Benjamin. He sees the dangers of invoking a collective consciousness as, 
he believes that such a move distracts from individual opinion. He encourages 
Benjamin to rely more heavily on theory235
Some of the main concerns o f Benjamin and Adorno can now be looked at in more 
detail. How Benjamin, uses the model o f Marxist dialectic tradition to forward his ideas, 
is demonstrated in his approach to questions o f mass culture, history and art.236 Marxist 
philosophy, as embraced by Benjamin in his theses ‘On the Concept o f  H istory’ (1940),
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offers a view o f historieism that differs from philosophical tradition. The latter upholds
the idea of history as a linear progression. Taking this tradition to its natural
conclusion, would seem to indicate that the human race will modify and adjust the
apparent discrepancies o f past times, leading to a utopian future o f self fulfilment. But,
Marxist theory and Benjamin refute this linear progression. It is Benjamin’s contention,
that an examination of the unfulfilled hopes of past generations may provide the present
generation with resolutions to pressing social concerns. Terry Eagleton, refers to
Benjamin’s ‘Messianic’ reading o f history.237 It would appear that he is supporting the
notion that each generation, in its chronological present, is capable o f asking new
questions and proposing new solutions to the unresolved problems of preceding
generations. This theory displays an optimistic appraisal o f the individual capability of
human beings to plough new furrows in a force field o f current construction. The
dialectical image is suggested as a means to facilitate a new understanding of social
history, to quote Benjamin ‘image is that wherein what has been comes together in a
238flash with the now to form  a constellation .
What Benjamin proposes, in his essay ‘The Work o f Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, brings aesthetic debate onto a new level o f enquiry? He examines how 
revolutionary, technological advancement in reproducibility, influences and effects 
visual art. 239 At the beginning o f his essay Benjamin compares the manual reproduction 
of past, with the mechanical reproductive capabilities o f the Modem era. His argument, 
which the unique existence o f time and place previously associated with a work o f art, 
is dissipated through the process o f reproduction. An express consequence shows the 
authenticity of the work o f art is interfered with. He points out ‘the presence o f  the 
original is a prerequisite to the concept o f  authenticity'' .240 This loss of authenticity 
means the object, namely the work o f art, can no longer have the authority once 
attached to it.
By making a work of art available, to be viewed by an individual in a contemporary 
environment, Benjamin points to the fact that reproduction allows the work o f art to be 
displaced from its unique original time and place. The latter condition reduces the 
distance between the viewer and the work. This shattering o f tradition explodes the 
mythical quality of a work of art. Consequently 'that which withers in the age o f
241 imechanical reproduction is the aura o f  the work o f  a r t’. So in other words the cult
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or distance value of the work of art is dismantled. However, rather than lament this 
fact, Benjamin embraces what he considers the explosion of myth, and views it in a 
positive light. He believes that when art can be removed from its original birthplace, 
and brought into direct contact with the individual, the object portrayed is reactivated. 
He accepts the idea o f mass culture and considers that ‘ mechanical reproduction 
emancipates the work o f  art from its parasitical dependence on ritual’.242
Benjamin’s essay offers critical analysis o f the effects o f  mass production on cultural 
history. He suggests a synthesis between a loss o f ‘aura’ that traditionally attaches to 
the work of art on the one hand, and the power o f technological reproduction on the 
other. This synthesis may produce a positive outcome. In other words, the bourgeois 
perception that a work of art should be isolated, and maintained at a distance, is 
dissipated through the intervention o f mechanical production, and so, may become more 
universally accessible. Adorno, makes the point, that the alacrity o f Benjamin’s 
uncritical acceptance of technology, is connected to his over valuation of the archaic as 
such.243
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ is referred to in Adorno’s 
letter dated eighteenth March 1936. His concern is with Benjamin’s correlation of 
magical aura and the autonomous work of art. He remarks, that originally Benjamin 
differentiated works o f art from magical documentation, and is disturbed to find that 
Benjamin now seems to casually relate magical aura to ‘an autonomous work o f  art, ’ 
and at the same time ‘assign to the latter a counter-revolutionary function ’. Adorno 
eloquently defends the central role of art as dialectic
'it seems to me that the centre o f  the autonomous work o f  art does not 
itself belong on the side o f  myth ... but is inherently dialectical; within 
itself it juxtaposes the magical and the mark offreedom ,244
Aesthetic Theory by Adorno addresses the dilemmas that confront art, the artist and the 
viewer in the modem era245. At the outset, Adorno gives an overview of these problems. 
He questions the function of art, if  art can justify its existence, and whether art has in 
inner essence, and, if  it does, what does this inner essence consist of.
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For Adorno, autonomy is an irrevocable aspect o f art, but, he argues in Aesthetic 
Theory, in Modem times autonomous art is blind. He suggests, as a reasonable 
probability, the release o f art from the redemptive notions o f religion i.e. the 
secularisation of art, could provide an opportunity for art to flourish. But, according to 
Adorno, this does not happen; no real alternative is put in place o f religion. In his 
interpretation of Modem culture, neither the rejection o f redemption nor it’s opposite, 
total secularisation, sums up or ‘captures the meaning o f  a r t’. For Adorno, to arrive at 
an accurate understanding o f a work o f art a third dimension should be added. In his 
opinion, Modem art, however, does not succeed in adding this third dimension because, 
it has no clear idea where to go. lIt is through its dynamic laws, not through some 
invariable principle, that art can be understood.'246
The latter statement seems to be directly aimed as a criticism of Hegel, and 
Enlightenment aesthetic theory, when art is spiritualised. Adorno observes that those 
who do not understand the latter may have a reactionary response, and opt for a 
consumer art that they may enjoy. The effects he sees as twofold. Firstly, this puts the 
Modem artist in the position that necessitates finding other ways to spiritualise art. 
According to Adomo this explains why so many modem artists feel the need to look 
back to archaic art. It also perhaps indicates his consideration of the Marxist 
understanding of the role o f history. Secondly, bourgeois society reduces art to an 
objective status; to be measured on a scale o f the pleasurable sensation it can proffer the 
viewer. Adomo, has no interest in such a reduced perception of art.
In his analysis on the enjoyment of art, Adomo raises a number o f interesting ideas. 
What he identifies, initially, is the equation o f the fetishising the enjoyment o f  art with 
crudity and insensitivity, in other words the raising o f art to a level o f irrational 
reverence. From this, it is quite easy to appreciate Adorno’s strong contempt for 
bourgeois values. But then, he examines this viewpoint in detail and admits the 
limitations of such a critique. He questions, whether art may have any purpose if  it is 
devoid of an enjoyment principle. He comments, that people enjoy art less the more 
they know about it and vice versa. He compares the modern enjoyment o f art with the 
traditional role o f art. He allows that originally works o f art fall into the realm of magic 
and ritual, and do not have an aesthetic autonomy. Traditionally, their purpose is not 
pure enjoyment; traditionally they are valued for their sacredness. Even though Adomo
76
is a staunch supporter o f Modem art in so much he does not believe in a return to 
‘classical or realistic alternatives,247 he distances himself from regressive fantasies of 
organic wholeness in the past, and rejects the idea o f positing any new ones for the 
present.
Reality or truth, or the lack o f either, is a vexed question for many in Modem society. 
Art, in the Modem era, is hiding reality and is caught up in self- awareness, according to 
Adomo, and, when art becomes self- aware, the illusion, that art is pure spirituality, 
ends. The function o f art is to unlock the unique and individual. Questions regarding 
reality that are unresolved in the empirical world are reflected in art, or as Adomo puts 
it, take ‘the guise o f  immanent problems o f  artistic fo rm ’.248 Such an opinion would 
sustain Croce’s point that resolution of meaning must be reached by the artist, prior to 
the execution of the work o f art. What Benjamin proposes, is that the individual should 
look beyond the obvious, and search for constellations o f meaning, which the discerning 
eye will eventually yield up. According to Croce, meaning can be found in a work of
In order to clarify the conundrums o f modernist aesthetics, both Benjamin and Adomo, 
anticipate deconstruction theories. Theories more usually associated with postmodernist 
critical theory, particularly with those o f Jacques Derrida (1930-). Adomo considers that 
all the ‘ heterogeneous fragments ’ be presented for an inclusive interpretation or 
evaluation.2^  Metaphorical language is a means to employ to try to unearth reality and 
truth. In using the ‘constellation’ metaphor to describe social phenomena, it is clear that 
Adomo, believes that social phenomena cannot be carefully structured into one core 
principle. According to Jay, the metaphor o f the constellation encompasses the 
juxtaposition of, and the subtle relationships between, the subjective and objective, 
particular and universal, historical and natural dimensions. Adomo, does not believe in 
a hierarchical system that elevates one element over another. The ‘force field’ metaphor
is used to describe the ‘relational interplay o f  attractions and aversions that constituted
) 250the dynamic, transmutational structure o f  a complex phenomenon
Naturally, questions o f reality and truth lead to questions o f value. Benjamin points out, 
how the ritual value of art is replaced by the exhibition or material value. One 
conclusion that may be drawn is, that the aesthetic value is relegated to secondary
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importance, while the material value of a work of art is awarded primary status. A 
change o f values indicates how a work o f art, in the Modem era, can be considered 
under the term commodity. Even though Adorno recognises that the fetish character of 
the commodity is dialectical, he also points out the limits o f viewing art simply for its 
commodity status. In his letter to Benjamin he states
‘ The fetish character o f  the commodity is not a fac t o f  consciousness; 
rather, it is dialectical, in the eminent sense that it produces 
consciousness \ 251
Adorno makes the point that, if  life is only looked at through the mediation of 
commodities, then it is reasonable to assume that the viewer may get lost in art, so that 
he can hide from ‘the penury o f  life '... He recommends that, ‘zn order to grasp the 
importance o f  art one has to zero in on the artistic object rather than on the fun  o f  the 
art lover ’252
The lowering o f value o f art, in Adorno’s opinion, is attributable to the failure by art to 
reflect current historical circumstances. His opinion is that ‘the affirmative essence o f  
art, has become insufferable. ’25S But, Adorno implies a redemptive role for aesthetics, 
however, because aesthetic identity can help to promote the idea o f truth and ‘assist the 
non identical in its struggle against repressive identification compulsion that rules the 
outside world’ ,254
By the same token, Adomo, warns against the narrow-mindedness of viewing art in 
purely aesthetic terms. He raises the point that, he thinks what is taking place in the 
Modem era is, that aesthetics is becoming the obituary notice for art. He queries how a 
work of art can be regarded as a windowless monad.255 What he proposes is a synthesis 
between unreality, and non- existence, and the existent in art, the transcendental, and the 
physical. What seems to be implied is the promotion o f a holistic interpretation o f the 
role of the work of art.
‘The elements o f  art as well as their constellation, or what is commonly
*256thought to be the spiritual essence o f  art, point back to the real other'
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Adomo, criticises the hermeneutic aspect of aesthetic enjoyment, because it 
compromises the social essence of art, and the critical tendencies inherent in it. In other 
words, this concept is too restrictive, because it only appeals to one aspect o f the human 
condition. He blames this attitude on the bourgeois mentality where, art is only 
measured on a level ‘o fa  use value modelled on sensuous pleasure . Pleasure in 
isolation is infantile, according to Adomo. This is doing a disservice to both sensuous 
pleasure and to art. Art does not seek to produce pleasure as an immediate effect. He 
makes the point that, the person, who cannot differentiate between a beautiful sound and 
a dissonant one, is lacking in artistic experience, but Hn true art the pleasure component 
is not given free rein, depending on the time it is more or less narrowly circumscribed’. 
So, it is dependent on the empirical and the historical reality. ‘an autonomous entity and 
a social fa c t? 51
Adomo makes a strong case for those who have genuine interest in art, those who have 
no aspiration to reduce art to the status o f an object, or commodity. He has no interest in 
a reduced perception of art. Adomo emphasises that art is not merely about pleasure. In 
his opinion, the deprivation o f real gratification to human beings by providing 
‘sensously dressed up a r t’, results in a reified consciousness. A reified consciousness 
can use a strategy o f pretending to bring works o f art closer to people, but, in fact, the 
effect is to reduce art to the level of the commodity
1fo r  the fetishistic notion o f  art as a good that can be owned and, through 
reflection, destroyed, corresponds neatly with the idea o f  a piece o f  
property in the psychic household’25*
An indication of the loss o f confidence in individual judgement, and the increase in the 
comfort of collective evaluations, can be deduced from Benjamin’s comparison between 
the reaction of an audience to a Chaplin movie, and the reaction to a Picasso painting.
In the case of the film, where visual and emotional enjoyment is fused together, and 
engineered in such a manner that the viewer can pronounce with expertise on the value, 
there is an affirmative response. The other, i.e. the Picasso painting, presents an enigma 
not easily grasped, and not easily evaluated. What is not easily understood can pose a 
threat, what is not clear therefore is viewed with suspicion. A consequent result is an 
adverse reaction to progressive or avant-garde art, which is in direct opposition to
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Marxist hopes and so the proletariat is deprived of its revolution. When, through the 
medium of film, the public takes on the role o f critic, cult value is relegated to the 
background. As Benjamin sees it
‘ The film makes the cult value recede into the background not only by 
putting the public in the position o f  the critic, but also by the fact that at 
the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an
*259examiner, but an absent minded one ’
This problem of the absent minded examiner is referred to by Eagleton, in his essay 
entitled ‘The Marxist Rabbi’. He maintains that, an important aspect of Modem 
aesthetics is the ‘re-entry o f  myth into European culture'260 Eagleton puts forward a 
logical argument to support the resurgence o f myth. For him, myth is resurrected, to try 
to give some level o f understanding, to every phenomenon that is submitted to a method 
of deconstruction and reification. The point he makes, supports the idea that the 
individual has lost the power to discriminate, and relies on myth to provide some 
answers. He explains
‘Perhaps, then, it is myth which can provide the missing mediations 
between the over formalized on the one hand and the myopically 
particular on the other261
If the value o f a work of art is understood as a commodity then the way is clear for the 
politicising of aesthetics, according to Benjamin. To explain what he means by the 
politicising o f aesthetics, Benjamin uses the example o f the Futurist manifesto that 
maintains that ‘ War is beautiful So the Fascist cry ‘fia t ars -perea t mundus ’ [create 
art -  destroy the world] implies that war may be the only means to satisfy a sense
perception that has been altered by technology. In other words the beauty o f war is the
262exemplary idea. The message being put forward is that war is justified . By using this 
reference Benjamin draws attention to how the politicising of aesthetics may serve the 
propaganda machine o f the capitalist society and lull the masses into a false notion of 
cultural expertise. He proposes support for communist ideals as a way to combat this 
phenomenon. Plate 20
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To summarise the Marxist dimension o f the Modem period, it would appear that 
aesthetic theory, as analysed by both Benjamin and Adorno, epitomises the concept o f a 
Marxist dialectic. A dialectical system makes a proposition, is challenged by an 
antithesis and suggests a synthesis. By engaging in a search, for a solution to bridge 
the gap between idealism and materialism, Marxist dialectics plays its part in the 
ongoing puzzle that is life. As Keamey remarks,
‘Marxist synthesis o f  critical reflection with productive praxis -  a 
dialectical synthesis which aims to resolve the traditional opposition 
between idealism and materialism ’ 263
Both, Benjamin and Adorno, express deep concern for the modem perception o f art, its 
affects and its function. Benjamin embraces the advent o f the technical advancements 
that allow works o f art to be reproduced mechanically. He considers this phenomenon 
opens the way for the emancipation of a work of art from a purely auratic perception. 
Adorno expresses his reservations on the development of a global consciousness of 
perception that contributes to the obfuscating of reality, and the reduction of an 
understanding o f an ideological concept that can only breed fascism. As Martin Jay 
points out, Adorno blames this circumstance on a reproducing society. He quotes 
Adorno
‘ where purely immediate relations o f  power predominate, there are
really no ideologies .for ideology in the proper sense, relationships
o f  power are required which are not comprehensible to this power itself, 
which are mediated and therefore also less harsh. Today society, which 
has unjustly been blamed fo r  its complexity, has become too transparent 
fo r  th is,264
Adorno also maintains, that, when art becomes totally absorbed with individualism it 
closes in on itself, and does not really express the reality o f the whole. By not 
expressing the truth o f society art loses its autonomy, so Adorno observes, that ‘As
265society became less humane, art became less autonomous’ . This opinion echoes that
of Sartre, that individualism does not necessarily benefit society as a whole.
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Perhaps what underlies the polemic o f the early twentieth century is best expressed in 
the exchange of letters between Adomo and Benjamin. What should be kept in mind is 
that, while they both share such common ground as their Jewish traditions, their 
preoccupation with Marxist aesthetics, their scholarship also very clearly indicates, the 
continuing attempts to lift a veil on the mystery that attaches to all human endeavours. 
While clarity is the perceived goal o f the debate, what does emerge is the breadth of 
interpretations that can be ascribed to aesthetics. Notwithstanding the concern that is
expressed, it is encouraging to note, that both men are still interested in the concept of
• 266 astonishment, as quoted by Benjamin in his letter o f ninth o f December 1938.
Astonishment can be related to a concept o f mystery, as can the obvious dialectic
between Adomo and Benjamin, which implies a need to travel further on the road to
discovery.
As already mentioned the study o f psychoanalytic theory plays an important role in 
aesthetic theory o f the Modem era.
Psychoanalysis is an analytical study o f the workings o f the human mind. Sigmund 
Freud (1856-1939) is generally considered the father o f psychoanalysis. There is 
significant documentary evidence to support this, e.g. Freud, by Richard Wollheim and 
Sigmund Freud by Pamela Thurschwell. Another important name to be associated with 
psychoanalysis is that of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961).
Both Freud and Jung hold medical degrees, Freud in physiology, and Jung in 
psychiatry. Presumably it is from their common interest in medicine that their collective 
scholarship emerges. Their theses point to an extraordinary elaboration of the 
knowledge surrounding the constitution o f the human psyche. The basis for this 
scholarship comes mainly from observational analysis o f patients. Patients who have 
presented themselves with symptoms o f illness that in some cases have no obvious 
physiological basis, symptoms that manifest themselves through neuroses of various 
forms. A neurosis may be defined as a psychological disorder. Both Freud and Jung 
are interested in the origins o f such neuroses. A major priority, for both scholars, is to 
make a map of the human mind whereby, cul de sacs and avenues can be explored, and 
malfunctions, which interfere with the normal functioning of the mind, can be exposed. 
The systematic naming, and deconstruction o f the different parts of the psyche, occupies
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their lifetime endeavour. In fact, Freud and Jung, collaborated and agreed basic 
elements o f psychoanalysis until a point where they disagreed on fundamental 
approaches to methods and the interpretation o f the evidence presented to them.
An interesting aspect o f Jungian theory is his inclusion o f soul and spirit into his 
analysis o f the psyche.269 Freud is also aware o f the disparities o f perception between 
the external and the internal. Both men, however, are agreed on the importance of the 
unconscious. They are particularly interested in its’ influence, and the subsequent 
responses of the human psyche to the physical world o f people and objects. Because of 
what their research uncovers, and simultaneously despite their efforts, debates and 
arguments on their theories form the basis for continued research. One such noteworthy 
theorist who has devoted considerable time to psychoanalytic theory is Jacques Lacan 
(1901-1981), who, for instance in his support o f Freudian analysis, draws an analogy 
between the psychological structural relationship of unconscious/ conscious and the 
Saussurean model o f langue and parole in linguistics270.
With the advent o f psychoanalysis it could be imagined that definite answers, to all 
questions pertaining to the reactions o f human beings to external stimuli, might be made 
available. After all, it is the mind that separates the human being from objectified 
reality. The natural propagation of such theory might consequently result in all traces 
of mystery being removed from aesthetics. However, while psychoanalysis opens up, 
and sheds light on many areas o f understanding, it does not complete a picture of 
irrefutable proof; many questions remain a mystery. It is no surprise, therefore, that 
visual art, in a particular way, responds to and reflects the impact o f psychoanalysis
‘For art, as an open-access laboratory o f  imaginative exploration, is one o f  the
} '2.11most powerful reminders that history is never completed ’
The intention here is to set out, briefly, some o f the main elements o f psychoanalysis 
that may be considered influential in the history o f aesthetics. As already indicated, 
psychoanalysis is an analytical study of the workings o f the human mind. For a simple 
introduction o f the Freudian construct o f the psyche the metaphorical symbol o f the 
iceberg, where one third is visible and two thirds submerged, is one that is familiar and 
easily grasped. Plate 21 In plain terms the visible third may be equated with the
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conscious mind and the remaining two-thirds with the unconscious mind. Both areas 
can be further divided e.g. Freud identifies the preconscious as the area that straddles 
both the conscious and the unconscious mind. Jacobi’s description is helpful
"It is rather the case that the psyche is a conscious -  unconscious whole with 
continually shifting borderlines o f  contact’ 272.
In Freudian theory, the preconscious can be summoned by the conscious mind, as need 
requires. Conforming to the analogy o f the iceberg, the unconscious forms the largest 
portion o f the psyche, and is not so easily accessed.273 Both Freud and Jung, develop 
strategies to awaken, and disclose, what information is contained within the 
unconscious. This information is gleaned mainly through such methods as hypnosis, 
free association and dream therapy. In turn, this information may be used to help rectify 
whatever disturbance produces neuroses in certain individuals. While both scholars 
submit that the unconscious is a source of knowledge not to be underestimated, Jung in
274particular, draws attention to a portion o f the unconscious that can never be accessed.
In Jungian theory, the unconscious acts as an archive for the Archetype, a central theme 
in his dialectic that will be referred to later.
For the purposes of this essay, the essential relevance of psychoanalytic study rests on 
the discovery that the unconscious is a dynamic source o f knowledge. Freudian theory, 
dispels any misconception that the mind consists of purely conscious matter, and that 
the unconscious consists of only that which is forgotten or repressed by 
consciousness.275 As Wollheim remarks
‘ i f  we relinquish the equation o f  the mental with the conscious and interpolate 
mental events into the gaps o f  consciousness in such a way as to get rid o f  the 
discontinuities o f  mental life, we still have only a descriptive conception o f  the
,276unconscious
Wollheim, makes a strong case for the Freudian understanding of the dynamic 
unconscious. Jolande Jacobi’s book, The Psychology o f C. G. Jung, endorses Jung’s 
theory on the dynamic energy that attaches to the unconscious. Jung also expands the 
understanding of the unconscious, and, focuses attention on the role of the collective
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unconscious. It would appear that, Jung ascribes a more expansive remit to the role o f 
the unconscious, and, certainly, his approach is reminiscent of dialectical Marxism. Like 
Aristotle, and the end for which things are made, Jung is interested in a synthesis that 
can be arrived at through a process o f thesis and antithesis.
Freud outlines, and names the constituent parts of the human psyche, and makes a case 
for the progression of the various stages in the growth of a healthy psyche. He, also, 
points to the areas where neurosis and disease may occur. He analyses these parts into 
such areas as the Id, the Ego and the Superego. Basically, the Id can be described as an 
amorphous substance that is present at birth, from which the mind develops. The
777predominant impulse of the Id can be expressed simply as 7 want' . The Ego, 
develops from the Id, and is described by one writer as the image o f the individual as a 
self-conscious being. Wollheim, interprets Freudian theory o f the ego and explains it as 
follows,
‘It is in virtue o f  the ego that we can perceive the world, that we can change the
>278world, and that we adapt to the world '
Put another way, the Id has no parameters, is not really capable of discernment, while 
the development of the Ego introduces a faculty of perspicacity. In Freudian theory, a 
healthy psyche develops the Superego. The Superego, plays the part of parent or, in 
other words, introduces the restraining factor, and according to Freud, and pointed to by 
Wollheim, ‘a power o f  this kind, watching, discovering and criticizing all our 
intentions, does really exist.'219 Wollheim, also, indicates a summary o f the activities of 
each of the foregoing functions of the psyche as interpreted by Freud, in the following
‘Repression is carried out by the ego upon the id, but the ego acts in the service 
and at the behest o f  the superego ’
While Freud concentrates on the tripartite functions of the psyche, Jung extends his 
understanding to include a fourth function. The functions he names are, thinking, 
feeling, intuition and sensation. To these functions he adds ancillary characteristics,
namely extroversion and introversion. Jolande Jacobi makes the eloquent observation in
)28 ]her preface ‘For the psyche is always capable ofputting forth new flowers ’ .
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According to Jung, all human beings can be psychically assessed, and categorised under 
a combination of the previous headings. However, Jung maintains that, no two functions 
can operate simultaneously.242 Freudian theory seems to indicate that the main function 
that operates in the psyche is instinct2^ . As Wollheim remarks, ‘For Freud instinct is at 
the forefront o f  his picture o f  the mind.'284 But,as already mentioned, Jungian theory
• 285allows that there is an area in each individual that cannot be accessed. While both 
Freud and Jung concentrate on the force o f the Libido or psychic energy, Freudian 
theory is usually understood to equate psychic energy with sexual energy, whereas,
Jung adopts a more inclusive role and equates all psychic energy to libidinal 
impulses286. Such explorations are evident in the renewed interest in sexual fantasy as 
expressed in the art of the twentieth century. Plate 22
From the research conducted by this study, it appears that, while Freud is the instigator 
of psychoanalytic theory, Jung encourages a wider perspective and extends the 
parameters of the understanding o f the individual psyche. Jungian theory offers a 
greater opportunity for a wider dialectical understanding of the concept o f a holistic 
psyche. In Jacobi’s opinion, Freud poses the questions 'why’ and ‘whence’ whereas 
Jung asks ‘To what end?2S1 For instance, Freud emphasises the repressive function of 
the unconscious whereas, Jung concentrates more on the dynamic nature o f the 
unconscious. In formal analysis, Freud encourages a passive role for the analyst 
whereas; Jung encourages a more interactive role between analyst and analysand.
The concern here is the consequences for the visual arts and aesthetics. It is not difficult 
to imagine that the initial reaction, o f the creative community to psychoanalytic theory, 
could be construed to be one o f freedom from constraints o f form and content. 
However, because psychoanalytic theory attempts to constrain and enclose all actions to 
particular areas in the psyche, and, tries to explain every eventuality by narrowing 
meaning down to action, and reaction, the impact upon the visual arts is twofold. 
Firstly, what is generally perceived to be the accepted norm can now be extended, and, 
consequently, ascribed to the product o f the unconscious. Questions of dream 
interpretation and apparent free association are manifest in the art of the Surrealists. 
Plate 23 Both Freud and Jung, attach significant importance to dream therapy. Dream 
therapy can offer a more complete understanding of the conscious, the subconscious and 
the unconscious. Freud writes extensively on this subject, particularly in his paper
86
entitled ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’, published in 1900. In keeping with Freudian 
scholarship it would appear that each effort is carefully constructed to transmit the 
symbolic reference that can be accessed and recognized. As Jacobi remarks
‘As fa r  as we can follow  the creative process, it consists in activating the
external symbols o f  mankind which lie dormant in the unconscious and in
)  288shaping and elaborating them to produce a finished work o f  art ’
Secondly, from the art historian’s viewpoint, interpretative freedom is the responsibility 
of the viewer, in so far as the individual’s understanding of particular symbols allows. If 
we are to believe Jacobi’s interpretation of Jungian psychology then
'The individual is not just a fixed  and unchangeable complex o f  psychological
j 289facts; he is also an extremely variable entity ‘
The question must be, whether the impact o f psychoanalyses offers a more 
comprehensive understanding of a work of art to the viewing public, or does it in fact 
deepen the mystery surrounding the human condition. While offering possible 
explanations at one level it must also be remembered that Jung, in particular, 
emphasises the uniqueness o f the individual psyche, and cautions, what must be 
remembered at all times during analysis is, that judgements and conclusions can only be 
reached by bearing in mind the particular psychical make up o f the individual.290 This, 
then, makes a clear case for the contemplation and unique concentration of time and 
space to be afforded each work o f art. Universality can only be achieved at a theoretical 
level. What seems to be the aim of economic and technological advancement in the 
modem and post-modern world is to promote a universal response, which displaces the 
requirement of a deeper personal responsibility. An endorsement o f this latter statement 
can be linked with Jacobi’s observation of Jung’s position,
‘But the consciousness o f  modern man has moved somewhat too fa r  from  its
origins, from the unconscious; we have forgotten that the unconscious does not
9291
function in accordance with our conscious purposes; but autonomously ’
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Psychoanalysis does not eliminate a concept of mystery. Psychoanalysis does not offer 
irrefutable proof of empirical reality; in fact both Freudian and Jungian studies in 
psychology reinforce the existence of vast areas o f the unconscious that are impossible 
to deconstruct, and reassemble with plausible answers. The impact o f psychoanalytic 
theory on aesthetics as explored by Freud and, more particularly by Jung, therefore, is 
dynamic. Nowhere is this more evident than in Jung’s theory of the Archetype or 
primordial image. The Archetype, according to Jung, can manifest itself either in static 
form, or as a dynamic process, in the functioning o f consciousness. What could be 
perceived to forge a link between universality and individuality is the Jungian 
description of the archetype.
As Jacobi points out Jung understands the psyche to consist o f two antithetical spheres, 
the conscious and the unconscious. From the aesthetic viewpoint his inclusion of soul, 
or anima, as part of the inner persona offers a more complete picture of the psychical 
impulses of the human being than the instinctual attitude o f Freud’s theory. Spirit is a 
faculty that pertains to consciousness, but also has a natural bond with the unconscious. 
Jung considers that spirit comprises intellect and soul292. It is, however, reasonable to 
make a connection between spirit and intuition because, both are illusive, and, in 
Jungian terms, could be considered irrational when compared to those functions o f 
thinking and feeling that are concerned with evaluations and judgements. But, 
according to Jung, ‘Intuition perceives through its capacity fo r  an unconscious inner 
perception o f  the inherent potentialities o f  things '2Ji
According to Jacobi, Jung bases his theory of the Archetype on Augustinian 
philosophy 294 St. Augustine is one of the foremost thinkers of the Middle Ages and has 
already been referred to in a previous section. Jung distinguishes, between an 
Archetype that is non-perceptible, ‘which is present only potentially in every psychic
295structure’ and, archetypes that have ‘already entered the fie ld  o f  consciousness’
Jung believes, that all the typical human manifestations of life rest on archetypal 
foundation. While their symbolic meaning may shift with the tides of time and space, 
their basic foundational structure is steadfast. For Jung, the Archetype plays a vital role 
in the inherited functioning o f psychic life as he says
88
"they represent or personify certain instinctive data o f  the dark, primitive
> 296psyche, the real but invisible roots o f  consciousness
It can be understood that, Jung is referring here to the numinous function of the 
Archetype, rather than the Archetype representing a particular preconditioned method of 
reaction. Even though Jung considers the Archetype as being universally present in all 
human beings, he is much more concerned with the individual archetypal history of 
each psyche. What he is saying is, that we can control the content o f our consciousness 
by our will, but we cannot control the unconscious. Part o f this has to do with what 
archetypal foundation has been laid, or what pathways the individual travels to unleash 
an archetypal image, or, indeed, what circumstances may lead to the Archetype. What 
Jung claims is, Archetypes are laid down in our unconscious, they are the reservoirs of 
all the historic data and experience o f mankind, but it is the arbitrary nature o f certain 
circumstances that may bring these to light in the individual, ‘the unconscious, however
5 297has a continuity and order that is independent o f  us and impervious to our influence’
Jung is referring to an inherited idea, he is pointing to an inherited mode o f psychic 
functioning, corresponding to a pattern o f behaviour. That is only an external 
manifestation. At the core o f the individual the Archetype presents itself as numinous 
(spiritual), and this ought to be the concern of aesthetics. As Jung points out, "their 
ultimate core o f  meaning may be circumscribed, but not described’ and, again, that the 
Archetype is invariable in principle, but not in 1concrete manifestation’. Jung also 
describes the Archetype as 'se lf portraits o f  the instincts’. Instincts cannot be defined 
and rationalised, therefore the theory of the Archetype is central to both psychology, 
and, to the argument in support o f mystery.
‘Not fo r  a moment dare we succumb to the illusion that an archetype can be 
finally explained and disposed o f  Even the best attempts at explanation are
*298only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language ’
Doubtless the influence of both Freudian and Jungian psychoanalyses impacts on the 
creative mind as is most evident in the art of the Surrealists. It also opens the way for 
Outsider Art and Art Brut and several other art movements o f the twentieth century; it 
opens up an interest in the psychic life of artists and viewers. Plate 24.
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Psychoanalytic theory opens new ways to look at the oppositions between, what is 
rational and sensual, universal and individual. Despite the obvious insights 
psychoanalytic theory can offer, it is clear that the ripples that emerge from this theory 
are linked to the overall concept o f mystery that can be ascribed to the aesthetic 
experience. For example, an acceptance of the validity of psychoanalytic theory may 
encourage research, speculation, and culminate in a desire to attempt symbolic 
associations into what may be put forward in a work of art.
For consideration o f the concrete effects on creative art o f various developments 
including philosophical, empirical, theoretical, and psychoanalytic theory, Clive Bell, 
Roger Fry noteworthy critical theorists of the twentieth century, offer interesting theses 
for debate.
While, for the most part, it is the theories o f French and German scholars that 
predominate this research, Britain also produce some notable contributors to this debate, 
as mentioned earlier. The introduction of Post-Impressionist’s artworks to Britain plays 
a decisive role in motivating two British theorists, Roger Fry (1866-1934) and Clive 
Bell (1881-1964), to undertake projects that exercise considerable influence on the 
subsequent history o f aesthetics, and subsequent Modem art movements of the 
twentieth century. This is borne out by the following statement by Hayden B. J. 
Maginnis, in Art Theory, as recently as 1996
‘Formalist criticism in art history and in discussions o f  the’ moderns’ was 
central to scholarship o f  the very late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
It shaped our understanding o f  modern art; it reshaped our understanding o f  
artists o f  the past; it claimed to make accessible art from  all times and all 
cultures ’299
Art movements, in the early twentieth century, are often accompanied by written 
manifestos, setting out the criteria, the aspirations and justifications for particular 
attitudes to visual art e.g. the Futurist Manifesto 1910, Percy Wyndham Lewis ‘Our 
Vortex’ 1914, De Stiil Manifesto I 1918 ‘The Realistic Manifesto 1920. J. B. Bullen, in 
his introduction to the 1949 edition of Art by Clive Bell, makes the point that Bell’s 
work is in keeping with this popular tradition. Here, Bell attempts to set out what
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criteria should be applied to the judgement of a work o f art. His conclusion comes 
under the generic heading ‘significant fo rm ’. How Bell explains this will be looked at 
later in this section.
No doubt the questions posed, by Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910), regarding the aesthetic 
merits of a work o f art, exert influence on the criteria for judging a work of art in the 
early twentieth century.300 Tolstoy is interested, not only in the moral implications of a
301work of art, but in clear expression, and the intention o f the artist. The birth of 
abstract art in the twentieth century is a break with traditional representation o f objects 
defined by nature. Consequently, a problem arises for the artist and the critic, on how to 
disseminate form in such a manner that the criteria referred to initially by Tolstoy and 
subsequently by Fry and Bell might be recognised.
From a world of Realism and neo Classicism to Impressionism, is a considerable leap. 
The Post-Impressionist exhibitions of 1910 and 1912, introduce the avant garde and 
modernism of European art to the British Isles.302 It is in the catalogue for the second 
Post-Impressionist Exhibition in Britain in 1912, compiled by Bell, that the first 
reference to ‘significant fo rm ’ is made’303. Bell, it seems, opposes an art that is too 
involved in ‘illusionism and the mechanical reproduction o f  natural fo rm s.,3n4 It is 
suggested, by Bullen, that Bell uses the art o f Paul Cezanne (1839-1906), as the 
yardstick whereby all great works o f the past may be measured. If a general 
understanding of the art o f Cezanne includes the cone, the sphere and the cylinder as 
those shapes in nature he translates into painting, the transition to a notion o f 
‘significant form  made by Bell, is more easily understood. It is not surprising that, in 
the aftermath o f such a radical move from traditional mores, e.g. Post Impressionism, 
some attempt is made to re-establish parameters that clearly outline what may be 
considered art. Consequently part of the flourishing of art awareness in the early 
twentieth century, involves the reassessment and re-examination of traditional attitudes 
to art. To this end, Roger Fry (1866-1934) and Clive Bell (1881-1964), publish two 
books namely Art by Clive Bell, published originally in 1914, with a later edition in 
1949, and Vision and Design by Roger Fry, published in 1920. In the words of Clive 
Bell ‘the science o f  aesthetics is a complex business and so is the history o f  a r t305
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It really is a question of emphasis. Bell, appears to solve the question o f aesthetic 
response as being firmly related to ‘significant form  ’, and attempts to set out what this 
is. Roger Fry, acknowledges the important role of design, but places his stress on 
aesthetic perception.306 Both are agreed that the nature o f the response to a work o f art is 
unique.
In relation to this unique un-quantifiable attribute, Fry and Bell attempt an explanation, 
by looking at various common aspects o f works o f art. For both, the representation o f 
natural objects is examined and, both express their interest in primitive art forms. As 
Bell points out,
4primitives neither create illusions, nor make display o f  extravagant 
accomplishment, but concentrate their energies on the one thing needful -  the 
creation o f  fo rm ,307
From their opinions, as outlined in their respective books, the implication can be drawn 
that representational form is not the only requirement for the judgement of a work o f art,
n0 o
even though, Fry does not discount its value in quite the same manner as does Bell . 
Such an avoidance of representation is certainly in keeping with many subsequent art 
practices o f the early twentieth century. Plate 25. Also implied in their critique, 
technique alone cannot produce, what they consider should be a requirement for great 
works of art. While, on the one hand they encourage abstraction, gesture, and 
expression in their support o f the art of the primitives, on the other hand, they 
emphasise the importance o f line, colour, spatial planes, design, in the support for the 
art o f Cezanne. As Fry remarks,
‘one might add as an empirical observation that the greatest art seems to 
concern itself most with the universal aspects o f  natural form  to be the lease 
pre-occupied with particulars,309
For Bell, it is a particular combination of all the elements of design that bring about 
‘significant form  Significant form being, for him, that illusive component that he can 
name, indicates where it might be found, but not specify exactly how it may be 
achieved.310
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While Bell and Fry elaborate on particular aspects o f aesthetic judgement, they both 
infer that what is required is an intangible, intuitive, attribute, which affectively, 
inspires an awesome response in the viewer. According to Fry, another indicator that 
points to the possible discovery of the aesthetic emotion is, for the viewer to know the 
intention of the artist. As Fry points out,
7 also conceived that the spectator in contemplating the form  must inevitably 
travel in an opposite direction along the same road which the artist had taken,
>311and himself feel the original emotion ’
Another indication of the importance o f the relationship between artist and spectator is 
referred to in Fry’s statement, where he suggests the link between the intention of the 
artist, and how art impinges on the viewer, and so uncovers latent emotions that
312otherwise might remain untapped' .
As already remarked Fry, in particular, emphasises that aesthetic emotion is completely 
and utterly different to any other emotion; he also points out that it is impossible to 
define aesthetic emotion and that the concept confounds him. As he explains
‘One can only say that those who experience it fee l it to have a peculiar quality 
o f 'reality ’ which makes it a matter o f  infinite importance in their lives. Any 
attempt I  might make to explain this would probably land me in the depths o f
• ,313mysticism
But, as Bell points out, the attributes of design, already referred to, are integral to the 
realisation of this unique experience. He avers in his ‘Aesthetic Hypothesis’,
‘ The relations and combinations o f  lines and colours, these aesthetically moving 
forms, I  call ‘Significant Form and ‘Significant Form ’ is the one quality 
common to all works o f  visual a r t ,314
However, having explored the theories o f both Fry and Bell, neither theorist/critic does 
explain in a scientific manner what specifically induces the aesthetic emotion. Their 
foundation, for its’ existence, lies in the fact that historically there have been great
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works of art that stand the test of time and space. What is clear is that the aesthetic 
response they try to explain remains enigmatic. For Bell, what is universal to all these 
works of art is their ‘significant form’. For Fry, it is the perceptual uniqueness o f the 
response. This quality they identify is an intuition, a feeling, an emotional reaction that 
cannot be quantified, a j'e ne sais quoV. As pointed out by Jeffrey Dean in his article 
entitled Clive Bell anti G. E. Moore: The Good of Art, that while not all works o f art 
will provoke the same emotion, the emotion itself is o f the same kind and peculiar to the
315viewer’s experience of art, and that nothing else can inspire this emotion. However 
Bell makes the eloquent claim for the effects o f art, which can be linked to fCantian 
thought, and Burke’s exposition of the sublime, when he says
‘ Art transports us from  the world o f  m an’s activity to a world o f  aesthetic
)316exaltation; —  we are lifted above the stream o f  life ’
It should be noted here that the concept o f the sublime has several interpretations. In 
one case the effect is one that inspires awe, fear, terror and suspense and the other 
brings about a reverence, a dreamlike feeling o f wonder and infinity. Both Kant and 
Burke try to explain the mysterious sensation that attaches to an experience o f the 
sublime.317
In conclusion it is fair to say that what Tolstoy, Fry and Bell uncover, confirms that in 
the twentieth century, despite all advances in technological and scientific research, no 
one can define specifically the feeling of awe that a great work o f art inspires in the 
viewer. In his book ‘Pictures and Tears’ James Elkins examines this very concept o f 
awe. While he gives many examples of the reactions experienced by viewers to great 
works o f art the main thrust o f his scholarship indicates that the experience has a very 
definite link to an understanding of the transcendent318.
A key work e.g. that o f Wassily Kandinsky, is a testament to how colour and emotion 
are formally employed to express the exemplary idea in the twentieth century. Plate 26. 
What remains to be seen is, whether with the unprecedented advance o f technological, 
cybernetic and academic pursuits that constitute the Post modernist era o f the twentieth 
first century, the notion of mystery is finally labelled, packaged and assigned for 
recycling.
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Chapter III: The Dilemma of Postmodernism:
Having looked at the main aesthetic concerns that coincide historically with or pre-empt
decisive shifts in art practice, it is now imperative to examine the current position of
philosophy, and critical theory, and the implications for aesthetics. The dominant theme,
uncovered in this period of history, is the apparent supremacy of a universal concept of
mystery over an individual interpretation, in other words, the subjugation of the
individual opinion in favour of globalisation. Any understanding of mystery in art is
understandably submerged within this debate. Because the individual is immersed in
time and place, any conclusion, or analysis o f a contemporary period, can therefore only
be provisional. As Martin Heidegger points out, in his essay entitled ‘The Politics of
Being’, 'the sighting o f  any particular thing is always itself elusive, fading into
319indeterminacy as the thing itself surges forward’
Several writers offer opinions on the prevailing tensions, and values that emerge from, 
what is termed the Postmodern period, the late twentieth century to the present. For 
instance Frederic Jameson, in Postmodern Culture, edited by Hal Foster offers a resume
• .  320of the position o f the Postmodern viewpoint vis. a vis. aesthetics . Elsewhere Foster, in
his essay Art in Theory, makes the point that the role of the artist in the contemporary
world and the role o f the viewer have expanded
‘becomes a manipulator o f  signs more than a producer o f  art objects and the 
viewer an active reader o f  messages rather than a passive contemplator o f  the
321aesthetic or consumer o f  the spectacular .
Foster suggests Postmodernism as a concept may be divided in two, progressive and 
regressive. In his essay, entitled Postmodernism and Consumer Society, he describes 
each position; firstly as a theory that attempts to deconstruct Modernism and resist the 
status quo, and in the second place, as a theory that repudiates Modernism to celebrate 
the status quo. In other words a proposal to incorporate Modernist theory into the 
present day, Modernist theory that is based on a critical appraisal of the world as it is, or 
a proposal to reject the Modernist theory. The former, a resistant Postmodernism, is 
concerned with a critical deconstruction o f tradition with a critique o f origin. Basically
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this type of postmodernism is interested in questioning rather than in exploitation of 
cultural codes, to explore rather than conceal social and political affiliations. The latter, 
is a postmodernism of neo -conservatism or reaction. Jameson supports the former as
322the more progressive.
It is understandable, how many o f the prevailing thought patterns that surface in the 
twentieth century and already referred to, influence those currently in vogue. These 
include dialectical Marxism, existentialism, psychoanalysis and formalism. Twentieth 
century scholarship produces other methods to assess cultural history, such as 
phenomenology, critical theory and structuralism, all of which impact upon the subject 
of this essay and aesthetics as a whole.
Phenomenology deals with objectivity versus subjectivity, as Richard Kearney explains 
in his book, ‘Modem Movements in European Philosophy’. Phenomenology ‘wished to 
eliminate all prejudice, to suspend all our easy answers to fundamental questions, all 
our taken fo r  granted attitudes,32i. While, critical theory is deemed necessary to 
critique those values that surface in cultural and social conditions o f the western world. 
Values that indicate causes for concern, such as, reification, the reduction of the human 
being to the status of object, materialism, reality versus hyper-reality; simulation and 
counterfeit, and the Modem sublime. Georg Lukacs (1885-1971), cited by Kearney, 
offers a justification for critical theory in the contemporary world, and, subscribes to the 
belief, that questions that have either a moral or aesthetical implication cannot have a 
singular solution. As he remarks, such questions ‘pertain to a moral and aesthetic
) 324intuition irreducible to the empirical positivism o f  the natural sciences
Structuralism has three main themes. Firstly, phenomena ought not to be taken at face 
value. Secondly, a structural method ought to be followed to examine meaning.
Thirdly, that linguistics is the discipline to be scrutinised. A method, that is similar to 
the continuous refinement o f a piece o f technical equipment in order that it may 
function at a higher level, and disclose possibilities other than those clearly indicated, is 
how Kearney describes it.
Phenomenology, is first introduced by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), and advanced by 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). It emerges as a response to the positivism of modem
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science that sidelines human subjectivity. Phenomenology supports the celebration of 
individuality. Husserl’s argument revolves around the notion that subjectivity and 
objectivity of the human being cannot be separated into two opposite poles. Meaning, 
therefore, can be presumed to come from a combination o f both subjectivity and 
objectivity. Epistemology is a term that applies to the branch o f philosophy that inquires 
into the nature and possibility o f knowledge.325 Ontology is an inquiry into the theory 
o f being as such, and forms the general part o f metaphysics, or theoretical 
philosophy.326 Kearney explains, Husserl’s theory o f phenomenology has 
epistemological concerns while, Heidegger’s theory moves to ontological concerns that
‘Human existence  must be understood as a project o f  possibility?21 As a student of
Husserl, Martin Heidegger applies an existential dimension to the theory of 
phenomenology. For Heidegger, existence must be understood ‘neither as mere 
subjectivity nor mere objectivity, but as a fundamental openness to the Being o f  beings ’ 
328 ‘/I project o f  possibility ’ may be taken as an affirmation o f the ongoing search for
solutions, while, at the same time, indicating the continued presence o f mystery.
Another important voice that adds to the phenomenological debate is that o f Jean Paul 
Sartre (1905-1980). As Kearney points out, Sartre’s main concern is with the freedom 
of the human being, and the lived experience ‘m order to rediscover an intentional and 
creative relationship with the world’329. Where Heidegger is concerned with the ‘Being 
o f  Beings, ’ Sartre places his emphasis on the human being, and regards the human race 
as firmly and genuinely situated on terra firma. Essentially, he explores the 
possibilities o f choice that are open to the authentic human being. It is obvious that 
Sartre considers art to be an important aspect o f human development, as he bases his 
analogy of moral choice on the construction o f a work o f art. He points out that, ‘'there 
is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation 
and invention ,33° In Sartre’s exploration o f the concepts o f consciousness, emotion and 
imagination, he finds that neither emotion nor imagination can be reduced to conform to 
mechanical ‘models o f  explanation ’. Nor are they, ‘simply the products o f  empirical 
causes but express a highly strategic consciousness,33/. The latter is an obvious 
reference to the basic Husserlian understanding of phenomenology. As already 
indicated, under the section that deals with existentialism, Sartre directs his emphasis on 
the importance of the individual, and freedom of choice. His search for meaning seems
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to point towards the consequences that may result from a false understanding o f reality. 
As Kearney concludes
‘by means o f  his distinction between a liberating imagination o f  aesthetic play 
and an incarcerating consciousness o f  se lf obsession, Sartre lays the foundation
332fo r  his ontological distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence’
As, with most debates, several contributors can be found, each adding significantly to a 
wider understanding of the concept, or at least offer their theses as an opportunity for 
lateral thinking. Maurice Merleau Ponty (1898-1961) can be counted among these. He 
expands on the duality of Husserl’s notion of phenomenology of object and subject, and 
maintains a dialectical model is appropriate. His comprehension o f the person as a 
holistic unit is exposed in Kearney’s interpretation o f this commitment, indicated as 
follows
‘phenomenology made possible the recognition that the body is not an object 
amongst objects, to be measured in purely scientific terms, but a mysterious and 
expressive mode o f belonging to the world, through our perception, gestures, 
sexuality and speech ' 333
Other contributors to the concept o f phenomenology include Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), 
and Jacques Derrida (1930-), as recorded by Kearney. Ricoeur emphasises ‘ the primacy 
o f  symbolising signification ’, while his main discourse concerns hermeneutics, ‘the art 
o f  deciphering indirect meaning,334. For Ricouer, hermeneutics can thus be raised to 
the level o f a universal philosophy. A philosophy which acknowledges that, when we 
use language we are already interpreting the world, not literally as if  it possessed a 
single transparent meaning, but figuratively in terms o f allegory, symbol, metaphor, 
myth and analogy.’335 Ricouer leads beyond Husserl, and believes that it is inadequate 
to describe meaning as it appears. He suggests, that there is more to it than meets the
*336 •eye, ‘we are also obliged to interpret itself as it conceals itse lf . Ricouer also 
acknowledges that Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich Nietsche, in other words 
dialectical materialism, psychoanalysis and existentialism, contribute greatly to the 
complexity o f meaning. Meaning for Ricouer is, fa r  from  being transparent to itself 
is in fa c t an enigmatic process which conceals at the same time as it reveals,337.
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Ricouer refers to this as the problem of false consciousness. Another indicator o f the 
perceived crisis in the interpretation of meaning that is prevalent in the contemporary 
world. This might be considered a further reminder that mystery is an integral part of 
the interpretation of phenomena.
Jacques Derrida draws attention to the importance of looking beyond the surface of 
things. The main area, he concentrates on, is the deconstruction o f language. He refutes 
the possibility of arriving at a definite meaning that can be contained, packaged and 
consigned to a particular destination.
‘ What deconstruction certainly does denounce is the attempt to reduce the
signifying process to a totalised system o f  absolute knowledge -  to a meaning
338that could be possessed once and fo r  a ll’
In fact, Derrida’s thesis may be looked at as a total rebuttal of the contemporary desire 
to come up with definite answers for everything. The latter phenomenon will be 
addressed in Baudrillard’s essay entitled Simulations later in the essay. Derrida puts 
forward the proposal that, meaning is illusive, and may perhaps always lie beyond 
reach. Derrida’s meticulous exploration into language under the heading, ‘Of 
Grammatology’ implies that a concept o f mystery exists, despite all attempts to locate 
meaning within the parameters o f empirical reality. As he points out
‘that meaning is always other than consciousness, extending infinitely beyond
339the se lf into the ever receding horizons o f  historical signification
It is a fair assumption that, while phenomenology is an additional attempt to unravel the 
mystery that surrounds human development, phenomenology cannot supply all the 
answers, but can only aspire to completion. Rather than dispel the concept of mystery it 
contributes to the fact o f its existence.
A different group, critical theorists, such as Walter Benjamin, (1892-1940) Georg 
Lukacs,(1885-1971) Antonio Gramsci,(l 891 -1937) Ernst Bloch, (1885-1977) Herbert 
Marcuse, (1898-1979) Jurgen Habermas, (1929-), are also considered protagonists in 
the social and cultural debate o f the twentieth century. Critical theory challenges
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empirical proof as the most positive means to address social culture. Some, like Georg 
Lukacs, urge a renewal of theory in order that there might be a renewal of practice. He 
is interested in, redirecting dialectical materialism, away from the positivism that is 
predominant in European thinking o f the twentieth century. As Herbert Marcuse 
remarks in his essay. One Dimensional Man. ‘ When technics becomes the universal 
form o f material production, it circumscribes an entire culture,34(
Lukacs sees one of the main problems to be that, o f the predominance of reification ‘ the 
practice o f  reducing men to the condition o f  ‘things 341 What is emerging here is the 
awareness among some of the foremost scholars that, reduction of everything to an 
objective status is limited, and narrow-minded. Such a reduction does not adequately 
reflect the human condition. This is an echo of the line drawn between the objective 
and the subjective, through the study of phenomenology. Kearney points to, Lukacs 
belief that, the ‘history o f  the human spirit could not be explained away in terms o f  
general methodology o f  neutral or ahistorical facts ’342
While the main thrust of Marxist theory, one of the more dominant ideologies of the 
twentieth century relates to the unification of human beings through a revolutionary 
process of material equality, certain Marxist theorists seek to adapt dialectical 
materialism to include a cultural production. One such writer is Antonio Gramsci. What 
he implies is, that the orthodox Marxist misses the point if, cultural production is not 
included in the grander development of mankind. His writing proposes that, economic 
advancement alone is insufficient to bring about the necessary changes that will ensure 
a more equitable system for all. His proposal, therefore, is for the adoption of a radical 
cultural critique.
Ernest Bloch (1885-1977), is another Marxist who suggests a different approach to 
dialectical materialism. In the same way as Husserl, in the case o f a theory o f 
phenomenology, Ernest Bloch, introduces the theological dimension to dialectical 
materialism. He does this, because he believes it to be a necessary ingredient in the well 
being of mankind, Lin order to keep open the futural horizon o f  transcendence as a sort 
o f spiritual leaven to the ongoing revolutionary struggle,343. Obviously Bloch considers 
the spiritual or transcendental to be o f supreme importance to the evolution of the 
individual, and, by inference, to society in general.
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Universality is countered by arguments put forward by Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979), 
and Jurgen Habermas (1929-. Marcuse in particular, as Kearney points out, is 
concerned about how the individual conscience can get swallowed up in a universal 
ideology. As Marcuse sees it
"the concreteness ofphilosophy in the existence o f  each individual person must 
ever be relegated to an abstract subject, to a ‘one ’ fo r  this would mean 
relegating decisive responsibility to some arbitrary universality '344
Marcuse, according to Kearney, seems intent on synthesising the Marxist dialectical 
theory and Heidegger’s phenomenology in order to produce a dialectical 
phenomenology. Marcuse, has great faith in the effectiveness o f art to fulfil this two 
dimensional role. Together with Ernest Bloch, his theory recalls the need for the 
transcendent dimension in life. ‘The Aesthetic Dimension’ by Marcuse, is an important 
defence that culture carries strong import on the welfare o f the human species. His 
contention is that a work of art may provide a solution to counteract the rationale of 
production
‘the inner logic o f  the work o f  art terminates in the emergences o f  another 
reason, another sensibility, which defy the rationality and sensibility 
incorporated in the dominant social institutions ’345
But Walter Benjamin (1892-1940), would seem to adopt a more material approach 
when he applauds the loss o f auratic tradition. He believes that the loss of aura and 
authenticity opens up the world o f art to a wider audience. In his essay ‘The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ Benjamin dismisses the need for mystery, 
he promotes the idea o f montage and pastiche, and particularly embraces the art o f film 
as the progressive means to an inclusive and positive reaction to a productive society. 
Such a position by Benjamin might be construed to support the idea o f a regressive 
postmodernism as proposed by Fredric Jameson, which is to accept the status quo, and 
to embrace the current codes and practices. However, Benjamin does make the point 
that even though the audience at the movies takes on the role o f critic he also adds ‘ the 
public is an examiner, but an absent minded one ’346
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Habermas also recommends that, critical theory take on the challenges posed by 
technological and materialist domination. Positivist thinking is one result o f a total 
reliance on materialism and scientific proof. From a phenomenological and critical 
theory standpoint, positivist thinking has the effect to dis-empower or suppress 
individual critical evaluation. Edward Said points to this phenomenon in his essay, 
‘Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community, when he remarks, that in the 
contemporary world everything must be viewed and assessed under a specific label, and 
what now exists is a neutralisation o f dissent347.
The other group, are those who question how advisable it may be to adopt a purely 
material approach to life in the twentieth century. As already mentioned they come 
under the general heading o f Structuralism. They include such writers as Ferdinand de 
Saussure,(1857-1913) Claude Levi Strauss (1908-, Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Louis 
Althusser (1917-1990), Roland Barthes (1915-1980). All o f  these contribute to an 
increasing number o f voices not happy to; accept the popular consensus that material 
progress is the only kind o f progress that matters in contemporary society. In other 
words, they appear to be concerned with balancing the scales between an empirical 
approach, which may be construed as universal and a more transcendental approach, 
which might be classed as individual.
As already remarked, structuralism has three concerns: phenomena ought not to be 
taken at face value; a structural method be used to decipher meaning, 
and, the focus o f the latter two concerns is linguistics. Different writers concentrate on 
various aspects o f this process. The main thrusts o f some arguments have implications 
for aesthetics, and in particular, to the history o f art. For instance, Ferdinand de 
Saussure, examines the structure o f myths, symbol and kinship codes in language. All 
of the latter play a significant role in visual art, because o f their relationship to the
348imaginative process. Claude Levi Strauss also looks at the construct o f myths . He 
submits that, they are structured in a manner to make intelligible those inner drives, 
which cannot be adequately expressed through the accepted codes of language. Levi 
Strauss also submits the thesis that the recurrence o f the use of myth is on the level of 
optimism, a refusal to accept the positivism that is prevalent currently. Comparison 
between traditional metaphysical understanding o f myth, as opposed to the economical 
character o f myth today, can be augmented by reading Baudrillard, under the heading
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Mythologies. Optimism, as proposed by Levi Strauss, can be deduced from the fact that 
a myth can have many different versions and not one definite one. Myth, for Levi 
Strauss, also affirms the complexity o f human intelligence and denies the wisdom of 
trying to direct it to a definite line of thought. Michel Foucault makes the point that; 
production is not the primary motivation that inspires progress. He is also concerned to 
examine how, the de-structuring o f language may have implications that lean towards 
the domination o f society, rather than purely to broaden knowledge.349 While Louis 
Althusser considers that what may be proved empirically implies more than a single 
signification, and Roland Barthes offers interpretations o f language based on his studies 
in semiology.350 All o f the foregoing point to the disadvantages of a purely empirical, 
rational, clinical, interpretation of language. The concerns, expressed by these writers, 
appear to imply what a more inclusive interpretation o f language may offer. While 
merit is attached to the methodological investigation, significant importance may attach 
to time for contemplation, in order to fully understand the implications that changes in 
social and moral conditions uncover.
In the latter half o f the twentieth century several other writers emerge who question the 
positivist influence o f production and materialism. They offer suggestions as to why a 
dogmatic theory might need examination. What is generally perceptible from 
contemporary aestheticians is an unease or discomfort with the direction being 
suggested as a desirable aim for artistic endeavour.
As already mentioned, this is a period referred to by art historians as the Post Modernist 
period. Jean Francois Lyotard (1924-1998) and Jean Baudrillard (1929-), could be 
considered exponents o f an antithetical approach to the contemporary aims being 
promoted by the arts 351 From their work one can detect a deep concern with what they 
consider the abuse o f scientific and technological advancement which is proving 
detrimental to the world o f art. Not only does Lyotard question what kind o f demand 
Postmodernism makes upon artistic experimentation, he also maintains there is a call for 
order, a desire for unity, for identity. In other words, he points to the need for a sense of 
direction; a sense o f direction which has been perceived by authority to have been 
derailed by both the Avant Garde and the Modernist movement. One Postmodernist 
reaction maintains that a coherent line o f direction is signified through embracing 
realism.352
103
In his essay, entitled ‘Note on the Meaning of the Word ‘Post’ and answering the 
question “What is Postmodemism”J ean Francois Lyotard, addresses an understanding 
of this term353. Lyotard specifies that an impetus to complexify, quantify, synthesise and 
modify the size of each and every object obfuscates rather than clarifies a fundamental 
search for progress.354 He highlights the dangers that attach to the elevation of 
objectivity over subjectivity, a position that echoes the viewpoint expressed by those 
who support phenomenology. By referring to Jean Baudrillard’s essay entitled 
Simulations, Lyotard’s view may be sustained. Baudrillard claims that human beings 
are perceived under the category o f object. As Kearney remarks
‘The positivist attitude o f  much modern science reduces the world to an isolated 
object, and consciousness to a disembodied sp irit’355.
People are faced with the complexity o f the techno-scientific, and, simultaneously faced 
with the problem of the survival of the human race. Simplicity is looked upon as 
barbaric in such a context. What must emerge, as a result is fear on a grand or sublime 
scale! Lyotard’s sublime has the element o f fear that is common to Burke’s and Kant’s 
notion of the sublime that has already been examined in the section on the 
Enlightenment, but the Post modem understanding of sublime does not have a 
transcendent resolution. A more detailed account of Lyotard’s sublime is set out in his 
essay ‘The Sublime and the Avant Garde’356
It is also Lyotard’s contention that it is difficult to recognise or identify what is real in 
our contemporary world. He elaborates that, what is presently being promoted is a 
realism constituted o f such attributes as nostalgia or mockery. This type o f realism is 
based on the ambitions o f a capitalist society. Effectively reality is destabilised, and 
what passes for reality is a counterfeit. The new realism bears little or no relationship to 
what is outlined by Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956) in his essay ‘Popularity and Realism’ as 
realism
‘ discovering the causal complexes o f  society, unmarking the prevailing view o f
things as the view o f  those in power ......... Emphasising the element o f
development, making possible the concrete, and making possible abstraction 
from  i t ’357
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For Lyotard points out, ‘reality is so destablized that it offers no occasion fo r  
experience but one fo r  ratings and experimentation,358 A direct result, which arises 
from a false notion o f reality, must be the question of how this relates to art and 
highlights a crisis in aesthetics.359 In the absence o f aesthetic criteria determining 
judgements are made by politics, the politics o f the market place. As Kearney notes, the 
preoccupations o f the age are 1 M an’s obsession with technical prediction, economic 
profit and political control’360. Such a statement affirms the preoccupation of 
objectivity over subjectivity that is prevalent in contemporary society. At this juncture it 
is important to clarify how Realism can be understood from a traditional point of view 
and from a Postmodernist perspective. In her book ‘Realism’ Linda Nochlin gives a 
definition o f realism as follows. Realism, she maintains,
lis concerned with giving a truthful, objective and impartial representation o f
>361the real world, based on meticulous observation o f  contemporary life ’
Pursuant on the technological revolution o f recent history, and the rise in material 
values where production is the key concept, it is easy to understand how such an idea 
that the real is that which can be proved scientifically gains ground. However such 
writers as Lyotard, Baudrillard and Edward Said, among others, recognise the dangers, 
to the well being o f the individual, which may arise as a result o f such a false concept. 
One such danger, expressed by Edward Said, in his essay entitled, Opponents,
Audiences, Constituencies and Community, is impassive criticism. He comments
'the cult o f  expertise and professionalism, fo r  example, has so restricted our
scope o f  vision that a positive (as opposed to an implicit or passive) doctrine o f
>3 f)2non-interference among fields has set in ’
A suggestion, already referred to by Walter Benjamin, when he remarks on the 
collective nature of the public as an absent-minded examiner.
While Lyotard is concerned with coming to terms with the meaning of Postmodernism, 
Jean Baudrillard elaborates on an understanding o f reality. He moves forward from 
Lyotard’s position of counterfeit, to the idea of simulation. This latter notion of
• 363simulation includes concepts of the series, the model, and cybernetics
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Baudrillard proposes interesting challenges, with regard to the proliferation of reliance 
on technological expertise, the overturning o f subjectivity in favour of objectivity, the 
obfuscation of reality and the rise in impassive criticism. He examines this question of 
signification and reality. His insight supports and reaffirms those already indicated by 
phenomenology, structuralism and critical theory. He goes even further to discover how 
a concept o f reality is currently perceived, and expresses grave doubts as to the wisdom 
of such a perception. He explains that traditionally a sign indicates the real and has 
obligations o f authenticity. In other words, the relationship to its referent is obvious.
But, in a contemporary context, the sign is arbitrary and, as such, has no definite 
obligation. The contemporary sign only simulates its relationship to a referent and so 
the contemporary sign is counterfeit and puts the status o f reality under suspicion.
Also examined by Baudrillard is the concept of the test, the rapid-fire question and 
answer syndrome. He maintains, that the context in which the test is set, is engineered 
and counterfeit. He looks at the consequences of this. Baudrillard’s essay, Simulations, 
exposes the theory that everything is controlled by the code.
"All material production now fa lls into the sphere o f  reproduction, in the sphere
o f  simulacra and the code that the global process o f  capital is founded364.
This is an interesting and incisive estimation o f the impact o f technological production, 
and dependence thereon, and what affect the fragmentation of sign referents has on 
contemporary aesthetics. Among the causes for this situation he cites the automaton, the 
robot, the series, the code and more recently the model as they constitute the 
components o f the value system that currently prevails. He then looks at the 
implications o f these technologies for the human race and for art. His observation is that
‘'All aura o f  sign, o f  significance itself is resolved in this determination; all is
resolved in the inscription and decodage,365
From Baudrillard, it is possible to adopt an understanding that the code overrides any 
spontaneous dialectical possibilities as he states, 'it is the discontinuous indeterminism 
o f the genetic code that now controls life’366 Everything is decided on the test, the 
model, question and answer. Such preoccupation, having to supply a rapid response to
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the barrage of questions that contemporary society poses to the individual, implies there 
is no room for contemplation. Lack o f contemplation in turn, displaces individuality.
As Baudrillard points out,
‘Montage and codification demand, in effect, that the receiver construe and 
decode by observing the same procedure whereby the work was assembled. The 
reading o f  the message is then only a perpetual examination o f the code,36y
One more construction that Baudrillard refers to is the Hyperreal. His description, taken 
from his essay, The Critique of Originality, is an indictment o f the contemporary 
understanding o f reality.
‘It becomes reality fo r  its own sake, the fetishism o f  the lost object: no longer the
object o f  representation, but the ecstasy o f  denial and o f  its own ritual
*368extermination: the hyperreal ’
Here it is implied that no traditional concept o f reality is tangible or currently 
accessible. The effect o f duplication o f the sign is, that it destroys its’ meaning, 
therefore the contradiction between real and imaginary is dimmed, ‘the very definition
*369o f the real becomes that o f  which it is possible to give an equivalent reproduction ’
The subsequent consequence for art and aesthetics is dismal, according to Baudrillard,
‘because reality itself, entirely impregnated by an aesthetic which is
>3 70inseparable fo r  its own structure, has been confused with its own image ’
According to Baudrillard, the implications of heightened technological advancement, in 
particular DNA is practically universal371. One cannot help comparing this position to 
that of Aristotle and John Locke’s ideas on universality. Baudrillard is quite pessimistic, 
and feels that dialectical evolution is no longer a possibility but ‘it is the discontinuous
*312indeterminism o f  the genetic code that now controls life '
Consequently, reality is broken down into simple elements that are reassembled into 
scenarios of regulated oppositions. Reality is tested, and the viewer must decode it by 
applying the same methods. Baudrillard maintains public opinion is hyperreal, its
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survival depends on montage, and test manipulation. He remarks that in this euphoric 
state o f fusion of information creativity suffers. The real collapses and we are left with 
the hyperreal.
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume from Baudrillard’s essay, that he perceives 
creativeness and aesthetics to be in crisis. This is an affirmation o f what has already 
been attested to by Lyotard Baudrillard goes further, he infers that preoccupation with 
technology, the test, rapid-fire question and answer syndrome deprives human beings of 
their power to discriminate, and lowers their status to either that o f the automaton 
(mechanical man) or robot. To strengthen his argument, he includes how with the 
advance o f genetic science each human being can now be considered under the code of 
DNA. The danger in depending too much on such scientific data is a construction that 
implies the path of the individual may be inevitable, and offers little opportunity for 
change. A consequence o f such an understanding must infer that there is little hope for 
creativity or spontaneous reaction to stimuli and no space for imagination. As Richard
} 373Kearney asks ‘Has the very notion o f  imagination become a contradiction in terms
Baudrillard is not the only philosopher who is concerned with the contemporary use or 
misuse o f sign or with the concept o f hyperreality. Umberto Eco (1932-), in his essay 
‘Travels in Hyperreal it v \  confirms how the application of new technology implicates 
the creative world o f the artists, and consequently the perceptions o f the viewer. Eco is 
extremely critical o f the value system that pervades society. In particular, he is critical 
of American values ‘a country obsessed with realism As he sees it the counterfeit, the 
fake and hyperreality are some of the consequences o f this obsessiveness. He makes the 
point that, the completely ‘real’ now consists of the completely ‘fake’, ‘Absolute reality 
is offered as real presence.,374 For Eco too, the contemporary function o f the sign is to 
become the object. The latter is in line with Baudrillard’s opinion. Basically, Eco 
maintains, that technology confuses the real and the fake, and the result is what is sign 
‘appears to seem reality ’ and ‘reality aspires to appear sign , i7’He warns that, in these 
circumstances, any referents for the sign can be replaced. In particular, Eco looks at the 
consequences for art and for aesthetic appreciation. He uses the example o f the copies in 
waxwork o f Leonardo’s Last Supper, and points to the fact that, in making any o f these 
copies, the concern is not with the formal execution, but only with the subject matter. 
One implication that can be drawn from this could be that it makes it difficult to argue
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with its authenticity as a reproduction. When Eco refers to Randolph Hearst’s 
recreation o f European grandeur, he stresses that every space is filled with some 
suggestion and, Eco is scathing in his derisive criticism of this ‘ baroque rhetoric, 
eclectic frenzy, and compulsive imitation ’ that prevails in a land ‘where wealth has no 
history To back up his argument even more, Eco uses the example o f theme parks
>376‘Disneyland tells us that technology can give us more reality than nature can ’ In 
Disneyland, any individual initiative is discouraged. As Eco sees it, parts of the theme 
park plan means no allowance is made for transitional spaces. He also makes the point 
that, in museums all is sign but aspires to seem reality, and, in the simulated version of 
reality, in such places as e.g. Marineland, another theme park, all is reality but aspires to 
appear sign.
A brief synopsis, of what could be considered a crisis in ‘reality’, can be outlined as 
follows. Already in the early twentieth century, Walter Benjamin points to the powers 
o f reproduction and how they obscure authenticity. He also makes reference to the use 
of montage, and the manipulation o f data, particularly with regard to photography and 
film. With the advance in technology further possibilities for obfuscation of reality are 
made available. The combined affect o f all such advances is to reduce reality to a 
counterfeit or hyperreal state. The result brings confusion as to what, if  anything might 
be considered real.
Despite the obvious tensions, the implications from the foregoing are that, certain 
writers and philosophers engage their dialectical skills to suggest alternative values, to 
combat a predominantly materialistic and technological society that prevails at this 
point in history. They are anxious to bring about a critical awareness o f what it is that 
undermines aesthetic values in today’s world; a society which, in their view, 
increasingly appears to be compelled to obscure the more esoteric aspects o f the human 
condition. The perceived need for such a dimension - a holistic development of the 
human being - and the evolutionary process that is involved therein - is suggested by 
several. Merleau Ponty, for instance states that,
‘The genesis o f  meaning is never completed. We can only contemplate truth in a
3 77symbolic context which situates our knowledge.
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Even considering the title ‘Metaphor and the Problem o f Hermeneutics’ by Paul 
Ricoeur alerts the reader to the concerns of contemporary philosophers, when 
considering the arts, particularly with regard to interpretation 378 He points to the fact 
that, hermeneutics shows that philosophy does not have all the answers,
‘there is no ‘first truth ’, no ‘absolute knowledge’ no transcendent vantage point 
o f lucid consciousness where the dispersal into multiple meaning could be 
definitively overcome in one fina l synthesis. ’379
Baudrillard’s writing suggests that, the role of aesthetics is to dissipate the myth that 
science and empirical testing can supply all the answers. What is vital in the 
contemporary context therefore, and the imperative of creative artists, is to produce an 
art that can imbue the viewers with a sense of wonder and awe, a sense of mystery. 
Baudrillard makes the significant observation that, despite the fact that signs now refer
‘only to the law o f  exchange and come under the commercial law o f  value’ there
>380still exists ‘a nostalgia fo r  a natural referent o f  the sign ’
Yet again, the particular angle taken by Merleau-Ponty on phenomenology, alerts us to 
the significance o f the aesthetic image, in the following assertion
'Each artwork articidates a particular style o f  expression which opens an 
horizon o f  interpretative possibilities fo r  reader or viewer. Put in another way,
the meaning o f  an artistic project is determined as much by the audience’s
t f381recreation as by the author s original creation ’ .
Despite the serious construction that may be the initial response to the title of Richard 
Kearney’s, The Wake o f the Imagination, he does hold that, in the realisation of a 
human being’s individual potential, salvation may be found through communication 
with fellow human beings. As he puts it,
‘in the everyday claim o f  the face to face relation that we discover the still small 
voice which bids us continue the search fo r  an ethical imagination -  even when 
it is pronounced dead.3n
110
Relating to a sense of mystery can thus affirm, within the individual, the uniqueness of 
themselves as created beings, and not simply as an objectified code. Kearney describes 
this as
"the inalienable right to be recognised as a particular person whose very
)  383otherness refuses to be reduced to a mimicry o f  sameness ’
In the foregoing, many eminent scholars draw a picture o f the contemporary cultural 
climate; a picture that implies meaning at several different levels.384 A brief summary 
may suggest two interpretations of the role of mystery in the Postmodernist period, 
namely the concept of mystery, as it refers to the empirical nature o f phenomena, and a 
loss of a concept of mystery, as it refers to the transcendental nature o f the individual.
In the former case, the concept of mystery as it refers to the empirical nature of 
phenomena; it might be felt that no satisfactory solutions can be concluded, despite all 
the delving into structure of both language and production, enabled by the consistent 
breakdown into separate fragments of the content of any given phenomenon. This 
methodology produces the cult of the expert that, might fit with one writer’s opinion of 
postmodernist society that, ‘replaces the cult o f originality with myriad variations on 
the theme o f  repetition385 Expert opinion is constantly being sought, and relied upon, 
and may be alleged to have universal power. Increasingly language is used to quantify, 
qualify, and sort into categories the conceivable permutations that go into the 
production of an object. Unfortunately, the individual is also examined by means of 
objective method. Reality and authenticity become relics, and are replaced by montage 
and pastiche386. Nothing is at it appears to be, which is one level at which a concept of 
mystery might be understood to exist, and this is a universal empirical level.
An alternative interpretation might be the loss o f an understanding of a concept of 
mystery as may be applied to the individual. A world, inhabited by experts, institutes a 
constant barrage of information, and images, and manipulates communication and 
meaning at an inordinate rate. One affect, that may result, is the individual imagination 
is anaesthetised. Any space, for the expression o f or contemplation of a concept o f 
mystery that expresses the transcendental, is pushed aside.
I l l
However, Julia Kristeva (1942-), noted contemporary philosopher and psychoanalyst, 
introduces a note o f optimism into what might appear to be a pessimistic future. She 
points out the importance of retaining a sense of the imaginary ‘the need fo r the
? 387imaginary, in fact, never ceases to make itself felt and is never exhausted’. One
solution to the current need to reinstate the imaginary and restore the transcendental 
imagination in its role as the purveyor of mystery may be found in a work o f art as
TOO
suggested by Edward Said .
The turmoil of the twentieth century, and the present cultural history, is affected by the 
counterfeit, the hyperreal, the series, and the code. How these conditions impact upon 
contemporary aesthetics is explored not only by Baudrillard, Paul Ricoeur, and Umberto 
Eco, but also by Edward Said in his essay ‘Opponents. Audiences. Constituencies and 
Community’ As Said sees the current situation
fa r  from taking in a great deal, the universal system as a universal type o f  
explanation either screens out everything it cannot directly absorb or it 
repetitively churns out the same sort o f  thing all the time ’
Said talks about the limitations imposed by fields o f expertise. One consequence may 
be the lack o f objectivity o f the expert regarding his own position in relation to society 
as a whole. It is encouraging, however, that despite the seeming inevitability of experts, 
Said concludes his essay on a more optimistic note that,
‘one must refuse to believe , however, that the comforts o f  specialized habits can 
be so seductive as to keep us all in our assigned places ,39°
But the fact that philosophers do not always arrive at satisfactory or logical destinations 
on their journey does not dampen the enthusiasm o f their successors; in fact it has the 
effect of encouraging a fresh start or renewed vigour to continue the search. This could 
be understood as, ambition to outshine ones predecessors, or perhaps, more a case o f a 
genuine desire for knowledge, and a holistic attempt to enhance the destiny o f the 
human condition.
112
A fresh approach, by a new generation, certainly takes into account the tradition out of 
which each study arises. This is evident in the fact that Moderism, adapted Kantian 
theory for its purpose, and if  the rationale o f this essay were to prove other associations 
and derivatives it would not be difficult to draw the strings o f correlation together. 
However, what is o f interest here, is the drive down new avenues with due regard for 
the foundations that have already been put in place by previous seekers of knowledge. 
This is the ongoing search for answers regarding the fundamental elements of creativity, 
through the medium of art, which will be o f most benefit to human beings in their quest 
for the meaning of life.
Several analogies come to mind that may clarify this striving or hunger for solutions to 
perennial questions, one that may adequately capture the picture is that o f the enchanted 
forest with its gnarled and twisted roots and divergent paths. Unquestionably, what can 
be deduced from the preceding pages is the importance o f the reaction o f contemporary 
aestheticians to previous canons; also the belief that the quest will continue, block upon 
block, refining and redefining in order to build a solid structure; such structure to form 
the basis upon which to uphold the claims of the importance o f the cultural implication 
that attaches to the creative arts.
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Conclusion:
The basis for this thesis was set in motion by a particular individual experience. Due to 
the nature of the phenomenon, it was decided, that the most likely source to offer an 
explanation of the wider implications, if  there was any, might be found through 
exploring the history o f aesthetics. A series o f insights begin to emerge.
At the outset it was necessary to get an understanding o f the historical role o f art in 
cultural development. What was found is that social conditions have always been the 
dominant influence on the content of a work of art. The same can be said for the 
present day.
There is no ambiguity in stating that the primary purpose o f art is its role as 
communicator. Traditionally, works o f art are committed to the communication o f a 
particular idea. By means o f the recorded changes in art practice, as shown in the 
attached images, the history of art is divided into several periods. From these periods, it 
can be seen that an interesting shift in emphasis, of what is being communicated, has 
taken place over time. The content o f earlier works of art was concerned with 
promoting an exemplary idea that had a basis in metaphysics, but from the Renaissance 
onwards, the focus o f works o f art takes on a more secular bias.
For example, in Ancient Greece the concept behind the work o f art takes the form of 
ideal beauty, the omnipotence o f a Christian God is the message in the Middle Ages, the 
genius of the artist in the Renaissance, the autonomy o f the individual spirit in the 
Enlightenment, the individuality of the artist in the Romantic period, the political 
imperative in the Modem period, but now with the ambivalence o f contemporary art it 
is almost made a virtue in itself to assess what the content is trying to communicate. 
What makes this ambiguity more complex is the prevalence of more material values in 
the evaluation o f contemporary postmodernist era.
Indications on how to proceed are revealed slowly and with an open mind. Having 
established the role o f art as communicator, the next imperative was to find out what 
constitutes an aesthetic experience. Just as the gradual realisation of the presence o f the
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Rothko paintings infiltrates the mind, so the connection between various elements that 
can be adduced in the contents of a work of art come to light in this search. To ascertain, 
if  particular criteria are necessary before a decision as to the specific nature of what 
occurs when confronted with a work of art, can be judged to come under a particular 
heading, is indicated.
Initially, the contents o f a work of art can be judged at two levels, the objective and the 
subjective. As far back as Plato and Aristotle there is evidence of the tension between 
such apparently obvious oppositions. What becomes clear, however, is that the 
relationship between what is objective and subjective is mirrored in the oppositions 
between the empirical and the transcendental, the universal and the individual, the 
reasonable and the sensual, the realistic and the imaginative. Some works o f art reflect 
the logical, reasonable, empirical proposals to understand and measure what is 
perceived to be reality. Plate 27. Other works o f art, at different periods in history, are 
more concerned with the imaginative, intuitive, emotive, sensual, metaphysical, 
interpretations of reality. Plate 28. Neither opposition, however, actually reflects the 
complete picture. The question must be if  a third dimension is needed, in an effort to 
explain what happens when confronted by a work of art. So, the journey assumes an 
added necessity, to find out if, and, of what, this third dimension may consist.
What was found was, that, ideally, there must be a dialectical possibility between the 
artist, and the work of art, that must, in turn, synthesise with the viewer, in order to 
create the climate for the aesthetic experience. In other words, a tripartite relationship is 
formed between the artist, the work of art and the spectator to validate a truly aesthetic 
experience. A synthesis such as this indicates the presence o f a ground from which to 
propose a new thesis. The importance o f the aesthetic experience is then guaranteed 
and so is the possibility o f a continuum.
From the examples looked at, it is evident that, there is no standard agreement on the 
criteria that can induce an aesthetic experience. All that can be stated is that at different 
times, subjective considerations are in the ascendancy and objectivity is relegated, and 
vice versa. Other contradictions also become clear, as more and more information is 
uncovered and the voices o f various writers are heard. Step by step, the recognition of 
the consistency of the tensions between, the rational and the sensuous, the
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epistemological and the ontological, the universal and the transcendental becomes clear. 
There is no conclusive evidence to support the primacy of one element over the other; 
rather, what can be deduced is a situation that makes allowances for the inclusion of 
both, to create another. It is impossible to provide definite answers to how this can be 
achieved successfully. What is implied is the importance o f the individual involvement, 
and engagement with the work of art. The individual must engage with the work o f art 
and take responsibility for making a judgement.
The task at hand takes on a more intimate and personal agenda, and encourages a 
tantalising desire to uncover more. There is no conclusive evidence to define how the 
constituent parts produce the complete aesthetic experience. However, even though the 
latter case is valid, detailed arguments to support the value of such an experience can be 
verified by history. The aesthetic experience can be linked to the exemplary idea. Kant, 
Hegel and Burke and many others attest to the interactive relationship, between the 
viewer and a work o f art. Visual art can transport the individual from the realm of 
reality into another reality, a transcendental space. Values that are central to the holistic 
development of the human being are brought to the attention of the viewer, through the 
medium of the aesthetic experience.
Several writers support the idea that this must benefit the individual, and elevate the 
consciousness o f society at large. Such a situation is reminiscent o f ritual, and, by 
inference, religious practice. What appears to happen then is that the work of art can act 
as a catalyst so that the viewer is reminded o f the importance of the exemplary idea and 
a value system, which is removed from a purely tangible material value. Consequently, 
the question that arises must centre on the validity o f the aesthetic experience, as it can 
be related to the cultural climate of today; in other words the relevance of the aesthetic 
experience in the contemporary world.
It is clear, from history that the exemplary idea is open to individual interpretation but, 
in earlier times, symbolic reference keeps the focus and interpretation o f works of art 
within certain parameters, one reason being that the content was based on natural 
phenomena. In other words, a consensus on symbolic meaning was possible. Today, 
however there is confusion because the symbol itself has no basis in any reality and 
symbol is a conglomerate of any number o f phenomena. Nature is being sidelined in
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favour of simulation. An added problem is that several experts can explicate the 
meaning of any given symbol. Universal opinions are handed down and take the form of 
dogma; the question and answer test syndrome is perceived to be the most reliable 
evaluation system. Any opinion that cannot fit such criteria would appear to have no 
value, or might be viewed with suspicion. One result appears to be that, the individual’s 
own integrity is relegated by expert opinions and therefore, the value o f individual 
integrity is placed at risk in the rush for globalisation.
If a universal value is applied to a work of art surely there is no compulsion upon the 
individual viewer to examine the content in any great depth. Therefore, the aesthetic 
experience may be deemed unnecessary, and the exemplary idea has little or no value. 
The value o f the work o f art is merely the commodity value, and, as such, is robbed o f a 
more esoteric possibility and, consequently, so is the individual. As James Elkins 
remarks ‘ We are on a strict diet o f  ironic detachment; we permit ourselves slim rations
jn  j
ofpleasure, but genuine transport is strictly forbidden ’
While the pendulum swings from the empirical to the transcendental, there is a space in 
between that offers more intriguing possibilities. It could be construed that the 
contemporary message being delivered by works of art is one of complete materialism 
on the one hand. It should be remembered however that throughout history there has 
been a core element of thought that has never completely forgotten or ruled out the 
transcendental tradition first attributed to the Classical period of ancient Greece. So, on 
the other hand, evidence to support the importance o f the aesthetic experience can still 
be recognised in the work of some thinkers and some artists.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the current situation that some element o f hope and 
redemption is always to be found. This is dependent on a number of factors. The 
imperative of the artist to instil within the work some essential element that is 
extraneous to the work itself. The illusiveness o f this element must, in turn, fascinate the 
viewer in such a manner that the desire to be led into this enchanted space defies logic. 
This brings the argument full circle, back to the aesthetic experience. An experience 
that cannot be quantified and qualified except in so much as it is construed to be 
impossible to contain within any logical explanation.
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The initial steps, along the path of the history of aesthetics, make it clear that there is no 
continuous conduit that leads from the Ancient Greeks until now. The history of 
aesthetics is like a maze that shows many different routes leading to various points at 
which the traveller must pause, and reassess what has been learnt along the way. What 
has been learnt is, that all through the history of philosophy and critical theory tensions 
exist between both empirical and transcendental solutions, between the epistemological 
and the ontological. Neither one, nor the other, can claim exclusive paths to the truth, 
or, put it another way, both can claim their way leads to the truth. However, a more 
balanced opinion incorporates both views and proposes a third. Even so, while theorists 
and critics put forward different arguments, the individual conscience is the final arbiter.
All the time this journey branches off down side-roads that offer a more interesting vista 
of the area being explored. The question o f individuality is one that insinuates itself 
into the equation. A work of art is an affirmation o f the individual, not alone as the 
individual per se but the individual as a member o f a community. A work of art is made 
for the community; otherwise it would have no function. A work can have many 
different agendas, it can be for enjoyment, as an anarchic political statement, or as a 
conscious reminder o f some important truth, but ideally, a synthesis o f the sensuous and 
the reasonable to produce an ephemeral third dimension, the aesthetic experience, is 
what makes a work of art.
Claims can be made for the role o f art in society. What was found is that the subject of 
art is commensurate with the changes that are contemporary to society. In this way art 
is still imitative but through more abstract means o f  representation. One could say that, 
art is the barometer of the social conditions that prevail at any given moment in history. 
This can manifest itself as a total rejection o f reality, as a symbolic reflection of reality, 
or as an attempt at a realistic re-presentation of reality. What is firmly established, as a 
result o f this research, is that art has many roles, teacher, social analyst, spiritual and 
moral guide, and symbol of material status. Therefore art can have an influence on the 
well being of the individual.
Art cannot be relegated to a cul de sac. Whether the message it conveys is derisory or 
cynical, or positive and affirming, it always commands a response. Because o f this, 
some feel that it is incumbent on the artist to adopt a very responsible attitude to the
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creation o f an image that will impact on the viewer as a capacity for good. While others 
maintain, that the artist and art should be autonomous. The balance to be struck is a 
question o f value, aesthetic value or material value. The question o f value challenges 
the viewer’s own set o f values. Through the whole journey, what dominates is the 
intrepid enquiry o f so many philosophers, theologians, critical theorists, and critics, into 
this enigmatic experience that is provoked by a work of art. This is what this journey 
has been all about, enigma, mystery, illusion, and ephemera. This journey itself takes on 
all the attributes o f mystery as it leads from one idea to another. Whether the aesthetic 
experience may mirror, or form a link to any other known life experience, gradually 
impinges upon the mind. In a Western Christian tradition such signposts can lead to 
only one possible link that is analogous with this experience, and that is, the religious or 
spiritual one.
To revert to the experience o f the Rothko paintings there is no absolute explanation for 
such an experience. It can be partially understood but is not completely understandable. 
What is established however is that this experience can be shared. It does have a 
communal aspcct to it.
Throughout the course o f this research references are made to the strong relationship 
between art and metaphysics. Religion is traditionally related to metaphysics. What is 
suggested by this research is the very authentic and important role that art plays in the 
overall holistic evolution of human beings. Considering a number o f facts that emerge, 
namely the advance o f secularisation and the relegation o f religion; allowing for the 
relationship between the exemplary idea and mystery; allowing that Mystery has many 
connotations but the most valid seems to be related to an out o f world experience, in 
other words a transcendent experience; a suggested path is to identify what other known 
experience may be linked to the aesthetic experience.
In Western Christian tradition an aesthetic experience is most easily linked to a notion 
of sacrament. A short explanation, o f the role of Sacrament in Christian tradition, shows 
that sacrament is linked to the most important events in the life o f any human being. 
Sacrament is a sign and symbol that arises out o f the experience o f our lives. The 
purpose o f Sacrament is to call to mind certain things but, Sacrament can only be 
effective so long as it is relevant to life. As Joseph Martos explains, ‘Sacraments are not
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for the unconscious, the asleep or the dead’. They are fo r  the awake and aware, the 
living and the growing'392. Birth, communion, initiation to adulthood, relationships, 
reconciliation, dedication and death are what form the basis of Christian sacraments. 
There can be no argument that such events are essential, they are individual yet impinge 
on the community, and so there is an obvious connection to the exemplary idea. Art is 
also a communicator through sign and symbol o f the exemplary idea. So the question 
that now must be asked is, can a work o f art fulfil the role o f sacrament in a 
contemporary society? A reasonable proposal suggests that art might fill the obvious 
void left by obsessive secularisation.
Finally, what is found is a degree of mystery is what impels human beings forward on a 
quest to try and understand the fundamental issues o f life. The aesthetic experience not 
only facilitates a concept of mystery, it embodies mystery. Art can have a very positive 
role in the overall well being of an individual. An individual is part o f a community, 
therefore, art can have a beneficial communal affect. So the experience in the presence 
of the Rothko paintings is once again recalled. In the words o f James Elkins
‘The glow o f  a Rothko painting might be a sign o f  God or even a sign from  God:
but it also could ju s t be a reminder o f  God
An experience that is inexplicable, wondrous, enigmatic, essential, haunting, magical, 
spiritual, and inspiring. The aesthetic experience is validated through this research.
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